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Abstract 
 
Controlling and scrutinising government expenditure is an important duty of the New 
Zealand Parliament. There is an on-going debate on the effectiveness of Parliament in 
undertaking this. The role, inherited from the British Parliament, has been developed upon 
and refined by the New Zealand Parliament. Parliament holds the government to account for 
its expenditure through a system consisting of the Finance and Expenditure Committee, other 
subject select committees, extensive Budget and Estimates documentation, and detailed 
appropriations. The Controller and Auditor-General, debate in the House, and thorough 
accounts and accounting are also a part of the process. The New Zealand Parliament can have 
more than adequate control of government expenditure, but is sometimes deficient at 
scrutinising its details. Recommendations to improve Parliament’s ability to control and 
scrutinise government expenditure must centre on Members of Parliament being willing, able 
and eager to undertake the role.  
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Introduction 
 
The finance of the country is ultimately associated with the liberties of the country. It is the 
powerful leverage by which English liberty has been gradually acquired…If the House of 
Commons by any possibility lose the power of the control of the grants of public money, depend 
upon it, your liberty will be worth very little in comparison.1 
William Ewart Gladstone 
 
The Thesis  
The New Zealand Parliament has the important role of controlling and scrutinising the 
government’s expenditure. The government in providing governance for society expends 
public money that has been earned by the people on their behalf for their benefit. It is 
fundamental to democracy that the government be held accountable for its expenditure. 
Parliament, an assembly of representatives, is the body charged with undertaking that task on 
the people’s behalf. It is important that Parliament performs the duty to a high standard given 
the inherent faith and trust afforded to it by the people. Parliament performs the role by 
controlling and scrutinising government expenditure. Chubb, in discussing the British House 
of Commons, effectively defines what is meant by parliamentary scrutiny and control: 
It is concerned, first, with questions of policy – what shall be the amount of taxation and 
expenditure and to what objects public money shall be applied. This policy aspect is the more 
spectacular, but to view the House only as ‘the grand forum of debate’, or as a legislative 
production live, is to miss the other important, though less exciting, aspects of its work. For it is 
concerned, second, to ensure that the policy which, though it is the government’s in origin, it 
endorses and makes its own, shall be carried out accurately, faithfully, and efficiently.2  
Therefore, the question is: how effectively does the New Zealand Parliament perform the role 
of controlling and scrutinising government expenditure? This thesis argues that they perform 
the role less than optimally. Specifically, it determines that Parliament has adequate control 
of government expenditure but is somewhat deficient at scrutinising it.  
 
Methodology 
This thesis utilises both primary and secondary sources to determine the effectiveness of 
Parliament at controlling and scrutinising government expenditure. Although secondary 
                                                          
1 Peter Einzig, The Control of the Purse: progress and decline of Parliament's financial control (London: 
Secker & Warburg, 1959), p. 3.  
2 Basil Chubb, The Control of Public Expenditure: Financial Committees of the House of Commons (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1952), p. 3.  
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sources particularly academic literature provide a solid foundation for this research it is 
primary material obtained through interviews that facilitate the answering of the research 
question. Interviews with key actors, especially Members of Parliament, offered the most 
potential to effectively analyse and critique Parliament’s performance.  
There were twelve subjects in total interviewed for this thesis including nine MPs. The 
composition of the MPs interviewed was as follows: four members of the major government 
party, one member of a government support party, three members of the major opposition 
party and one member of a minor opposition party. The MPs had varying levels of 
parliamentary experience with five having served as a Minister. There was an emphasis on 
interviewing MPs who were, or had been on, the Finance and Expenditure Committee. 
Emphasis was placed on interviewing these MPs due to their greater awareness of the 
function having served at the centre of Parliament’s undertaking of it. Two staff members of 
the Office of the Auditor-General were interviewed. One staff member of the Office of the 
Clerk was interviewed but was not at liberty to provide opinion and could only provide 
information. In addition, one public servant from the Treasury provided information at an 
informal meeting. Further information was subsequently provided by another public servant 
from the Treasury through e-mail.  
All interviews were confidential, information and opinions obtained are not attributed 
to their source. Confidentiality was provided to participants to ensure that they were open, 
frank and upfront. However, where it is beneficial the distinction is made between 
government and opposition MPs and if a member is notably senior in experience. The 
interview period began in October 2012 and went through to the end of January 2013. All 
interviews with MPs were undertaken at Parliament Buildings in Wellington. Staff from the 
Office of the Auditor-General and Office of the Clerk were interviewed at facilities at their 
respective offices in Wellington. The informal meeting with the public servant from the 
Treasury was at a café on the Terrace.  
 
Thesis Outline 
The first chapter is a literature review that examines the existing research in the field. The 
literature review is in two sections. The first section identifies the roles of the New Zealand 
Parliament including that of controlling and scrutinising government expenditure. The review 
ascertains that there is an on-going debate on the effectiveness of Parliament at performing 
the function. As such the thesis is placed into the existing literature on New Zealand’s 
Parliament and its performance of its duties. The second section summarises further literature 
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on Parliament’s undertaking of the function. These texts examine the function specifically or 
address particular aspects of it. The chapter determines that: the New Zealand Parliament is 
recognised as having the role of controlling and scrutinising government expenditure, that 
there is an on-going debate as how effective Parliament is at undertaking the role and that its 
current performance requires re-evaluation.   
The history of Parliament’s control and scrutiny of government expenditure function in 
both Britain and New Zealand is discussed in the second chapter. The first section describes 
the origins of the role in Britain. It states how the House of Commons came to hold 
responsibility for controlling government expenditure and the system comprised of key 
features, the circle of control, which it subsequently developed to enable it to adequately do 
so. The second section examines how the New Zealand Parliament took the role as well as 
practice and procedure inherited from Britain and subsequently developed and refined it. The 
chapter raises a number of issues and trends for consideration when Parliament’s current 
performance is evaluated. The history of the function further emphasises its importance to 
Parliament.  
Chapter three describes Parliament’s current practice and procedure for controlling and 
scrutinising government expenditure. The first section of the chapter describes the central 
provisions that allow Parliament to control and scrutinise government expenditure, 
principally that the Crown requires parliamentary consent in order to spend public money.  
The chapter subsequently describes the six core components of Parliament’s practice and 
procedure that it currently utilises to perform the function: the appropriations system, Budget 
and Estimates documentation, financial statements and accounting, the parliamentary process 
comprising the supply and financial review processes, the Controller and Auditor-General, 
and the Finance and Expenditure Committee.   
The next chapter assesses Parliament’s effectiveness at performing the function. The 
evaluation chapter starts with MPs identifying and defining their understanding of 
Parliament’s role of controlling and scrutinising government expenditure and their overall 
assessment of Parliament’s performance. MPs also comment on what they believe should 
happen if supply were not granted by Parliament and what affect, if any, the move to the 
MMP electoral system has had on Parliament’s performance of the function. The chapter 
subsequently evaluates the various components of Parliament’s practice and procedure 
detailed in the previous chapter utilising the material acquired through the interviews and 
further literature. As such the chapter determines how effective Parliament is at controlling 
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and scrutinising government expenditure and identifies where the strengths and weaknesses 
are in its performance of the function.  
The final chapter concludes the thesis with a series of recommendations that have the 
potential and Parliament should consider implementing in order to improve its control and 
scrutiny of government expenditure. The chapter considers a range of proposed reforms 
sourced from the existing literature, the previous history and evaluation chapters, and from 
the interviewees.   
 5 
 
Chapter One: Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
Parliamentary control and scrutiny of government expenditure has been written about 
extensively. As a result this literature review is not exhaustive of all texts in the field. Instead 
it seeks to give a broad overview of what has been written. The first section of this chapter 
places the topic of parliamentary control of government expenditure into the broader 
literature on Parliament, specifically that which discusses the role and functions of 
Parliament. It establishes that an important function of Parliament is the control and scrutiny 
of government expenditure, and the extent to which the New Zealand Parliament fulfils the 
function has been debated over many decades. It is important to note that the prominent 
academics discussed in the first section wrote over fifty years apart. Some key aspects have 
changed, and will be described in the next chapter. In order to preserve the purity of the 
academics’ arguments, subsequent changes to Parliament’s procedures have been left aside. 
The second section of this review examines texts that focus more exclusively on Parliament’s 
control and scrutiny of government expenditure, and texts that only cover particular aspects. 
The second section shows that there are gaps in the literature and gives further evidence that 
there is a debate as to how well Parliament performs its control and scrutiny function. In 
summary, this literature review will show that an important function of Parliament is the 
control and scrutiny of government expenditure; that there is a debate as to how well 
Parliament performs the function; and that there are gaps in the literature, which I shall aim to 
fill.  
 
Historical Debate 
McGee describes the theoretical roles and functions of Parliament. Despite identifying that a 
function of Parliament is the control and scrutiny of government expenditure McGee does not 
make a judgment as to how effective Parliament is in the role. However, he does go so far as 
to say that the ‘control of public finance has historically been at the heart of Parliament’s 
constitutional pre-eminence’.3 McGee provides the most recent extensive description of the 
institutions and processes that Parliament has available to exert control over government 
expenditure.4  
                                                          
3 David McGee, Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand, Third Edition, (Wellington: Dunmore Publishing, 
2005), p. 443.  
4 ibid, pp. 443-516. 
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McGee makes two important points about the roles and functions of Parliament. Firstly, 
McGee makes a distinction between Parliament and the House of Representatives.5 The New 
Zealand Parliament contains the House of Representatives and the Sovereign of Right in New 
Zealand. In other words, the House of Representatives is the elected component of 
Parliament.6 However, the House of Representatives is more commonly known as 
Parliament, not just as a component of Parliament. Secondly, McGee identifies that the role 
of the House is not defined anywhere. In fact the functions of the House have largely been 
determined by its own members. Furthermore, the House does not have an exclusive hold on 
its functions.7  
McGee, in differentiating between Parliament and the House, establishes that the two 
have different sets of functions. McGee states that Parliament only has one function, to make 
laws.8 The House, on the other hand, has four major functions: to serve as a legislature, to 
provide a government, to scrutinise and control the government and to represent government 
and the people.9 McGee in discussing the scrutiny and control of government function of the 
House explains that the government requires the continued support of the House for it to stay 
in office.10 The government in exchange for continued support from the House must be 
answerable for the management of the state. McGee argues that one of the main ways that the 
House performs the scrutiny and control function is through the annual process of granting 
supply to the government.11 Therefore, McGee identifies that control and scrutiny of 
government is a primary function of Parliament and that the main method that it uses to 
achieve this is through the approving of government expenditure.  
Palmer and Palmer also identify that a main function of Parliament is the control and 
scrutiny of government expenditure. Palmer and Palmer provide a concise overview of the 
procedures and institutions that Parliament has to help it carry out its control of government 
expenditure function.12 They do not comment on how effective Parliament is in this role. 
However, Palmer in an earlier text commented that the processes of Parliament have 
historically been insufficient, but believed that there were signs that this was changing.13 
                                                          
5 ibid, pp. 1-2.  
6 ibid, p. 1.  
7 ibid, p. 2.  
8 ibid.  
9 ibid, pp.2-5.  
10 ibid, p. 4.  
11 ibid.  
12 Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer, Bridled Power: New Zealand's Constitution and Government, Fourth 
Edition, (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 118-135.  
13 Geoffrey Palmer, New Zealand's Constitution in Crisis (Dunedin: John McIndoe, 1992), pp. 125- 126.  
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Palmer and Palmer establish that Parliament is pre-eminent and as a result should be 
capable of controlling the executive. Palmer and Palmer argue that ‘one of the primary 
constitutional doctrines of the Westminster system of Parliament is parliamentary sovereignty 
or parliamentary supremacy’.14 From there Palmer and Palmer link parliamentary supremacy 
with Parliament’s control of the executive which they argue is a distinguishing feature of 
parliamentary government.15 Palmer and Palmer, with assistance from Rush, explain that 
parliamentary government is when the membership of the executive comes from the 
legislature and the executive is answerable to the legislature.16 As a result of these various 
aspects of the Westminster system of parliamentary government Parliament ‘has the ability to 
curb the executive’.17 Palmer and Palmer have identified that Parliament should have the 
ability, in theory at least, to control the executive. 
Palmer and Palmer identify that a function of Parliament is to control and scrutinise 
government expenditure. They list Parliament as having five functions: 
 ‘Raise the money by which the business of government may be conducted 
and to approve the expenditure of money 
 Consider and pass bills into law 
 Provide a place for the airing of grievances 
 As a check on the manner in which government is actually carried out 
 Serve as a forum for party political contest’.18 
The first function of Parliament identified by Palmer and Palmer is akin to that of controlling 
and scrutinising government expenditure. This is particularly the case when it is combined 
with the fourth function of acting as a check on government. Added to this, Palmer and 
Palmer believe that ‘the power of Parliament over finance is a key element in our system of 
government’.19 Palmer and Palmer, therefore, identify that control and scrutiny of 
government expenditure is a primary function of the New Zealand Parliament, they just do 
not judge how effective Parliament is at performing that function.  
Jackson takes an alternative approach to the other academics in describing the roles of 
Parliament. He describes what the roles are in theory before describing what functions 
                                                          
14 Palmer and Palmer, Bridled Power, p. 156.  
15 ibid, p. 157.  
16 ibid. 
17 ibid, p. 158.  
18 ibid.  
19 ibid, p. 118.  
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Parliament actually performs. Jackson broadly describes the theoretical roles of Parliament as 
being: 
On the credit side, Parliament may be expected to serve as an information source, a sounding 
board and safety valve for grievances, while at the same time bestowing an air of authority or 
legitimacy upon government actions. On the debt side, Parliament means that a government has to 
give reasons for its actions, debate them and even modify them. In short it must be accountable.20 
The above description from Jackson is very general when compared to the list approach used 
by the other academics. In actuality, Jackson does go into greater detail about what the 
functions of Parliament are and dismisses the general consensus created by other 
academics.21 Unfortunately, Jackson primarily chooses to examine British literature. 
Although helpful it was not entirely necessary due to the growing amount of New Zealand 
literature that was available even then.   
Jackson, through criticising the roles and functions of Parliament, set out by others, 
establishes that in theory Parliament controls government finance when in reality he believes 
it does not. In general, Jackson believes that the New Zealand Parliament has lost most, if not 
all, of its control functions and has instead become more of a support institution.22 Jackson 
leaves Parliament with only one unquestionable function, that of legitimation.23 Jackson 
states that ‘control by an elected body over revenue and expenditure is a myth’.24 However, 
Jackson later softens his view saying:  
Overall in the narrow sense of financial accountability, regulatory and propriety in the use of 
public funds, New Zealand is adequately served by the existing control mechanisms. If, however, 
one looks at such concepts as value for money or control of the scale of public expenditure and the 
priorities within it, the same conditions can hardly apply.25 
In other words, Jackson is arguing that the control of government expenditure is adequate but 
the scrutiny of that expenditure is inadequate.  
Scott is the most straight forward academic when it comes to both describing the roles 
and functions of Parliament, and offering his opinion on the effectiveness of Parliament’s 
control and scrutiny of government expenditure. Scott argues that the functions of Parliament 
are: ‘legislation (including control of finance); provision of a government; debate; ventilation 
of grievances; and selection of national leaders’.26 From a political standpoint the first two 
                                                          
20 Keith Jackson, The Dilemma of Parliament (Wellington: Allen and Unwin, 1987), p. 27.  
21 ibid, pp. 37-39.  
22 ibid, p. 39.  
23 ibid, p. 42.  
24 ibid, p. 37.  
25 ibid, p. 160.  
26 K.J. Scott, The New Zealand Constitution (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 39.  
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functions are only seen as functions in a nominal sense.27 The legislation function is seen just 
to be giving effect to the government’s proposals, and government changes are linked to the 
electorate at a general election. Constitutionally, however, Scott believes that the first two 
functions are the most important, notably including control of government finance.28  
Scott discusses further the control of finance function of Parliament. Scott believes that 
Parliament only has control of finance in theory and that real control over financial matters is 
exercised by the executive.29 Scott’s argument has two parts. The first is that the House may 
only consider expenditure proposals from the executive.30 Secondly, the House rarely seeks to 
modify any of the expenditure proposals brought before it.31 In summary, Scott identifies that 
it is a role of Parliament to control government finance but in reality it does not perform that 
function; control is really with the executive.  
Lipson’s approach is to identify what the historical functions of Parliament have been. 
Lipson states that:  
At one time or another in their history Parliaments have been called upon to perform functions as 
vital as the petitioning for remedy of grievances, the authorization of taxation and expenditure, the 
enactment of laws, the control of executive departments, and the interpretation of public opinion.32 
Lipson has identified that Parliament is charged with authorising expenditure. Lipson does not 
go so far as to say that a function of Parliament is to control and scrutinise government 
expenditure. However, if the authorising function is combined with that of controlling 
government departments it is possible to see that such a function is within Lipson’s role 
description.  
Lipson believes that the ability of Parliament to perform the authorising function has 
declined. In discussing the ability of Parliament to control government finance Lipson argues 
that ‘Parliament has little say in determining financial policy in the preparatory stages. It has 
virtually lost control of the public purse’.33 Added to this, Lipson states: 
Control over finance is a co-operative venture jointly managed by the Treasury, the spending 
departments, the Cabinet, the House of Representatives, and the Controller and Auditor-General. 
Of all these authorities, the House, though formally supreme, is in actual practice a minor 
partner.34  
                                                          
27 ibid.  
28 ibid.  
29 ibid, p. 56.  
30 ibid, p. 57.  
31 ibid.  
32 Leslie Lipson, The Politics of Equality: New Zealand's Adventures in Equality (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1948), p. 314. 
33 ibid, p. 327.  
34 ibid, p. 322.  
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It is argued that Parliament’s ability to perform its functions has declined because it lacks 
adequate machinery.35 Lipson states as much:  
to realise that Parliament’s various functions are no longer equally suited to its machinery, and that 
the relative need of legislative participation in these diverse functions has altered, is the key to an 
understanding of the problem.36   
Lipson here is arguing that Parliament’s institution and processes do not allow Parliament to 
adequately perform its functions. As stated earlier, much has changed with Parliament’s 
procedures and as a result this may no longer be the case.  
 
Further Literature  
To build a complete picture of the existing literature it is necessary to discuss the texts that 
have examined more specifically the parliamentary function of controlling and scrutinising 
government expenditure and those that have covered particular aspects of it. This section will 
start by addressing the considerable body of literature from the 1950s through to the 1970s 
when the subject matter was of great interest particularly due to the new Public Expenditure 
Committee (PEC) and the growing level of government expenditure. The following section 
also examines the body of literature related to the Public Finance Act 1989 (PFA 1989) and 
the Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 (FRA) that fails to adequately address the impact these 
have had on Parliament. Finally, there will be an examination of the most recent texts 
including those dealing with MMP and the Finance and Expenditure Committee (FEC). 
Analysing these texts will reinforce the need identified in the previous section to re-examine 
how effectively Parliament controls and scrutinises government expenditure and will also 
determine the approach and focus of this thesis going forward.  
 
1950s to 1980s Examinations of Parliamentary Control and Scrutiny  
Extensive literature has been produced on the New Zealand Parliament’s control and scrutiny 
of government expenditure from the 1950s. Both Lipson and Polaschek discussed the 
function in their works examining politics and public administration in New Zealand.37 They 
did not discuss the function in as much detail as Beck, Downey, Hayes and Wood who 
focused more specifically on the subject.38 Their thesis examined the control of government 
                                                          
35 ibid, p. 315.  
36 ibid.  
37 ibid, pp. 322-327; R.J. Polaschek, Government Administration in New Zealand (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1958), pp. 240-257.  
38 A.J. Beck, L.J. Downey, K. Hayes, and G.E. Wood, The Control of Government Expenditure in New Zealand 
(School of Public Administration, Victoria University of Wellington, 1962). 
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expenditure by the government itself and by Parliament. However, the authors note that their 
thesis focuses only on particular areas.39 A slightly later text by Egan, Wakelin and Yuill 
would be more thorough in its examination.  
The thesis produced by Egan, Wakelin and Yuill delivers a very comprehensive 
assessment of the New Zealand Parliament and the control of government expenditure.40 The 
status of their work is such that it is referred to frequently in later texts including by the 
Treasury.41 The approach taken by Egan, Wakelin and Yuill is very effective and has had a 
considerable influence on the structure of this thesis. The text concisely summarises the 
history of parliamentary control of government expenditure and the procedure and practice 
used by Parliament at that point in time. Egan, Wakelin and Yuill thoroughly assess the 
procedure and practice that they have described, and from that they produce a number of 
recommendations for improvements. Through their comprehensive examination they come to 
the conclusion that parliamentary control of government expenditure is ‘imperfect’.42 Later 
texts focused on particular aspects of parliamentary control and scrutiny of government 
expenditure but those that did address the function more broadly were not as comprehensive.   
Following Egan, Wakelin and Yuill, further literature was produced that addressed 
Parliament’s control and scrutiny of government expenditure. Shand considers the extent that 
Parliament controls government expenditure and makes recommendations as to how it could 
be improved.43 Shand, though, is little more than a summary of the work of Egan, Wakelin 
and Yuill with a greater emphasis placed on potential improvements. McRobie writing in the 
late 1970s made a fresh examination of the topic and was particularly scathing of 
parliamentary control.44 McRobie does not get tied down in describing practice and 
procedure instead focusing on determining how effective it is and how effectively it is used. 
In addition, McRobie, von Tunzelmann and Aitken produced texts examining the PEC, while 
Leo examines the Auditor-General as well.45 These texts vary in focus and approach. For 
                                                          
39 ibid, p. 1.  
40 J.P. Egan, H.J. Wakelin, and J. Yuill, Parliamentary Control of Public Expenditure in New Zealand (Diploma 
of Public Administration, Victoria University of Wellington, 1968). 
41 The Treasury, The Planning and Control of Government Expenditures: Planning, Programming and 
Budgeting System (Wellington: Government Printer, 1973), p. 8.    
42 Egan, Wakelin and Yuill, Parliamentary Control, p. 80.  
43 D.A. Shand, 'Parliamentary Control of the Public Purse- How Real', Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 
34, No.2 (March 1972), pp. 59-73.  
44 Alan McRobie, 'Parliamentary 'Control' of Public Expenditure', in Stephen Levine (ed.), Politics in New 
Zealand: A Reader (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), pp. 115-130.  
45 Alan McRobie, 'The New Zealand Public Expenditure Committee', Political Science, Vol. 26, No. 1 (1974), 
pp. 28-46; Adrienne von Tunzelmann, The Public Expenditure Committee: The Process of Change 1962-1977 
(M.P.P, Victoria University of Wellington, 1977); Judith Aitken, Public Expenditure Planning in New Zealand 
(Ph.D., Victoria University of Wellington, 1983), pp. 597-689; Ann Puat Leo, The Role of the Public 
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example von Tunzelmann uses a chronological approach to track changes made to the 
committee and their impact. Therefore, the literature on Parliament’s control and scrutiny of 
government expenditure is quite rich through to the 1980s. There has since been a 
considerable decline with subsequent texts mostly concentrating on certain elements of 
parliamentary control and scrutiny.  
 
Finance and Expenditure Committee  
Thorough comparative research has been undertaken into Public Accounts Committees 
(PACs), including New Zealand’s FEC, the literature does not examine the effectiveness of 
the latter committee. Comprehensive studies have been undertaken to determine key features 
and to establish what makes for an effective PAC.46 McGee considers PACs extensively in 
his work while also examining broader issues relating to Parliaments and the Budget 
process.47 These studies do not specifically address New Zealand’s FEC. KPMG carried out a 
comparative study of PACs in Australasia including the FEC and the committees at the 
state/territory level.48 The comparative approach is used to identify ‘the range of structures, 
responsibilities and working practices’ across the various PACs.49 The study serves as an 
excellent source of information about the committees but they do not attempt to judge the 
effectiveness of their work. Jacobs, Jones and Smith who reported on the findings of the 
survey suggest this should be a future line of research.50 Therefore, it would be appropriate to 
consider the effectiveness of the FEC with the guidance of the criteria offered by the existing 
literature.  
 
Legislation Changes  
The introduction of the PFA 1989 and the FRA had a considerable impact on Parliament’s 
control and scrutiny of government expenditure with a body of literature reflecting this. Ball 
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(Washington DC: World Bank Institute, 2007), pp. 379-393. 
47 David McGee, The Budget Process: A Parliamentary Imperative (London: Pluto Press, 2007).  
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(Canberra: KPMG, 2006). 
49 ibid, p. 2.  
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Australasian Parliamentary Review, Vol. 22, No. 1 (autumn 2007), p. 43. 
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explains the changes to accounting and accountability that resulted from the PFA 1989 and, 
in particular, how they would impact upon the Controller and Auditor-General.51 However, 
Ball does not consider more broadly how the changes will affect parliamentary control. Pallot 
has also examined the impact of the PFA 1989 in her work. Pallot when examining the 
changes discusses more broadly the impact of the PFA 1989 on Parliament,52 including a 
piece that examines the Auditor-General.53 The FRA has been discussed extensively in the 
literature by the likes of Scott, Wilkinson and Janssen.54 The effect the legislation has had on 
Parliament was not considered by these authors. Pallot and Newberry have considered the 
impact of the PFA 1989 on Parliament as well as the potential impact of the Public Finance 
Amendment Bill 2004.55 They also examined further issues relating to Parliament and 
government including expenditure, to a limited extent, and were of the opinion that 
‘Parliament’s ability to scrutinise and control Crown financial activities has been severely 
eroded, and requires reinstating’.56 Consequently, the impact that the FRA has had on 
Parliament should be examined, and the effect of the PFA 1989 should be re-examined due 
principally to the passage of time and further proposed changes.   
 
Impact of MMP  
New Zealand’s adoption of the MMP electoral system created a small burst of literature that 
focused on issues around Parliament and government expenditure. James, writing at the time 
of MMP’s introduction, explains how there were both concerns and optimism about the effect 
that MMP would have on the Budget. In particular there were concerns from participants at a 
forum discussing the potential impact of MMP about what impact the new electoral system 
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53 June Pallot, 'A Wider Accountability? The Audit Office and New Zealand's Bureaucratic Revolution', in 
Susan Newberry (ed.), the Legacy of June Pallot, pp. 261-289.   
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http://www.treasury.govt.nz/downloads/pdfs/tfr-rl-1nov09.pdf (18 July 2012); John Janssen, ‘New Zealand's 
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would have on the granting of supply, if any changes would be made to the Budget process, 
and the effect of the new financial veto procedure.57 Dale also examined the impact that 
MMP could have on the Budget process. Dale, combined with commentary from Pallot, 
identify a number of issues related to MMP as well as others including the specification of 
appropriations and the controller function.58 Power produced a more extensive work on the 
financial veto but was only in a position to make predictions about its potential impact.59 
Boston and Church examine the effect that the adoption of MMP has had on the Budget 
process.60 They argue that the role of Parliament in relation to the Budget has changed little 
with the move to MMP. However, their analysis is limited to the first few years of MMP and 
they do not effectively address how procedure and practice, as well as political culture, have 
been affected. The impact of MMP must be examined more closely.  
 
Conclusion 
The literature on New Zealand Parliament’s control and scrutiny of government expenditure 
shows that there is an on-going debate as to how effective Parliament is at carrying out this 
function. Across the broader literature that examines the New Zealand Parliament and its 
functions it is widely accepted that one of Parliament’s roles is to control and scrutinise 
government expenditure. However, those that make a judgement on how well Parliament 
performs this function are not in agreement. The most authoritative assessment from Jackson 
is that Parliament has adequate control of government expenditure but does not carry out 
effective scrutiny. However, this assessment is 25 years old and as is shown in the following 
chapter there have been considerable changes made since then. So, this thesis will determine 
how effectively the New Zealand Parliament currently controls and scrutinises government 
expenditure.  
Examination of the literature that addresses the function more specifically, or an aspect 
of it, reinforces the need to determine how effectively Parliament carries out the function and 
shows that there are a number of holes in the evidence that should be addressed. Egan, 
Wakelin and Yuill carried out the most effective examination amongst a large body of 
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literature from the 1950s through to the 1980s. The literature since then has focused on 
addressing particular aspects of parliamentary control, or in discussing related issues, has not 
addressed the impact it has had on Parliament. Specifically the effect of the changing 
legislative framework has not been adequately discussed. Nor has the impact of the move to 
MMP been adequately addressed. Analysis of the FEC has not determined how well it carries 
out its work. In summary, this literature review has determined that there is a need to re-assess 
the New Zealand Parliament’s control and scrutiny of government expenditure.  
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Chapter Two: History of Parliamentary Control and Scrutiny of 
Government Expenditure 
 
Introduction 
To understand the New Zealand Parliament’s function of controlling and scrutinising 
government expenditure today it is necessary to know its origins. New Zealand inherited 
from Britain the control and scrutiny of government expenditure function when it got its own 
Parliament in the 1850s. The system that New Zealand inherited had developed in Britain 
over many centuries. Palmer and Palmer state that: 
Money has always been a core concern of the Westminster constitution. A large part of the 
historical development of constitutional relations between the English Crown and Parliament can 
be seen as a struggle over who has the power to tax and spend.61 
It is significant that New Zealand inherited a system of governance where the government has 
the right to propose expenditure while Parliament has the right to approve it.62 The system 
that only the government could propose expenditure formally dates back to the Standing 
Orders of the House of Commons of 1713, but in reality, it goes back to the very beginning of 
the English Parliament.63 As shown in this chapter, New Zealand continued to operate this 
system with slight modification.  
The system of control and scrutiny of government expenditure that New Zealand 
inherited from Britain was advanced for its time. Egan, Wakelin and Yuill set out that the 
New Zealand Parliament inherited a number of features from the British Parliament that 
enabled and aided the control and scrutiny of government expenditure.64 They provide five 
clear key features: detailed appropriation, the keeping of adequate accounts, a consolidated 
fund, a Comptroller and Auditor-General and a Public Accounts Committee (PAC). Britain 
had all of these features in place by the 1860s completing the ‘circle of control’ that allowed 
the House of Commons to control and scrutinise government expenditure.65 The following 
section summarises the British development of these features.  
It should be noted that New Zealand also inherited the House of Commons procedure 
for dealing with financial business. In particular New Zealand inherited the Committees of 
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the Whole House, specifically the Committees of Supply and Ways and Means.66 Britain 
used Committees of the Whole House because they wished to remove the influence of the 
king in the form of the Speaker while they dealt with financial matters.67 The Committee of 
Supply allowed for the hearing of grievances before the Crown was granted supply.68 By the 
time the New Zealand Parliament was established Britain had a recognisable budgeting 
process. The process was annual by the 1860s.69 Britain had begun budgeting in the last 
quarter of the 18th century but key components of the process were not in place until 1866.70 
The term Budget originates from the leather pouch that the king used to carry his money.71 
New Zealand has subsequently developed and modified these inherited features. Before the 
development of the five key features is detailed it must be set out how the British Parliament 
came to control expenditure through its right to consent to taxation.  
 
British History  
 
Consent to Taxation  
The Magna Carta, first signed in 1215, established the principle that there could be ‘no 
taxation without consent’. The Magna Carta set out that taxation could only be levied if it 
were approved by the ‘common counsel’.72 The monarch was required to give forty days’ 
notice that he was calling the Common Counsel if he wished to levy taxes.73 There was 
initially resistance to the Magna Carta from the Crown and no taxation without consent was 
even omitted from some later versions. However, difficulties in collecting taxes later in the 
century made the Crown realise that common consent was now a necessity.74 Edward I in 
1295 acknowledged that taxes needed common consent saying that ‘what touches all must be 
approved by all’.75 It was clear that common consent could be given only by an assembly that 
was representative of the realm.76 From the 1260s Parliament was made up of knights as well 
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as leading figures (burgesses) from each of the boroughs. Norton identifies this as the 
beginning of the House of Commons.77 There was now a representative assembly that had 
consenting to taxation as one of its functions.  
Parliament in the centuries that followed only had a limited ability to consent to 
taxation, but it started to get concessions for giving it. Payling argues that Parliament’s right 
to consent was ‘very short of free refusal’, because although Parliament had the right to 
consent through its representative nature, the ‘Crown had the right to demand a share of its 
subject’s goods in times of common necessity’.78 Carpenter, however, believes that 
Parliament as early as 1242 refused to consent to taxation and had made demands in return for 
consenting to taxation.79 There is consensus that from the 14th through to the 17th century 
Parliament developed the ability to refuse to consent and to get redress for supply. In other 
words, it was able to apply conditions to the giving of consent to taxation.80 Parliament could 
get redress for supply because the Crown had become more dependent on taxation to finance 
increasingly expensive warfare and its own extravagance.81 Parliaments from as early as 
1309, in return for consenting to taxation, had made the king accept public petitions for the 
redress of grievances.82 Furthermore, in 1340 the British Parliament showed the first signs 
that it wished to check how taxation was used when it got commissioners appointed to audit 
the accounts of subsidy collectors.83  
In the 17th century Parliament firmly established its ability to get redress for supply and 
developed its right to consent to taxation into the right also to approve how it would be spent. 
The Crown had become even more dependent on taxation consented to by Parliament.84 The 
House of Commons had grown in self-confidence and felt an increasing need to justify grants 
of taxation to its constituents.85 Its ability to get redress for supply grew when James II was 
removed from the throne by Parliament. Parliament took the opportunity to reaffirm that it 
had to consent to taxation, and that it must approve how that taxation would be spent, with the 
passage of the Bill of Rights 1688.86 Article four of the Bill of Rights 1688 states:  
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That levying money for or to the use of the Crowne by pretence of prerogative, without grant of 
Parlyament, for longer time or in other manner than the same is or shall be granted, is illegal.87 
McRae argues that the Bill of Rights 1688, particularly when combined with the Magna 
Carta, sets out that Parliament does not only consent to taxation but it must approve ‘the use 
the executive, using the Crown’s name, makes of it’.88 The Parliament had evolved from 
giving consent to taxation to also approving how taxation would be spent. Parliament, to an 
extent, had gained the ability to control and scrutinise government expenditure. However, 
Parliament would need to develop machinery to make its control of government expenditure 
effective.  
 
Detailed Appropriation  
The British Parliament had gained control over government expenditure following the 
revolution and the signing of the Bill of Rights in 1688. There was precedent for Parliament 
appropriating money for specific purposes.89 However, it was not common and was typically 
only when Parliament was in a strong bargaining position. In 1665 when Parliament supplied 
the Crown with money for fighting the Dutch, Sir George Downing, a teller at the Exchequer, 
added ‘into the subsidy bill a proviso, that the money raised by virtue of that act should be 
applicable only to purposes of the war’.90 Although there was initially resistance to the move 
from the Crown the king accepted it. When combined with earlier cases of appropriation in 
1624 and 1641 Parliament came to believe that its task was not only to consent to taxation but 
to approve of how the taxation would be spent.91  
From 1688 the British Parliament began consistently to approve the appropriations of 
funds for specific purposes. Furthermore, Parliament from 1688 only granted the monarch 
enough money to last a year, thus establishing annual control of government expenditure.92 In 
order to appropriate funds it was necessary to present Parliament with Estimates as to what 
the government wanted to spend.93 At first only the military submitted Estimates and they 
featured little detail. Civil spending, including the expenses of the Crown in the form of the 
Civil List, was one single complex appropriation.94 The ‘economic reform’ movement in the 
1780s led to increased interest in reforming government administration. Reforms, starting 
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with the Civil Establishment Act 1782 and concluding with the Exchequer and Audit 
Departments Act 1866, included gradually reducing the expenditure in the Civil List. It was 
instead put through Parliament’s supply procedures which included more detailed Estimates.95 
Parliament experimented with the specification of Estimates through to 1847 when they began 
to resemble their current form.96 The British Parliament had ‘detailed and rigidly defined’ 
appropriation by 1866.97  
 
Government Accounts and Consolidated Fund  
Parliament recognised that detailed appropriation was not sufficient to ensure that money was 
spent as appropriated. Parliament needed to check that the government spent the money as set 
out in the appropriations.98 By the 19th century it checked government spending in three ways: 
it ensured that it was presented with accounts that linked money that had been spent with what 
had been appropriated, by auditing the accounts and by controlling the issuing of money to 
the government.99 Parliament began to take control of the public accounts in the late 18th 
century. A number of attempts had been made in the past to take control of the government’s 
accounts, but they were generally unsuccessful.100  Parliament demanded better public 
accounts from the 1780s. In 1802 ‘finance accounts’ were presented, with balanced accounts 
starting in 1822, but it was not until the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act was passed in 
1866 that Parliament firmly established control over the government’s accounts.101   
A further key development with the government’s accounts was the introduction of the 
consolidated fund in 1787. With a consolidated fund, all revenue collected goes into a single 
account. The funds collected in the single consolidated account are then distributed to where 
Parliament has approved in the appropriations.102 Before the introduction of the consolidated 
fund, items of revenue were allocated to items of expenditure. Egan, Wakelin and Yuill argue 
that parliamentary control under the previous system was diffused because the tying together 
of taxation and expenditure in such a way meant that it was not considered rationally.103 
Expenditure was often judged by what item of revenue it was linked to and not just whether it 
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was of merit. Furthermore, the introduction of the consolidated fund meant that all 
government expenditure went through Parliament.104 
   
Comptroller and Auditor-General 
The Office of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, with the complementary roles of serving 
as controller and auditor, developed out of the Exchequer. The Exchequer was England’s 
ancient treasury holding a central role in government through to the 17th century.105 From the 
1660s the Exchequer was broken up with it losing the treasury role. The Exchequer’s 
responsibilities were limited ‘to the receipt, issue, recording and audit of public money’.106 
The Exchequer was not notably effective at carrying out these tasks. As a result the economic 
reform movement pushed for change. There was a gradual process of change through to 1834 
which resulted in the Exchequer losing more of its functions. It was, however, left with one 
important role; to ensure that all issues of money to the government were legal (i.e. the 
controller function). Key features of the later Comptroller and Auditor-General role were also 
established. The Exchequer carried out the controller function for Parliament rather than the 
government, and the head of the Exchequer, the Comptroller of the Exchequer, was an 
independent officer who could not be a member of the House of Commons.107   
Parliament would establish a stronger auditor by the middle of the 19th century. Britain 
had a long history of auditing by the 18th century. The Exchequer had carried out audits for 
the Crown as far back as the 11th century.108 Parliament had at various times carried out its 
own audits, such as with its appointment of commissioners in 1340 to audit the collectors of 
subsidies,109 and in 1666 to audit the public accounts and investigate potential fraud, which it 
found.110 Parliament, however, would not start to develop a sufficient level of auditing until 
the 1780s.111 The economic reform movement was again responsible for the change. From 
1780 Commissioners of Audit were appointed replacing the previous Exchequer auditors.112 
An Audit Board comprised of five members was formed in 1785. The creation of the Audit 
Board established the precedent that auditors could retain their position provided they showed 
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‘good behaviour’.113 However, there were a number of problems with the Audit Board; 
principally that it could not be recognised as a servant of Parliament. The Audit Board’s 
members were appointed by the government under Parliament’s authority, but it had no 
means of reporting to Parliament or getting its recommendations implemented. The audited 
accounts were instead sent to the Treasury, rather than Parliament, and due to the poor quality 
of the accounts its audits were of little use.114   
The problems with the Audit Board were addressed with the creation of the Office of 
the Comptroller and Auditor-General. The Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1866 
merged the Exchequer and Audit Board under the leadership of the Comptroller and Auditor-
General. The Comptroller and Auditor-General retained the good behaviour requirement of 
the Audit Board and no longer reported to the Treasury.115 Chubb states that the Comptroller 
and Auditor-General ‘was to audit the department’s accounts for the House of Commons and 
to report its findings to it. In this way the machinery of audit was finally harnessed to 
parliamentary control’.116 The Comptroller and Auditor-General could now be identified as a 
servant of Parliament. Furthermore, the Comptroller and Auditor-General benefited from 
improvements to the government’s accounts and the creation of the PAC.117   
 
Public Accounts Committee  
A permanent PAC was the final feature the British Parliament created that New Zealand 
inherited. Egan, Wakelin and Yuill argue that the final requirement for parliamentary control 
of government expenditure is a permanent committee of the House to review the 
government’s accounts.118 While detailed appropriations, proper accounts and a Comptroller 
and Auditor-General were all important, the information they produced was only useful if it 
was thoroughly considered. The solution was a PAC.119  
The British Parliament had a history of creating committees and appointing 
commissioners to examine taxation and expenditure issues. McGee traces committees as far 
back as 1341.120 The various committees that Parliament created through to the late 18th 
century were not very effective. They did not have access to much information and their 
                                                          
113 ibid. 
114 ibid. 
115 ibid. 
116 Chubb, The Control of Public Expenditure, p. 20.  
117 Egan, Wakelin and Yuill, Parliamentary Control, p. 16. 
118 ibid, p. 17.  
119 ibid. 
120 McGee, Parliamentary Practice, p. 426.  
 23 
 
existence was infrequent and temporary.  Committees became more common from the 1780s 
as a result of the other developments outlined. These committees were of limited 
effectiveness, but they did contribute ideas as to what a permanent committee should look 
like.121  
The creation of a permanent PAC was the result of a number of committee and 
commission investigations. The Royal Commission of 1831 and the Treasury Committee of 
1845 both recommended the appointment of a commission, or the creation of a committee of 
the House of Commons to examine the government’s accounts.122 Moore adds that the British 
PAC was based on an earlier Canadian PAC that was established in the 1830s.123 The decisive 
recommendation for the formation of a PAC was that of the 1856 Baring Committee. The 
Baring Committee made a number of recommendations to improve Parliament’s control of 
government expenditure.124 A key recommendation was that the audited accounts should 
annually be submitted to a committee of the House of Commons that the Speaker would 
nominate. Although the Baring Committee’s report was well received, the implementation of 
the various proposals took time.125 The PAC was finally introduced in 1861.126  
 
Conclusion  
The New Zealand Parliament in the 1850s inherited the control and scrutiny of the 
government expenditure function from the British House of Commons. Specifically New 
Zealand inherited a system of governance where the government had the right to propose 
expenditure and Parliament had the right to approve it. As a part of that inheritance New 
Zealand got a system, the ‘circle of control’, that comprised a number of key features to 
support Parliament’s ability to carry out the control and scrutiny of government expenditure 
function. Features included parliamentary procedure, detailed appropriation, government 
accounts including a consolidated fund, a Controller and Auditor-General (Auditor-General) 
and a PAC.  Not all of the features were fully developed in the 1850s, such as the PAC and 
the Auditor-General, but they would be quickly adopted. The following section describes 
how New Zealand developed on what it inherited from Britain.  
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New Zealand History  
 
Introduction 
The following section summarises the major developments in the New Zealand Parliament’s 
practice and procedure for controlling and scrutinising government expenditure. This section 
does not cover every single development. It instead summarises the major developments and 
trends with a particular focus on issues relevant to the later chapter that evaluates how 
Parliament currently controls and scrutinises government expenditure. This section is 
structured in much the same way as the previous one that dealt with British developments. 
However, there is a more extensive examination of the development of parliamentary 
process, and an additional section that describes the recent developments related to 
Parliament’s ability to scrutinise the government’s economic and fiscal policy at a high level 
including government expenditure.  
 
Appropriations 
The New Zealand Parliament has always been presented with detailed appropriations but the 
level of detail has been reduced in the past to make them more digestible for MPs. The 
appropriations presented to Parliament through to the 1940s were extremely detailed with 
New Zealand labelled as having ‘an addiction to detail’.127 From the early 1940s the level of 
detail in the Estimates was gradually decreased reducing the size of the Estimates document. 
Furthermore, in 1968 items of expenditure were rounded to the nearest $1000 and items 
smaller than $1000 were either merged with other items or removed altogether. Egan, 
Wakelin and Yuill provide that the changes introduced, although resulting in reduced detail, 
actually benefitted parliamentary control because they were more appropriate for 
Parliament.128 Initially Parliament did not appropriate money to government on a strictly 
annual basis. That would not begin until 1865.129 
There has been a steady increase in the information contained and provided with the 
Estimates. Initially the Estimates presented to the House only showed what the government 
wanted to spend in the coming year.130 If an MP wanted to make a comparison with the 
previous year they had to use the separate statement of expenditure. The statement of 
expenditure did not show the appropriation the previous year’s spending had been made 
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against; an MP would need a copy of the previous year’s Estimates to do that. The 
presentation of appropriated accounts from 1862/63 that showed the appropriation, what was 
actually spent, and the difference between the two helped. However, the appropriated 
accounts were not as detailed as the Estimates. The Estimates resembling their current form 
first appeared in 1939/40. They now showed for each item of expenditure the amount 
requested for the coming year as well as the amounts requested and actually spent in the 
previous year. The new format was seen to improve parliamentary control as it facilitated 
closer scrutiny.131 The level of information presented with the Estimates was increased with 
the Public Finance Act 1989 (PFA 1989).132 
Before the PFA 1989 Parliament appropriated funds to the government on the cash cost 
of inputs. Each department had a Vote that contained a number of inputs. Inputs were the 
cash requested by the government for departments organised under standard expenditure 
groups such as personnel, capital expenditure and maintenance. Program budgeting had been 
introduced in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It sought to organise inputs into broad 
programmes. It had been hoped that programme budgeting would turn the focus of politicians 
from the annual consideration of inputs to long term government objectives.133 Programme 
budgeting failed to take off with programmes poorly defined or simply acknowledged 
department’s organisational units.134 Departments were reluctant to use it and most politicians 
did not understand it which created the real problem; a lack of political support.135 
Furthermore, the system of inputs and program budgeting was deeply flawed.136 
The PFA 1989 completely overhauled appropriations. Three new types of 
appropriations were introduced: outputs for the purchase of goods and services, for capital 
investment and for the payment of benefits and grants.137 Output class, containing a common 
set of outputs, was the level at which Parliament authorised the purchase of outputs in the 
appropriation process.138 The Public Finance Amendment Act 2004 allowed for the merger of 
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several output classes into one appropriation, a multi-class output appropriation.139 Separate 
appropriation types for buying outputs and capital investment reflected the distinction 
between the government as owner and purchaser of outputs from a department.140 
Appropriation by output works by the government deciding what outcomes they wish to 
achieve and then choosing outputs that they believe will enable the outcome to be met. 
Departments or other suppliers are then tasked with delivering the requested outputs with the 
freedom to choose the inputs to make that happen.141 Importantly output classes in the 
Estimates must specify the outcome they are there to meet.142 Finally, all appropriations were 
now expressed in accrual terms and not cash.143 This meant they reflected the full cost of 
acquiring them.144    
The PFA 1989 made a number of other changes to appropriations and the Estimates. A 
new appropriation period was introduced. In addition to the existing permanent and annual 
appropriations there were now multi-year appropriations. The government is able to request 
and Parliament approve expenditure for up to five years.145  Appropriations were now made 
such that each Vote is linked to one responsible Minister and one department. Appropriations 
made to an office of Parliament had the Speaker as the responsible Minister for their Vote.146 
The new system also clarified that Ministers are responsible for outcomes and the choice of 
outputs while chief executives are responsible for delivering outputs.147  
 
Committees 
The New Zealand Parliament has always had a committee responsible for examining 
government finance. There were various committees from 1854 before the first significant 
committee, the Audit Committee, was created in 1858. It was quickly replaced with the 
Public Accounts Committee (PAC) that was first appointed in 1870.148 PAC had a 
government chairperson and in the late 1940s was comprised of ten members with a 
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government majority.149 The PAC initially had strong terms of reference that allowed it to 
investigate the government’s accounts and issues relating to the accounts. It was hoped at the 
committee’s creation that it would be non-partisan.150 The PAC had a number of functions 
and practices that were important ingredients for future committees: it examined the 
Estimates from 1912, it considered bills that were referred to it, it questioned Treasury and 
department officials as a part of the Estimates examination and it occasionally considered the 
Auditor-General’s report. Despite these various roles and responsibilities the PAC was a 
committee in constant decline. This was largely due to governments constraining its activity 
and the failure of the committee to regularly report to the House. The PAC’s only remaining 
role when it was replaced was examination of the Estimates, which it did poorly, and it did 
not report to the House.151  
The Public Expenditure Committee (PEC) replaced the PAC in 1962 on the 
recommendation of Parliament’s Standing Orders Committee. The PEC was initially a 
committee of 12 MPs but was later reduced to 10 members.152 The committee had a 
government chairperson and government majority. PEC’s terms of reference gave it 
significant roles and powers.  
To examine the estimates presented to this House and to report what, if any, economies consistent 
with the policy implied on those estimates may be effected therein; to examine the public accounts 
and the accounts of such corporations, undertakings, and organisations as are in receipt of any 
more appropriated by Parliament, in such manner and to such extent as the Committee sees fit, and 
to have regard to matters in relation thereto raised in the annual report of the Controller and 
Auditor-General or elsewhere, and to report thereon to the House or the Government; and to 
examine and report on any such matters referred to it by the House; the Committee to have power 
to sit during the recess and to adjourn from time to time and from place to place and to have power 
to appoint sub-committees and to refer to such subcommittees any of the matters referred to the 
Committee.153  
Furthermore, the PEC had bills with financial implications referred to it.154 The committee’s 
consideration of the Public Finance Act 1977 (PFA 1977) set a strong precedent that 
Parliament’s finance committee should consider bills with financial implications.155  
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Two significant decisions made with the creation of the PEC have repercussions for the 
current committee arrangements. One contentious issue with the creation of the PEC was if it 
should have a government or an opposition chairperson. The government ensured that it held 
the chairpersonship but opposition MPs could serve as a subcommittee chairperson. It was a 
compromise of the British system, that New Zealand was replicating, which had a PAC with 
an opposition chairperson and an Estimates Committee with a government chairperson.156 
The second significant decision was to have one committee with the combined functions of 
the two British committees. The conventional view is that a one committee structure was 
chosen because of the smaller Parliament.157 However, McRae claims that the real reason was 
the Standing Orders Committee being wrongly informed that Britain was merging its two 
committees.158  
The PEC was ineffective at examining the Estimates. The committee’s examination of 
the Estimates was no more effective than that of the PAC. It was ‘largely superficial and 
perfunctory’.159 From 1972 the PEC maintained overall responsibility for the Estimates 
examination but it could now refer sets of Estimates to other select committees, although it 
continued to examine most itself.160 The new practice failed to meet expectations with neither 
the time spent nor the quality of examination improving. The main problems were 
insufficient time, both given and available, and a lack of MP expertise with what little there 
was concentrated in the PEC.161 The PEC continued to serve as an information source but it 
also stifled debate as MPs did not want to reiterate what had already been discussed in 
committee.162   
The PEC was particularly notable for the inquiries that it carried out into matters 
relating to government expenditure. During Parliament’s recess the PEC used subcommittees 
to carry out investigations into a wide range of topics related to government expenditure and 
administration. The subcommittees were frequently chaired by opposition MPs and were 
quite non-partisan. Topics for investigation could come from any source but the Auditor-
General’s Annual Report and the committee’s own members were the major sources.163 The 
PEC’s inquiries were far more effective than its examination of the Estimates.164 
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There are further aspects of the PEC that are applicable to the consideration of the 
current committee system. Significant attributes of the PEC, initially at least, included: its 
willingness to scrutinise the government, its determination to follow up on recommendations 
and its ability to get its reports debated in the House.165 The strength of the PEC was linked to 
the capability of its members, particularly the chairperson.166 The effectiveness of the PEC 
declined considerably once a ginger group moved up to Cabinet.167 The PEC operated under 
a problematic rule that prevented the committee from examining policy.168 Muldoon got 
around the problem as chairperson by only leniently enforcing the rule.169 The PEC lacked 
administrative and research assistance.170 However, the Clerk’s Office did appoint an 
independent advisory officer from 1973 and the Audit Office an officer for liaison and 
technical advice from 1976.171 
The 1985 overhaul of the select committee system had a major impact on the role of 
select committees in controlling and scrutinising government expenditure. Thirteen subject 
committees were created ‘functionally related to Government departments’.172 The new 
committees had a principal legislative role but they were also to scrutinise policy, 
administration and expenditure of government departments.173 Among the new committees 
was the current Finance and Expenditure Committee (FEC) that replaced the PEC. The 
Committee is chaired by a government MP and has a government majority. However, in 1999 
there was a non-government chairperson and the committee was evenly split.174 The FEC 
initially had five members like all the other select committees at the time.175 The committee 
has since expanded to have approximately 12 members. This is due to there no longer being a 
set number of select committee members. Size is determined by the Business Committee with 
proportionality the major factor. The FEC was made larger than other committees to allow all 
parties representation if they wish due to the committee’s importance.176  
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The FEC has a different role to its predecessor. The FEC has a co-ordinating and 
overseeing role by having overall responsibility for examining the government’s finances and 
its financial arrangements.177 The PEC examined government finance almost entirely on its 
own with the exception of some Estimates. The FEC now allocates the financial work out to 
the subject select committees as standard practice.178 For example, it is now expected that the 
Estimates will be examined by the select committee that has responsibility in that area.179 
Furthermore, all select committees can now initiate their own inquiries, a power previously 
only held by the PEC.180 The Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 (FRA) reinforced the FEC’s role 
of examining the government’s finances with the various reports required under the Act 
referred to it for consideration.181  
The FEC has demonstrated its co-ordinating and overseeing role. In 1991 it developed 
the first standard estimates questionnaire designed to assist select committees with their 
Estimates examination.182 There was also a standard financial review questionnaire that was 
discontinued in 1997 with departments instead providing the information in their annual 
reports.183 The FEC has continued its predecessor’s role of considering on behalf of the 
House proposed changes to the format and content of financial information presented to the 
House. The PFA 1989 has reinforced this requiring that the House is consulted on changes to 
the content or format of an Appropriation Bill. Furthermore, it considers financial 
management legislation including the PFA 1989 and has reported on financial management 
issues.184 A further change from 1994 has been Ministers appearing before select committees 
as a part of their Estimates examination.185 Previously only officials appeared before 
committees. The change reflects that appropriations are now made to a responsible 
Minister.186  
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New Zealand’s Auditor-General originates from an Audit Branch, followed by an Audit 
Board established in the early 1840s, which reported to the British Commissioners of Audit. 
The first Auditor was appointed in 1846.188 The Audit Act 1858 created an independent 
Auditor, with the exception of being appointed by the Governor-General, who was 
responsible to Parliament and not the government.189 The Audit Act 1858 was repealed in 
1867 with the Public Revenues Act. As a result the Auditor no longer had its own piece of 
legislation and independence from government.190 The Auditor-General would not have its 
independence restored and its own piece of legislation again until 2001. A controller, then 
known as Comptroller of the Public Accounts, was introduced in 1865. The positions of 
Comptroller and Auditor-General were combined by the Public Revenues Act 1878 to create 
the Controller and Auditor-General (Auditor-General).191 The legal framework for the 
Auditor-General remained relatively unchanged until the PFA 1977. The exception was the 
Public Revenues Act 1910 that required the Auditor-General to submit an annual report to 
Parliament.192  
The Auditor-General has developed a close relationship with Parliament and its 
committees. The close relationship started with the Auditor-General sending an observer to 
the PAC from 1952. The relationship became far closer with the introduction of the PEC.193 
The relationship was closer due to the assistance the Auditor-General provided the committee 
and the committee’s consideration of the Auditor-General’s Annual Report.194 The 
relationship between the Auditor-General and the FEC took a step backwards in 1988 due to 
the Strategos Report that created unnecessary friction between the two.195 The 1994 
resignation of the Auditor-General did not help the relationship or the Audit Office’s 
position.196 However, the relationship would improve in the 1990s because the role of the 
Auditor-General, particularly in providing support to select committees, was further 
recognised with increased assistance given to Parliament. The result was a parliamentary 
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group within the Audit Office responsible for managing the relationship with Parliament and 
its committees.197  
The PFA 1977 significantly changed the scope of the audits that the Audit Office could 
carry out. By the beginning of the 1970s the Audit Office was stretching its auditing mandate 
by commenting on wasteful or extravagant expenditure.198 The legislation in place, the Public 
Revenues Act 1953, did not give the Audit Office the authority to carry out value for money 
audits.199 The Audit Office subsequently pushed to expand its own auditing mandate.200 The 
PFA 1977 allowed it to carry out value for money or performance audits. The ability to carry 
out value for money audits meant that the Audit Office could audit for the efficiency and 
effectiveness of expenditure.201 The Audit Office was given ‘considerable power and 
autonomy’ because it was to interpret the provision itself.202 However, the Audit Office could 
not question the merits of government policy as a part of the audit.203 
The PFA 1989 had a significant impact on the Audit Office despite leaving in place the 
main part of the PFA 1977 relating to the Auditor-General.204 The Audit Office was involved 
in creating and implementing the PFA 1989.205 The move to accrual accounting and the need 
to audit non-financial information meant new demands were placed on auditors.206 The new 
reporting requirements introduced by the PFA 1989 meant that the Audit Office now attested 
to the contents of the new annual reports rather than having to make substantive comments. 
This resulted in performance auditing being more targeted at the needs of Parliament.207  
The PFA 1989 contributed to a change in structure for the Auditor-General and the 
contracting out of auditing. The Audit Office’s monopoly on public sector auditing did not fit 
with the reforms of the late 1980s which stressed contestability and the need to show 
efficiency and effectiveness.208 The Audit Office was subsequently split into two units, 
consistent with other splits in the public sector during the same period. The first unit was the 
Office of the Auditor-General which was responsible for standard setting, overseeing auditing 
and dealing with Parliament. The second unit was Audit New Zealand that was contracted by 
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the Auditor-General to carry out audits. The carrying out of audits was made contestable 
through tender with private sector auditors and Audit New Zealand competing for audit work. 
The tendering of audits was done to show efficiency and value for money, and to draw on 
private sector knowledge.209  
The Public Audit Act 2001 (PAA) gave the Auditor-General its own piece of legislation 
and made it an officer of Parliament.210 Earlier in 1990 the Audit Office became financially 
independent of government when it was treated as an office of Parliament in the 
appropriations process.211 As a full officer of Parliament from 2001 the Auditor-General was 
now independent both financially and operationally from the government.212 It was 
responsible only to Parliament, emphasised by it presenting a draft annual plan for 
consideration by the Speaker and a select committee.213 The appointment issue was likewise 
addressed with the first appointment of a new Auditor-General on the recommendation of 
Parliament in 2002.214 The PAA also made it so that all public sector entities were covered 
consistently by the Auditor-General’s mandate. Furthermore, the Auditor-General could now 
check for legislative compliance and probity; work Parliament wanted it to carry out.215 
How the Auditor-General performed the controller function changed following the PFA 
1989 and the Public Finance Amendment Act 2004. The controller function had historically 
been performed by: 
Periodic certification by the Controller and Auditor-General to the Governor-General that 
payments to be made out of the Crown bank account (under a warrant signed by the Governor-
General) could be lawfully made; and 
Regular (in practice, daily) certification that amounts to be paid out of the Crown bank account 
were pursuant to a warrant by the Governor-General, and that there was an appropriation or other 
authority against which each payment could be charged.216  
This system was rendered ineffective by the shift to accrual accounting and subsequently 
offered little in the way of a check.217 The Auditor-General sought to address the weakness 
by developing the audit of appropriations in the 1990s.218 The audit of appropriations, 
performed well after the event during the annual audit, involved checking that departments 
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had met all the requirements for each appropriation during the financial year.219 The Public 
Finance Amendment Act 2004 ended the warrant and certification approach.220 The audit of 
appropriations which had previously been carried out under the Auditor-General’s auditing 
standards was now a statutory requirement.221 In addition, the Treasury was now required to 
present a monthly report to the Auditor-General on appropriations.222 The next chapter 
elaborates on how the controller function is currently performed.   
  
Parliamentary Procedure  
New Zealand has shifted away from the principle that only the government can propose 
expenditure in Parliament. The New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 set out that Parliament 
could only consider expenditure proposals from the Crown and the principle was enforced in 
Standing Orders.223 The principle was reaffirmed with the Constitution Act 1986 but the 
particular section was repealed in 2005.224 Under the appropriation rule in Standing Orders 
any bill or amendment from a non-ministerial MP that involved expenditure was deemed out 
of order, unless it had support from the Crown in the form of a message from the Governor-
General. However, MPs could propose a decrease, but not an increase, to a Vote in an 
Appropriation Bill.225 The appropriation rule was too constraining on MPs and failed to 
properly protect the Crown’s financial position. The appropriation rule was replaced by the 
financial veto procedure in 1996.226 The financial veto procedure allows MPs to present bills 
and amendments that propose expenditure as well as decreases and increases to an 
Appropriation Bill. The government though has the ability to veto any proposal that it 
believes will have a more than minor impact on its fiscal aggregates.227  
Parliament’s Budget process previously operated around the Committee of Supply, a 
Committee of the Whole House. Before the abolition of the committee the process started 
with the presentation of the Budget to the House with the Estimates subsequently tabled. 
There was then a Budget debate starting with a financial statement from the Minister of 
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Finance.228 The House or the government referred the Estimates to committee and reported to 
government or the House, depending on the year in question. Following that the Committee 
of Supply approved the Estimates item by item. The House later considered the 
Supplementary Estimates separately in much the same way. The main Estimates and the 
Supplementary Estimates were then put into one Appropriation Bill which was introduced 
and passed.229 The Committee of Supply was abolished in 1968. It was no longer considered 
particularly relevant considering its British origins.230  
The Committee of Supply was replaced with a process centred on Appropriation Bills. 
The new process that was created by the Standing Orders Committee sought to clean up the 
previous process.231 In summary, under the new system the Budget was presented to the 
House by the Minister of Finance with an Appropriation Bill introduced that had the main 
Estimates attached as a schedule. The Budget debate was held during the second reading of 
the Appropriation Bill starting with the Minister of Finance’s Budget statement. The main 
Estimates were referred to the PEC who considered them. The committee did have the power 
to report on them but it generally chose to pass a formal resolution returning them to the 
House without comment. The House subsequently debated the main Estimates in a 
Committee of the Whole House on an Appropriation Bill for two days each week during the 
parliamentary session.232 The Supplementary Estimates were considered in a second 
Appropriation Bill using a similar process.233  
Following the change to the Appropriation Bill system there have been two significant 
changes made to the parliamentary process. In 1972 Parliament adopted the recommendation 
of the Standing Orders Committee that the Estimates debate be reduced to 16 sittings days, 
with the concession made to the opposition that they would determine what Votes were 
debated. Any Votes not debated were considered passed without debate.234 The second 
significant change occurred in 1992 when the Estimates and the review of departmental 
spending were separated.235 Previously the House and select committees had dealt with the 
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two together.236 The new procedure features three segments of examination and debate by the 
House and committees: Estimates for the upcoming year, the financial performance of 
departments over the previous financial year and the financial performance of State 
enterprises (SOEs) and Crown agencies over the previous financial year.237 This is reflected 
in separate Appropriation (Estimates) and Appropriation (Financial Review) Bills.  
An historical theme of the Estimates debate has been the constraints placed on MPs in 
terms of what they are allowed to discuss. Before 1972 MPs were not allowed to discuss 
policy in debates on the Estimates. The rule was not actually in Standing Orders but had been 
developed over time by chairpersons with the Speakers’ support as a part of the ability to rule 
on relevancy in debate.238 The rule was eased slightly in 1967 with MPs able to debate the 
content of department’s annual reports. Determining the line between expenditure and 
administration and policy was a problem.239 From 1972 MPs were permitted to debate policy 
as a part of the Estimates debate. The Estimates debate subsequently changed from a focused 
discussion on expenditure and administration to a more general debate. In 1985 the Standing 
Orders Committee sought to tighten up the Estimates debate with the rule of relevancy. The 
rule of relevancy was such that the Estimates debate should be about the Estimate currently 
being debated. Discussion of the policy behind the government’s request was allowed but 
general policy debate was discouraged. The separation of Estimates and of financial review 
meant that the Estimates debate was on planned expenditure and not past performance.240  
A further theme of the House’s parliamentary procedure has been the steadily 
decreasing length of the Estimates debate. When the new process centred on the 
Appropriation Bill was introduced the Estimates were debated for two sitting days each 
week.241 The Estimates debate which had been set at 16 days in 1972 had become 13 days by 
1992 when it was reduced to 20 hours. In 1999 it was reduced further to eight hours. The 
financial review debate introduced in 1992 when Estimates and the review of the previous 
year’s expenditure were separated was initially ten hours but was also reduced in 1999 to four 
hours.242  
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Parliament from early on was regularly presented with a copy of the government’s accounts. 
A constant problem with the accounts has been that only a few people could understand them 
and attempts to make them more useable generally failed.243 Until 1989 New Zealand used 
cash accounting that reported transactions that had been made during the financial year. Cash 
accounting left out important information such as assets and the costs of producing outputs 
(goods and services).244 Pallot explains that cash accounting distorts the assessment of 
financial performance because it ‘records items when cash is received or paid without regard 
to the period to which they apply’.245 In the 1930s there was a limited experiment with using 
private sector accounting practices in the public sector but the idea would not be properly 
implemented for fifty years.246  
The PFA 1989 significantly changed the government’s accounting practices and the 
nature of its accounts. The PFA 1989 made the government use the same accounting 
practices as the private sector. More specifically the PFA 1989 set out that the Crown, 
government departments and Crown entities in all of their financial statements were to follow 
the generally accepted accounting practice (GAAP). The move to GAAP meant that accrual 
accounting was adopted, replacing the previous cash accounting system. Accrual accounting 
primarily results in accounts showing ‘resources used in the production of goods or services 
with the revenues or services generated in the same period’.247 Importantly, accrual 
accounting means that assets including depreciation are now included in the government’s 
accounts.248 In layman’s terms the use of accrual accounting means that ‘it is no longer 
possible to hide the costs of decisions’.249 Accrual accounting was steadily rolled in over the 
two years following the PFA 1989. By July 1991 all government departments were using 
accrual accounting.250 The Financial Reporting Act 1993 created the independent Accounting 
Standards Review Board that determines accounting standards that meet GAAP.251 As a 
result the government no longer sets its own accounting rules, and improved its transparency 
through preventing potential manipulation.252 In 2007 international financial reporting 
                                                          
243 Egan, Wakelin and Yuill, Parliamentary Control, p. 21.  
244 Treasury, ‘Putting it Together’, 1996, p. 18.  
245 Pallot, 'Accounting, Auditing, and Accountability', p. 57.  
246 Webb, Government in New Zealand, p. 116. 
247 Pallot, 'Accounting, Auditing, and Accountability', p. 57.  
248 Palmer, New Zealand's Constitution, p. 126.  
249 Pallot, 'New Public Management Reform’, p. 233.  
250 ibid, p. 229.  
251 Palmer and Palmer, Bridled Power, p. 125. 
252 Pallot, 'New Public Management Reform’, p. 231. 
 38 
 
standards (IFRS) were adopted.253 The use of IFRS meant the government’s accounting 
practices were aligned with best international practice.254  
The principle of a consolidated fund has generally been followed with a few 
exceptions. New Zealand historically had an account called the consolidated fund but it had 
been replaced by the 1980s.255 Prior to the PFA 1989 the government’s accounts centred on 
the Public Account that was comprised of a number of accounts including the Consolidated 
Account that carried out the consolidated fund role.256 The consolidated fund principle 
though had been deviated from in a number of ways. McGee points out that some 
departments were allowed to keep and reuse money they had made without it going into the 
consolidated fund and ‘that there was more than one fund’.257 Egan, Wakelin and Yuill 
provide further examples including government trading activities and permanent 
appropriations.258 There has been a tendency to use permanent appropriations to avoid 
parliamentary scrutiny with several efforts being made to return expenditure to the 
appropriations process.259  
The government’s accounts and reporting requirements prior to 1989 were 
incomprehensive and inconsistent. Preston points out that information on the government’s 
accounts was spread across a number of documents with no single document providing a 
complete picture.260 A Public Account statement was presented to Parliament each year. It 
was limited by a number of accounts, in particular trading enterprises, being outside the 
Public Account. Some aspects of these outside accounts were included in the Estimates and 
in tables that were a part of the Budget.261 Preston argues that the financial information in the 
Budget made it the ‘closest document to an annual financial report from the Government to 
Parliament’.262 Departmental annual reports included financial information for trading and 
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non-trading departments.263 However, there were no consistent reporting requirements for 
Crown agencies with some even having no financial reporting requirements.264  
The PFA 1989 further adjusted adherence to the consolidated fund principle and 
significantly changed reporting requirements. The PFA 1989 allowed for the holding of 
public money in the new Crown bank account that replaced the Public Account and in new 
departmental bank accounts.265 Although there was now more than one account the 
consolidated fund principle was still followed. Adherence to the consolidated fund principle 
was enhanced with the introduction of consolidated financial statements or whole of 
government accounting. The consolidated financial statements brought together the financial 
statements of departments, offices of Parliament, Crown agencies and State enterprises 
(SOEs) into one document.266 The document shows the full size and extent of the 
government’s finances and financial activity.267 The first accrual consolidated financial 
statement was produced in 1992.268 The PFA 1989 also introduced new financial statements 
meeting GAAP that improved and made more consistent the reporting requirements for the 
new Crown entities as well as departments and offices of Parliament.269 The new financial 
statements and reporting requirements improved transparency and made the government 
more accountable to Parliament and the public.270 
 
Fiscal Responsibility Act and High Level Scrutiny   
The FRA facilitated greater high level examination of the government’s financial 
management, consequently enhancing Parliament’s ability to control and scrutinise 
government expenditure. The Act was introduced for a number of reasons: the feared effect 
of MMP and to ensure that future governments factored in and were transparent about the 
long term impact of their financial decisions, as well as the lack of accurate financial 
information available in the run up to an election.271 The FRA complemented the earlier PFA 
1989. The PFA 1989 was ‘concerned with the “micro” side of the Budget process’, 272 
supporting parliamentary control and scrutiny of government expenditure at the appropriation 
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level. The FRA focused on the ‘macro’ or higher level.273 The Act as such enhanced the 
ability of Parliament to scrutinise government economic and fiscal management, including 
expenditure, as a whole. The FRA centred on requiring the government to set out its fiscal 
objectives and subsequently report on the extent to which it met those objectives.274 To 
enable that, the government and Treasury were required to produce new reports and the 
principles of responsible fiscal management were introduced.  
The principles of responsible fiscal management introduced by the FRA provided a 
framework for examining government fiscal management. The FRA sets out five principles 
that the government is to factor in when developing the Budget.275 The principles are not 
mandatory but the government does have to explain why it has departed from them and how 
it intends to meet the principles again in the future.276 Any departure from the principles was 
to be transparent and only temporary.277 The FRA did not define key words such as ‘prudent’ 
or ‘reasonable’ and they were left to the government to interpret.278 The Treasury summarises 
the five principles as being:  
 ‘reducing Crown debt to a prudent level,  
 maintaining Crown debt at a prudent level 
 achieving and maintaining Crown net worth at a level that provides a buffer against 
adverse future events  
 prudent management of fiscal risk  
 reasonably predictable tax rates’.279  
Government expenditure fits under the first and second principles due to the balancing of 
expenditure and revenue needed to reduce and maintain prudent debt levels.  
The FRA introduced new reporting requirements for the government and the Treasury 
that facilitated a higher level of scrutiny of government expenditure. The government had to 
produce a budget policy statement and a fiscal strategy report and the Treasury economic and 
fiscal updates. Scott states that the new reports provided ‘for regular and explicit fiscal 
reporting; for parliamentary review of fiscal reports; for a set of benchmarks against which 
fiscal policies can be assessed; and for more open budgetary processes’.280 All three of the 
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new reports were referred to the FEC for scrutiny.281 The Public Finance Amendment Act 
2004 merged the FRA into the PFA 1989 in order to consolidate public finance legislation 
with minor changes made to requirements for the three reports.282 Importantly the new reports 
were to meet GAAP.283 The contents of the three reports are described in the next chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has summarised the history of parliamentary practice and procedure that enabled 
Parliament to carry out its control and scrutiny of government expenditure function. It has 
highlighted the significant changes made to the key features that New Zealand inherited from 
Britain. The changes have been drastic with many concentrated in recent decades. Significant 
changes include the move from the Audit Committee through to the FEC, the shift in the 
bases of appropriations and the accounts to outputs, and Parliament’s evolved procedure for 
dealing with financial business. A further feature has been added with the FRA. It introduced 
new reports and the principles of responsible fiscal management that improved Parliament’s 
ability to scrutinise government expenditure at a high level. This history has raised a number 
of issues and trends that need to be addressed when evaluating Parliament’s current ability to 
carry out the control and scrutiny of government expenditure function. Such issues and trends 
include: the capability of Parliament’s FEC, the quality and length of debate particular in that 
on the Estimates; the capability of MPs to deliver on the function; and the appropriateness of 
output and accrual based appropriations and accounts. The next chapter will describe 
Parliament’s current practice and procedures for controlling and scrutinising government 
expenditure and stressing the key features that have been the focus of this history chapter.  
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Chapter Three: Current Practice and Procedure 
 
Introduction 
Parliament has extensive practice and procedure for controlling and scrutinising government 
expenditure. Before Parliament’s capability to perform the function can be evaluated it is 
necessary to describe how it is performed. Parliament’s practice and procedure is not 
specified in any one document or piece of legislation. The most important sources are the 
Public Finance Act 1989 (PFA), the Public Audit Act 2001 (PAA) and the Standing Orders of 
the House of Representatives 2011 (Standing Orders or S.O.) with a number of other pieces 
of legislation containing important components. This chapter starts by identifying the core 
legal provisions, system of appropriations and documentation that facilitate Parliament’s 
control and scrutiny of government expenditure. It then describes the supply and financial 
review processes that grant permission to the government to spend public money and check 
how that money was spent. The other key elements are then discussed including the accounts 
and accounting, the Controller and Auditor-General (Auditor-General) and the Finance and 
Expenditure Committee (FEC).  
 
Central Provisions 
 
Parliamentary Consent  
Parliament’s function of controlling and scrutinising government expenditure is enabled by a 
central provision that the Crown must have parliamentary consent to spend public money. 
Three pieces of legislation specify that the Crown needs the consent of Parliament to spend 
public money. The Bill of Rights 1688 provides that the Crown requires a grant from 
Parliament to spend public money and that it must be spent in the time period and for the 
purpose specified.284 The Constitution Act 1986 states that the Crown cannot lawfully spend 
public money unless it has Parliament’s approval by or under an Act.285 The PFA reiterates 
and further defines the provisions contained in the aforementioned legislation stating that the 
‘The Crown or an office of Parliament must not spend public money, except as expressly 
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authorised by or under an Act (including this Act)’.286 As such it ensures that offices of 
Parliament must also adhere to the provision and that public money can be spent if authorised 
by the Act itself. 
 
Financial Responsibility of the Crown   
The other central provision is the financial responsibility and required initiative of the Crown. 
The Crown must ‘take the initiative in financial matters’; it is both a statutory and a political 
duty.287 It is a political duty because the Crown is responsible for the functioning of 
government through its Ministers with a key aspect being the responsibility for financial 
matters including government expenditure.288 The Crown’s financial responsibility and its 
need to take the initiative are reflected in the requirement that the first Appropriation Bill be 
introduced within one month of the beginning of every financial year.289 The government’s 
financial initiative and responsibility means it ‘cannot have fiscal policies foisted upon it’.290 
The government is constrained to an extent by the requirement that policy objectives are 
pursued in accordance with the five principles of responsible fiscal management. The 
government may depart from the principles but any departure should only be temporary. The 
Minister of Finance must explain why the government has departed from the principles, how 
they will return to following them and how long that will take.291 The principles are only 
guidelines with no formal punishment for failing to follow them.292 The financial 
responsibility documents articulate the government’s following of the principles.   
 
Crown’s Financial Veto 
The Crown’s financial responsibility is demonstrated and reinforced with the financial veto. 
The financial veto prevents the House from passing a bill, amendment or motion that the 
government believes will have a more than minor impact on the its fiscal aggregates or from 
making a change to a Vote that the government believes will have a more than minor impact 
on its composition.293 The government must deliver a financial veto certificate with an 
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explanation of the nature of the impact and why it does not concur with the proposal. A 
financial veto certificate may be debated when the House next considers the bill, amendment, 
motion or Vote and the government may withdraw a certificate at any time.294 The financial 
veto may only be used at specified stages of the parliamentary process.295 MPs must give 
notice for an amendment that could have a minor impact on fiscal aggregates or a move to 
change a Vote.296 The financial veto ensures that MPs have the opportunity to scrutinise 
government policies that involve expenditure through proposing alternatives. The financial 
veto reinforces government responsibility because it prevents the Crown from having to take 
responsibility for proposals that involve government expenditure that it does not agree 
with.297  
 
Supply and Confidence 
Parliament grants the government the right to spend public money by providing supply. 
McGee explains that ‘Parliament’s consent to the expenditure of public money is often 
known as the granting of supply’.298 Parliament provides supply through the annual supply 
process that passes various Appropriation Acts.299 The supply process centres on the main 
Appropriation Bill presented with the Budget, ‘the government’s principal annual statement 
of economic and fiscal policy’.300 Key votes in the supply process on Imprest Supply Bills 
and Appropriation Bills serve as confidence votes in the government.301 The government 
requires supply to function with the potential for Parliament to withhold supply serving as a 
major check on the government.302 The government’s need to obtain supply allows for the 
control and scrutiny of government expenditure. Furthermore, it ensures that Parliament 
meets each year with the sitting schedule influenced by the various pieces of financial 
business that must be brought before the House.303 
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Appropriations  
Parliament in the supply process considers appropriations requested by the government in 
Appropriation Bills. An appropriation is ‘a parliamentary authorisation for the Crown or an 
office of Parliament to incur expenses or capital expenditure’.304 Appropriations enable the 
incurring of expenses or capital expenditure because that is how public money is spent under 
accrual accounting.305 Accrual appropriations show the full resource cost of an appropriation, 
not just the cash cost, with expenditure counted in the period the activity occurred or will 
occur.306 The nature of appropriations means that the provision preventing the expenditure of 
public money without authorisation from Parliament alone is inadequate.307  As such the 
Crown or an office of Parliament must have authorisation from Parliament in an 
appropriation or other authority to incur expenses or capital expenditure.308 Accrual 
appropriations are able to work because public money can be used to meet expenses and 
capital expenditure incurred in accordance with an appropriation or other authority.309 The 
government must have the legal authority to undertake what is proposed in an 
appropriation.310 Appropriations do not provide the legal authority themselves with the 
exception of permanent legislative authorities.311 There is no obligation to use an 
appropriation.312  
Key aspects of appropriations create clear accountability for expenditure. 
Appropriations centre on the concepts of inputs, outputs and outcomes. Inputs are the 
resources used to produce goods and services known as outputs.313 Outputs are designed to 
contribute to outcomes ‘a state or condition of society, the economy, or the environment and 
includes change in that state or condition’.314 The government is held accountable for its 
choice of desired outcomes and the outputs it purchases to meet them.315 Accountability is 
established through ministerial responsibility for appropriations. Appropriations are 
organised into Votes with each comprising one appropriation or a group of similar or related 
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appropriations.316 Each Vote has a responsible Minister or Ministers that are in charge of it.317 
The Minister or Ministers are responsible to Parliament for the use of the appropriations 
contained in the Vote.318 For offices of Parliament the responsible Minister is the Speaker.319 
Ministers may hold responsibility for more than one Vote. Each Vote is administered by one 
department or office of Parliament.320 Proposed appropriations for offices of Parliament are 
considered and recommended by the House, specifically the Officers of Parliament 
Committee, before they are included in an Appropriation Bill.321 
Appropriations are tightly specified to ensure Parliament is aware of what it is 
authorising. Appropriations must be one of six types that reflect different forms of expenses 
and capital expenditure with separate appropriations required for each category under each 
type.322 The six appropriations types are: output expenses, benefits or other unrequited 
expenses, other expenses, capital expenditure, and expenses and capital expenditure incurred 
by each intelligence and security department.323 Output expenses are usually for a single class 
of outputs that are a grouping of similar outputs.324 Dissimilar output expenses may be 
grouped together to form multi-class output expenses but their usage requires explanation.325 
Appropriations are defined as departmental or non-departmental to limit who receives the 
money.326 Appropriations allow for the incurring of expenses and capital expenditure up to a 
maximum amount.327 There is the exception that departments are able to incur output 
expenses up to the amount of revenue that they expect to receive from that class of outputs 
from parties other than the Crown.328 However, the usage of this provision must be specified 
in an Appropriation Act and have the approval of the Minister of Finance. The ability to incur 
expenses and capital expenditure is limited by the scope of the appropriation and cannot be 
used for any other purpose.329 Lastly, appropriations are limited by the time period that they 
can be used for. Most appropriations are for one year and lapse at the end of the financial 
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year.330 Parliament can approve appropriations for any number of years but multi-year 
appropriations ensure that a standard is available for appropriations longer than one year.331 
Multi-year appropriations can be for up to five years.332 The PFA provides departments with 
flexibility to manage their assets and capital expenditure with provisions to ensure 
parliamentary control and scrutiny.333  
 
Permanent Appropriations  
Permanent appropriations provide parliamentary authority to spend public money outside of 
the supply process. Permanent appropriations or permanent legislative authorities provide 
authority for the spending of public money through legislation other than an Appropriation 
Act.334 Permanent appropriations are primarily used for two purposes: to show independence 
from government, including the Auditor-General’s salary,335 and for the servicing and 
repayment of debt to provide reassurance to those lending money to the Crown.336 Permanent 
appropriations continue in operation until they are repealed by Parliament.337 The legislation 
providing parliamentary authority for a permanent appropriation generally imposes a limit on 
the scope but not the amount of spending.338 The PFA allows for expenses and capital 
expenditure to be incurred as a part of a permanent appropriation that otherwise only provide 
for the payment of public money. Permanent appropriations must be managed and accounted 
for as though they were incurred under an Appropriation Act.339 The information supporting 
the Estimates includes for each proposed category of expenses or capital expenditure to be 
incurred under a permanent appropriation the information required for appropriations in the 
Estimates, except the amount is a forecast, and the authority for each expense or capital 
expenditure.340 
 
Emergency, Excess and Transferring Appropriations    
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The government has some flexibility with appropriations that is balanced by reporting 
requirements that ensure parliamentary scrutiny. The Minister of Finance may approve the 
incurring of expenses and capital expenditure to meet a declared emergency or disaster 
without an appropriation.341 The Minister is not limited in the amount they can approve.342 
The expenses and capital expenditure incurred must be included in the annual financial 
statements of the government and in an Appropriation Bill for confirmation from 
Parliament.343 The government is allowed to make limited transfers between output expense 
appropriations, and incur expenses and capital expenditure to a limited extent in excess of the 
level appropriated during the last three months of the financial year. Any changes made using 
either provision must be included in an Appropriation Bill for confirmation from 
Parliament.344 A statement of excess expenses and capital expenditure must be included in the 
annual financial statements of the government and the department administering the Vote that 
contains the appropriation.345 The requirement for the government to get confirmation from 
Parliament does not affect the validity of the expenditure.346 The confirmation requirement 
ensures that the expenditure can be scrutinised by Parliament.347  
 
Unappropriated Expenditure  
Parliament retrospectively provides approval for the expenditure of public money. Parliament 
may want to legalise expenses or capital expenditure that were incurred without an 
appropriation or other authority.348 The desire to retrospectively grant approval may come 
from recognising that public money was spent in good faith and that there are obligations 
entered into that must be met through legalised expenditure.349 Unappropriated expenditure 
occurs when expenses or capital expenditure are incurred without an appropriation or the 
amount incurred is in excess of an appropriation.350 Parliament may validate unappropriated 
expenses or capital expenditure in an Appropriation Act. The Minister of Finance must 
provide a report to the House when validation is requested in an Appropriation Bill.351 A 
statement detailing any unappropriated expenditure must be included in the financial 
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statements for the financial year of both the government and the department that administers 
the Vote.352 Without validation the unappropriated expenses and capital expenditure remain 
unlawful.353  
 
Appropriation (Financial Review) Bill  
The government is able to get validation and confirmation for expenditure after the financial 
year has ended through an Appropriation (Financial Review) Bill. Appropriation (Financial 
Review) Bills are ‘An Appropriation Bill containing provisions solely concerned with the 
confirming or validating of expenditure incurred in respect of any previous year’.354 They 
allow the government to get the required confirmation in an Appropriation Bill for expenses 
and capital expenditure incurred in an emergency and in excess of existing appropriations as 
well as transfers between appropriations within a Vote.355 The Appropriation (Financial 
Review) Bill also allows the government to get unlawful expenditure, expenses or capital 
expenditure incurred without an appropriation or other authority, validated by Parliament.356 
Unlawful expenditure is occasionally validated in other legislation.357  
 
Budget and Estimates Documentation  
 
The Estimates 
The Estimates and the other supporting information contain the details required for 
appropriations contained in an Appropriation Bill. The government specifies its 
appropriations request from Parliament in the Estimates.358 Appropriation Bills only state the 
name and the amount of each appropriation. Parliament approves appropriations in an 
Appropriation Bill with reference to the information contained in the Estimates and other 
supporting information.359 The Minister of Finance presents the Estimates and other 
supporting information on the same day as the presentation of the Appropriation (Estimates) 
Bill and no later than after the delivery of the Budget.360 The Estimates must contain for each 
appropriation: the Vote that each appropriation relates to, the responsible Minister or 
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Ministers, the department that will administer the Vote containing the appropriation, the 
appropriation type, scope and period (if greater than one year) and the amount appropriated. 
The responsible Minister for each department must be identified and the projected balance of 
net assets for the department at the end of the financial year.361 The format of the Estimates is 
determined predominantly by the Minister of Finance with the information requirements 
having a significant influence.362 The Minister must consult the House on significant 
proposed changes to the format or content of the Estimates, supporting information, or 
Supplementary Estimates before they can come into effect. Proposed changes are submitted 
to the Speaker who presents them to the House.363 The House refers the proposed changes to 
the FEC that subsequently passes its own consideration and that of the other select 
committees to the Minister.364 The Minister must consider any comments from the Speaker or 
select committees.365  
 
Information Supporting the Estimates  
Most of the information needed to scrutinise government expenditure is in the information 
supporting the Estimates. The information supporting the Estimates includes for each 
appropriation: a short description including its intended impacts, outcomes or objectives, the 
performance measures and forecast standards to be achieved for each class of outputs, the 
forecast expenses for each class of output in a multi-class output expense appropriation, and 
the amount voted and the estimated amount actually spent for each appropriation in the 
previous financial year.366 The supporting information contains for each Vote: the voted and 
estimated actual expenses and capital expenditure for the previous year, the actual expenses 
and capital expenditure for the four years before the previous year for the total of each 
appropriation type and a summary of the financial activity for each Vote that includes the 
budgeted and estimated actual figures for the previous year.367 The Minister of Finance may 
include with the Estimates or the supporting information any additional information 
considered necessary or desirable.368 
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365 PFA, s.18.  
366 PFA, s.15. 
367 ibid.  
368 PFA, s.14-s.15 
 51 
 
Statements of Intent  
Statements of intent provide information on department’s and offices of Parliament’s future 
operating intentions.369 Statements of intent describe the ‘expected contribution to the 
government’s outcomes and priorities over the medium term (three to five years)’.370 They 
include forecast financial statements and statements of forecast service performance for the 
current financial year.371 Forecast performance information allows for the assessment of 
actual performance and contribution to outcomes.372 Statements of intent include statements 
of responsibility from the chief executive, chief financial officer and the responsible 
Minister.373 Statements of intent for offices of Parliament have adjusted requirements to 
reflect that they are responsible to the House and not the government.374 Statements of intent 
for departments and offices of Parliament must be presented on the same day as the 
Budget.375 Crown entities must also present statements of intent.376 The statements of intent 
for Crown entities also contain Budget and output information.377 State enterprises (SOEs) 
present statements of corporate intent.378 Departmental output plans, that state the outputs 
supplied by the department and standards used to measure the departments performance, are a 
further document used during the Estimates examination.379  
 
Supplementary Estimates 
The government can modify the appropriations and Estimates in the main Appropriation 
(Estimates) Bill with supplementary appropriations and Estimates. Although the main 
Appropriation Bill and the Estimates serve as the primary authority for incurring expenses 
and capital expenditure changes will be required during the financial year.380 Changes could 
be necessary because of new Cabinet decisions and more up to date spending forecasts than 
those used to produce the Estimates.381 Parliament authorises the changes wanted by the 
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government with supplementary appropriations.382 Supplementary appropriations generally 
only make technical accounting adjustments with select committees expecting to have their 
attention drawn to changes in government policy.383 Supplementary Estimates must state all 
changes to the information contained in the main Estimates that result from the Appropriation 
(Supplementary Estimates) Bill.384 The Minister of Finance must introduce Supplementary 
Estimates on the same day as the Appropriation (Supplementary Estimates) Bill.385  
 
Standard Estimates Questionnaire 
The standard estimates questionnaire is an important information source for select 
committees’ examination of the Estimates. The standard estimates questionnaire asks for 
information which supplements that contained in the Estimates and other supporting 
information. The FEC produces the questionnaire and receives advice from the Auditor-
General on its form.386 The questionnaire suggests to select committees what information 
they may want to obtain from their examination.387 Select committees may supplement the 
standard questionnaire with additional questions. Members may ask further written questions 
of Ministers and departments prior to the oral hearing but the select committee must approve 
of their usage to be formally included in the Estimates process.388 The sending off of the 
questionnaire to Vote Ministers is the first step in the Estimates examination. Ministers 
receive the standard questionnaire in respect of each Vote six weeks out from the Budget and 
are requested to respond to the committee soon after the delivery of the Budget statement and 
before the Vote’s examination.389 The questionnaire is designed to not be burdensome on the 
Minister or department. 
 
Fiscal Responsibility Documents 
The Minister of Finance must present to the House a number of fiscal responsibility 
documents. The fiscal responsibility documents are tied together with each other and the 
principles of responsible fiscal management creating a framework to scrutinise government 
fiscal and economic management. Economic and fiscal updates provide economic and fiscal 
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forecasts from the Treasury for the current and next two financial years.390 An economic and 
fiscal update must be presented in November or December.391 The budget policy statement 
states for the upcoming Budget the broad strategic priorities guiding its preparation and 
explains any changes to fiscal objectives or intentions. It must be presented by 31 March in 
the financial year prior to which it relates.392 The fiscal strategy report sets out the 
government’s long-term objectives and its short-term intentions across five fiscal variables 
and how they are consistent with the principles of responsible fiscal management.393 The 
fiscal strategy report and an economic and fiscal update must be presented on Budget day and 
no later than immediately after the Budget has been delivered.394 An economic and fiscal 
update must be presented just before a general election, usually between 20 to 30 working 
days prior.395 A statement on the long-term fiscal position is prepared for the House every 
four years by the Treasury.396 The statement is referred to the FEC.397 All documents are 
prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting practice (GAAP).398 
 
Financial Statements and Accounting  
The following section describes the financial reporting documents entities are required to 
present to the House. GAAP determines how financial information must be prepared and 
presented to the House. The government must prepare its financial statements in accordance 
GAAP.399 GAAP means any applicable finance reporting standards set by the Accounting 
Standards Review Board.400 Where no provision is made in financial reporting standards 
accounting policies must be appropriate to the Crown, department, office of Parliament or 
Crown entity and have authoritative support within the New Zealand accounting 
profession.401 The Accounting Standards Review Board, an independent Crown entity, sets 
financial reporting standards independently of the government.402 The House is able to 
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disallow or amend reporting standards set by the Accounting Standards Review Board.403 The 
government’s accounting practices are based on internationally accepted standards. GAAP is 
aligned with international financial reporting standards (IFRS) resulting in ‘harmonisation’ 
between New Zealand’s financial reporting standards and best international practice.404 The 
usage of GAAP for the government’s financial statements means that their accounts are 
prepared and audited to the same standards as the private sector.405  
Accrual accounting rather than cash accounting is used for the government’s financial 
statements. Accrual accounting is more accurate than cash accounting because it ‘measures 
expenses when incurred and revenue when earned’.406 Accrual accounting provides more 
accurate information because it ‘captures the full cost of resources used to produce outputs, it 
provides better information to support costing, purchase and ownership decisions than cash 
accounting provides’.407 It is also ‘less subject to manipulation’.408 Information on cash-flows 
is still important and is presented along with the accrual information in financial statements. 
Accrual accounting allows the government and government entities to accurately present 
their financial position on a balance sheet showing their assets and liabilities.409  
 
Departments and Offices of Parliament  
Departments and offices of Parliament produce annual reports. They are produced after the 
financial year has ended.410 Annual reports contain information on operations and 
performance, a statement of service performance, annual financial statements, an audit report 
and a statement of responsibility.411 The statement of service performance describes the 
performance in delivering outputs compared with that forecast in the Statement of Intent 
including a comparison of the forecast and the actual output expenses incurred.412 The 
financial statements contain the earlier forecast financial statements, and a statement of actual 
expenses and capital expenditure incurred against appropriations administered by the 
department, a statement and explanation of unappropriated expenses or capital expenditure 
incurred and any other information needed to fairly reflect its financial operations or 
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position.413 The statement of service performance and the financial statements are prepared in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting practice (GAAP).414 The chief executive and 
chief financial officer must sign a statement of responsibility.415 The Auditor-General audits 
the financial statements and the statement of service performance. An audit report is 
presented within three months after the end of the financial year. Departments’ full annual 
reports are also referred to the Auditor-General for review before providing the audit 
report.416 The responsible Minister presents the annual report to the House.417  
 
Crown entities, SOEs and other public organisations  
Crown entities, SOEs and other public organisations must also produce annual reports. 
Crown entities produce annual reports that contain statements of service performance, with 
the exception of schools and tertiary education institutions, and annual financial statements at 
the end of the financial year.418 Crown entities’ financial statements are audited by the 
Auditor-General who produces an audit opinion.419 The responsible minister presents the 
annual report to the House.420  SOEs present annual reports containing information of the 
operations of the enterprise and its subsidiaries as well as annual financial statements.421 The 
annual report is expected to compare the SOEs performance with its earlier statement of 
corporate intent.422 Other public organisations also prepare annual reports that are presented 
to the House. Several public organisations listed in schedule four of the PFA must present 
annual reports to the House meeting the conditions set in the Crown Entities Act 2004 
(CEA).423 A number of other public organisations are required by specific legislation to 
prepare annual reports for the House.424  
 
Annual Financial Statements of the Government  
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Annual financial statements are prepared for the whole of government. The Treasury 
produces annual consolidated ‘Financial Statements of the Government of New Zealand’ that 
include the entire government reporting entity.425 The government reporting entity includes 
departments, offices of Parliament, mixed ownership model companies, schedule four 
organisations, SOEs, Crown entities, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.426 The annual 
financial statements include information in accordance with GAAP, additional information to 
that, and the earlier forecast financial statements.427 The financial statements of the 
government are audited by the Auditor-General who produces an audit report.428 The 
Minister of Finance and the Secretary of the Treasury must sign statements of 
responsibility.429 The Minister presents to the House the annual financial statements, the audit 
report and the statement of responsibility.430 The statements are presented to the House 
approximately three months after the financial year has ended.431 The government must also 
produce monthly financial statements.432 Monthly financial statements are not presented to 
the House but they are publically available.433  
 
Reports on non-departmental appropriations 
The financial review process includes the consideration of reports on non-departmental 
appropriations. The reports are produced when an Appropriation Bill states that an 
appropriation or class of outputs within an appropriation, with expenses or capital 
expenditure incurred by an entity other than a department or an office of Parliament, is 
subject to section 32A of the PFA. The report contains a statement of service performance or 
a statement of results, and a comparison of the actual expenses or capital expenditure 
incurred with the amount appropriated or forecasted. A statement of service performance is 
not required when another entity is required to report on it. The Minister responsible for the 
appropriation or class of output presents the non-departmental appropriations report to the 
House within three months of the end of the financial year.434  
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Parliamentary Process 
 
Introduction 
Parliament provides the government with consent to spend public money and reviews 
government expenditure based on an annual financial cycle. The recurring annual cycle is not 
a necessity ‘it is always a question of legislative choice’.435 The annual cycle works around 
the government’s financial year that runs from the 1st of July through to the 30th of June in the 
following calendar year.436 Parliament’s financial cycle has two separate distinct processes; 
the supply process and the financial review process. The supply process involves Parliament 
granting appropriation or authorisation to the government to spend money to carry on the 
government in respect of that financial year that is not permanently appropriated.437 The 
financial review process serves as Parliament’s post-expenditure examination of government 
expenditure. It involves the review of: the performance in the previous financial year and 
current operations of each individual department, office of Parliament, Crown entity, public 
organisation and SOE, reports on non-departmental appropriations, as well as the annual 
financial statements of the government.438 The following page contains a diagram of the 
supply and financial review processes. The following section describes the two processes in 
detail. A summary table of debate lengths and MPs speaking times is included at the end of 
the section.   
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Figure 3.1: Supply and Financial Review Process Diagram  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
November-December: Budget policy statement 
and economic and fiscal update presented to 
the House.  
February: FEC examination of budget policy 
statement and economic and fiscal update.  
March: Budget policy statement debate.  
May-July: The Budget presented. Introduction 
of main Appropriation (Estimates) Bill. Budget 
debate.  The Estimates, other supporting 
information, statements of intent for 
departments and offices of Parliament, the 
fiscal strategy report, and an economic and 
fiscal update presented.  
August-September: Select committees examine 
and report on the Estimate (as allocated by 
FEC) s. FEC examines and reports on the fiscal 
strategy report and economic and fiscal update.  
August-October: Third reading debate of main 
Appropriation (Estimates) Bill. Fiscal strategy 
report and economic and fiscal update debated.  
May-June: Supplementary Estimates examined 
by select committees (as allocated by FEC) and 
report to House. 
June: First Imprest Supply Bill and debate. 
August-September: Estimates debate.  
August-October: Second Imprest Supply Bill 
and debate. 
1 July: beginning of financial year.  
30 June: end of financial year  
May-June: Introduction of Appropriation 
(Supplementary Estimates) Bill and 
Supplementary Estimates.  
June: Supplementary Estimates debate. 
Appropriation (Supplementary Estimates) Bill 
passed.  
November-December: Appropriation 
(Financial Review) Bill introduced.  
November-January: Financial reviews 
undertaken by select committees (as allocated 
by FEC). Reports on non-departmental 
appropriations also examined.  
February-March: Financial review debate on 
financial reviews of departments and offices of 
Parliament, reports on non-departmental 
appropriations, and annual financial statements 
of the government. Appropriation (Financial 
Review) Bill passed.  
Debate on the financial reviews of Crown 
entities, SOEs and other public organisations.  
November-December: FEC examination of 
annual financial statements of the government.  
September-October: Annual financial 
statements of the government and audit report 
presented.  
September-October: Annual reports of 
departments and offices of Parliament 
presented.   
August-September: Non-departmental  
appropriations reports presented.    
Supply process 
Financial review process 
Source: Office of the Clerk, ‘Parliament’s Annual 
Financial Cycle’, June 2012, 
http://www.parliament.nz/resource/0000195069 (25 
June 2013). 
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Supply Process 
 
Budget Policy Statement and Economic and Fiscal Update  
Parliament’s supply process begins in the prior financial year with an economic and fiscal 
update and the budget policy statement. The budget policy statement and the economic and 
fiscal update are typically considered together in November or December as the statement is 
usually ready early.439 The budget policy statement and the economic and fiscal update are 
examined by the FEC.440 The Minister of Finance must attend the committee hearing on the 
budget policy statement if requested. A transcript is made of the hearing and public 
submissions are requested. The FEC must report back to the House on the budget policy 
statement within 40 working days. The next general debate after the report has been 
presented is replaced with one on the statement and the report. The chairperson of the FEC 
has the right to speak first.441 The debate is comprised of 12 speeches from individual 
members of up to ten minutes with the debate running for up to two hours.442 All debate must 
be relevant to the question before the House.443 For the debate on the budget policy statement 
MPs must speak to the statement and the report.444 
 
First Imprest Supply Bill  
Imprest supply is granted through an Imprest Supply Act. Imprest supply provides the 
government with interim authority from Parliament to incur expenses and capital expenditure 
for any purpose before an appropriation has been approved. The condition is that all spending 
must later be contained as appropriations in an Appropriation Act for the same financial 
year.445 The first Imprest Supply Bill is introduced and passed before the financial year has 
begun. The bill provides imprest supply from the beginning of the financial year until the 
main Appropriations Bill has passed.446 The first Imprest Supply Bill is passed at the time as 
the Appropriation (Supplementary Estimates) Bill for the previous year.447 The debates on the 
second reading of an Appropriation (Supplementary Estimates) Bill and an Imprest Supply 
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Bill may be combined.448 The two debates may be combined because both must be passed by 
the end of the current financial year.449  
The House has a special process for Imprest Supply Bills. The government may 
introduce and proceed with an Imprest Supply Bill at any time provided no debate is 
interrupted.450 They may pass through all required stages on the same day in normal sitting 
hours. There is no debate at the first reading.451 Imprest Supply Bills, and Appropriation Bills 
themselves, are not referred to a select committee.452 The House debates the Imprest Supply 
Bill at the second reading. There are ‘virtually no limitations’ on relevancy in the debate.453 
Members may propose amendments relating to any matter concerning public affairs and are 
not required to be strictly relevant.454 A question of confidence in the government may be 
raised.455 Members may speak for ten minutes and the whole debate is three hours.456 
Following the second reading the House moves immediately to the third reading unless the 
Minister in charge of the bill requires the House to go into committee to consider an 
amendment. There is no debate at the third reading.457  
 
The Budget Debate   
The Budget containing the main Appropriations Bill is presented to the House at 2pm on a 
Thursday, usually in May, with the day notified in advance by the government.458 The 
Minister of Finance delivers the Budget statement, a prepared speech explaining the 
government’s economic and fiscal policies, at the second reading.459 The Minister has 
unlimited speaking time.460 After the Budget Statement, or alternatively at any time prior on 
the same day, the Minister of Finance presents to the House a copy of the Budget Statement, 
the Estimates and other supporting information,461 the statements of intent for departments 
and office of Parliament,462 the fiscal strategy report,463 and an economic and fiscal update.464 
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The subsequent Budget debate is started by the opposition’s leader or finance spokesperson 
followed by the other party leaders in order of party size starting with the Prime Minister. 
Amendments may be proposed relating to any matter of public affairs providing the 
opportunity to raise a no confidence motion.465 The debate goes for 14 hours excluding the 
Budget statement. Leaders of parties with six or more members speak for 20 minutes. Other 
members and Ministers speaking in reply may speak for ten minutes.466 The debate may 
conclude with a ten minute reply from the Minister of Finance.467 
 
Select Committee Examination of the Estimates  
The Estimates and other Budget documentation are referred to select committees for 
consideration. The Estimates are referred to the FEC that allocates the task of examining the 
Estimates to itself and the other select committees. Votes are allocated to the select 
committee that is responsible for the appropriate subject area. The FEC may break up a Vote 
and refer its appropriations to multiple select committees.468 The ability is used infrequently 
but it does allow for a Minister’s appropriations to be considered together. Oral hearings are 
subsequently held where members question the Minister in charge of the Vote and the chief 
executive of the department with the assistance of officials. Hearings begin with the Minister 
taking the opportunity to make a short statement. The hearing is conducted as the chairperson 
directs with the committees’ approval.469 The chairperson ensures that questions are relevant 
and that the information sought is for the hearings purpose.470 Members can request further 
information in writing on issues raised during the hearing.471 The hearings are generally open 
to the public, although they can be in private.472 Select committees receive assistance from 
the Auditor-General including a written and oral briefing if requested.473 Select committees 
following the hearing determine whether they can recommend that the appropriations in the 
Vote be accepted and may recommend changes.474 A report is produced for the House that 
summarise the responses to the questionnaire, other written questions and the oral 
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examination.475 Reports may include minority views to reflect differing opinions of 
members.476 Select committees must report back within two months of the delivery of the 
Budget.477 The FEC also considers the fiscal strategy report and the economic and fiscal 
update and reports to the House on both documents within two months of the delivery of the 
Budget.478   
 
Estimates Debate  
The Estimates debate held, at the committee stage of the main Appropriation Bill, is where 
the House considers the appropriations requested by the government in each Vote. The House 
debates the Votes in order on the question that each stand part.479 The Business Committee 
may determine the order that Votes are considered and how long will be spent on each.480 
However, the task is allocated to party whips allowing for a speaking list that distributes the 
time between parties and lets them decide which Votes they will debate.481 Which Votes are 
available to debate and how long will be spent on the debate that day is determined by the 
government.482 At the conclusion of the debate any remaining Votes and amendments 
proposed by the Minister of Finance that have not yet been considered are combined into a 
single question. There is no debate on the question.483 A Minister, usually the responsible 
Minister, is available to answer questions with officials present to assist.484 The Estimates 
debate is restricted to the expenditure plans in the Budget documentation.485 MPs may 
propose a change to a Vote.486 The FEC may examine adjustments proposed by the 
government.487 The Estimates debate is eight hours long. Ministers in charge of the Vote 
under consideration may deliver multiple five minute speeches but normally no more than 
two consecutive speeches. Other members may make two five minute speeches on each 
Vote.488 
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Appropriation Bill Debate   
The main Appropriation Bill is debated at its third reading. Members’ debate must be 
relevant. The debate may include reference to the fiscal strategy report, the economic and 
fiscal update presented with the Budget, and the FEC’s reports on each document.489 The 
third reading debate goes for three hours and members speak for ten minutes.490 The debate 
on the third reading must be completed within three months of the delivery of the Budget.491 
Given that the Budget must be presented to the House by 31 July the main Appropriations 
Bill must be passed by 31 October at the latest. The bill is passed much earlier in practice due 
to the Budget usually being delivered in May.492  
 
Second Imprest Supply Bill  
A second Imprest Supply Bill is passed at the same time as the main Appropriations Bill. The 
passing of the main Appropriations Bill ends the appropriation authority provided by the first 
Imprest Supply Act.493 However, the main Appropriation Act provides parliamentary 
authority with most of the financial year yet to occur. Supplementary Estimates with new and 
modified appropriations are presented later. The second Imprest Supply Bill provides 
parliamentary authority to address spending issues that will arise in the meantime. The 
authority provided by the second Imprest Supply Act ends when the Appropriation 
(Supplementary Estimates) Bill is passed.494 Expenses and capital expenditure incurred under 
the second Imprest Supply Bill is later appropriated in the Appropriation (Supplementary 
Estimates) Bill.495 The need to pass the second Imprest Supply Bill at the same time as the 
main Appropriation (Estimates) Bill is facilitated by the ability to combine the second and 
third reading debates respectively.496 Further Imprest Supply Bills may be introduced if 
necessary.497 
 
Supplementary Estimates 
The Appropriation (Supplementary Estimates) Bill and the Supplementary Estimates are 
examined by Parliament late in the financial year. The bill may be introduced at any time 
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provided no debate is interrupted.498 The Appropriation (Supplementary Estimates) Bill is 
generally introduced on the same day as the Budget for the next financial year.499 There is no 
debate at the first reading.500 The Supplementary Estimates are referred to the FEC who may 
examine a Vote itself or refer it to another select committee for examination.501 The 
committee cannot split up a Vote in the Supplementary Estimates examination like it can with 
the main Estimates.502 There is no set report time. However, the Bill must be passed before 
30 June, the end of the financial year, providing select committees with little time to consider 
the Supplementary Estimates.503 As a result the FEC frequently examines all Supplementary 
Estimates itself.504 The FEC relies on the explanations of Treasury officials, as well as 
officials from departments and Ministers, especially the Minister of Finance, when 
required.505 Select committees determine whether they can recommend that the 
appropriations in respect of the Vote be accepted and they can recommend changes.506  
The House debates the Supplementary Estimates following the select committee 
examination. Supplementary Estimates are debated by the House at the second reading of the 
Appropriation (Supplementary Estimates) Bill.507 It is a three hour debate with each member 
able to speak for ten minutes.508 Members’ speeches must be relevant to the bill and address 
the supplementary appropriations. Since it is the last debate of the financial year members 
may discuss the policies that the government has sought appropriations for throughout the 
financial year and the government’s financial position.509 After the second reading the House 
immediately goes to the third reading. There are two exceptions; when the Minister wants an 
amendment considered, or a select committee has recommended a change, the House resolves 
itself into a Committee of the Whole House to consider the proposals. There is no debate at 
the third reading.510 The government may introduce further Supplementary Estimates.511  
 
Financial Review Process 
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Introduction  
Parliament in the financial review process controls and scrutinises government 
expenditure after it has occurred. The process starts after the financial year has ended. There 
are three areas of examination. Firstly, the process involves the undertaking of financial 
reviews that examine ‘the performance in the previous financial year and current operations 
of each individual department, office of Parliament, Crown entity, public organisation or 
State enterprise’.512 Parliament, mainly its select committees, undertakes the task by 
reviewing annual reports that include a financial statement.513 Secondly, the process has the 
FEC examine the annual financial statements of the government.514 Lastly, reports on non-
departmental appropriations are examined by select committees throughout the year with 
reports prepared for the House for debate.515 The financial review process is largely 
structured around the consideration of the Appropriation (Financial Review) Bill.  
 
Select Committee Examination   
The financial review process starts with the presentation to the House of the above documents 
to the House and their referral to select committees. The financial review process begins with 
the presentation of annual reports to the House.516 The annual reports are referred to the FEC 
that allocates to itself and the other select committees the task of undertaking the financial 
reviews.517 Reports on non-departmental appropriations are also referred to the FEC and 
allocated in the same fashion. Select Committees are required to report to the House on all 
non-departmental appropriation reports received within one week of the first sitting day each 
year.518 The FEC is tasked with reporting on the annual financial statements of the 
government.519 The Minister of Finance and the Secretary of the Treasury serve as witnesses 
for the examination.520 The FEC must report to the House within one week of the first sitting 
day in each year.521  
The financial review process includes the select committee examination of departments 
and other entities. The core materials for select committees’ examinations are the annual 
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report, the Statement of Intent and the output plan of the department or other entity.522 Select 
committees frequently ask for further information before or after the oral examination. Only 
questions forwarded with the committee’s authority are formally part of the review.523 The 
Auditor-General may provide the select committee with an oral briefing if requested. A 
written briefing is provided unless a select committee requests otherwise.524 Witnesses for the 
committee hearings are the chief executive and senior officials for departments and for other 
entities the board and management. Although they can be invited Ministers are not expected 
to appear because financial reviews are for operational matters. Departments or entities may 
be asked or request themselves that they respond to questions in writing.525 Select committees 
do not carry out full examinations of all entities due to the limited time available. Many 
reports are based only on the documentation and the Auditor-General’s briefing.526  Select 
committees report to the House on the financial reviews for departments and offices of 
Parliament within one week of the first sitting day in each year. Reports for Crown entities, 
public organisations or SOEs must be presented within six months of the annual reports’ 
presentation to the House.527 
 
Financial Review Debate  
The financial review debate occurs at the committee of the whole stage of the Appropriation 
(Financial Review) Bill. The bill is generally introduced before the Christmas break. There is 
no debate at the first or second reading.528 The debate allows members to discuss: the annual 
financial statements of the government and the FEC report, the financial reviews of 
departments and offices of Parliament, and the reports on non-departmental appropriations. 
The debate must be held by the end of March.529 The government may select the day, which 
financial reviews are available to debate and how long will be spent on the debate that day.530  
The debate begins with the noting of the FEC’s report on the annual financial statements of 
the government followed by the financial reviews and non-departmental appropriation 
reports.531 The order and how long is spent on each financial review is determined the same 
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way as for the Estimates debate.532 The whole debate is four hours. The relevant minister may 
make multiple five minute speeches but normally not more than two consecutive speeches. 
Other members may make two five minute speeches for each review.533 At the conclusion of 
the debate any remaining provisions of the bill, and any amendments proposed by the 
Minister, are put as one question.534 Following the adoption of the report of the Committee of 
the whole House the Bill has its third reading with no debate.535  
 
Debate on Financial Review of Crown entities, public organisations and SOEs 
A separate debate is held for the financial reviews of Crown entities, SOEs and public 
organisations. The government selects the day the debate will be held, advising which 
financial reviews are available for debate and how long the debate will last that day.536 The 
Speaker ensures that the debate occurs and may interrupt the final sitting day of the financial 
year to ensure it happens.537 The order and how long is spent on each financial review is 
determined the same way as the Estimates debate.538 The debate usually occurs in the April to 
June period when most select committee reports are available. However, due to the 
continuous reporting process some will not be available for consideration.539 On the 
government’s chosen day the debate on the financial reviews of Crown entities, public 
organisations, and SOEs is set down as a government order of the day in the charge of a 
Minister. The debate is held in a committee of the whole House and examines the 
performance in the previous financial year and current operations.540 As each financial review 
is reached the question is proposed that the select committee report be noted.541 The debate 
goes for up to three hours. The responsible Minister may make multiple five minute speeches 
but not normally more than two consecutive speeches. Other members may make two five 
minute speeches for each financial review.542 
 
Other Parliamentary Scrutiny   
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Parliament’s control and security of government expenditure is not limited to the supply and 
financial review processes. Several interviewees stressed that the government is held 
accountable through parliamentary questions, both oral at question time and through written 
questions, put to the responsible Minister.543 Questions are asked by members that cover 
government expenditure both directly and indirectly. Requests for information under the 
Official Information Act 1982 are also used to hold the government to account for 
government expenditure.544 General, urgent and special debates may also provide 
opportunities.545 Furthermore, select committees can receive briefings on and undertake 
inquiries at their own initiative into matters relating to their subject area including 
government expenditure.546 As such there are many ways and opportunities for members to 
control and scrutinise government expenditure outside of the formal supply and financial 
review processes.  
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Table 3.1: House Debate Time Limits and MPs Speaking Times547 
Debate Type Total 
debate 
time 
(hours) 
Ministers or particular members 
speaking time (minutes) 
Other 
members 
speaking time 
(minutes) 
Imprest Supply Bill 3 N/A (Not Applicable) 10 
Budget Policy 
Statement Debate548 
2 N/A 10 
Budget Debate 14 Minister of Finance delivering 
Budget statement has unlimited 
time. Leaders of parties with six or 
more members speak for 20 minutes 
each. Minister in reply 10 minutes. 
10 
Estimates Debate 8 Minister in charge of the Vote may 
make multiple 5 minute speeches 
but not normally more than two 
consecutive speeches. 
Not more than 
two speeches of 
5 minutes each 
for each Vote. 
Debate  on the third 
reading of main 
Appropriation Bill549 
3 N/A 10 
Supplementary 
Estimates debate550 
3 N/A 10 
Financial Review 
Debate 
4 Minister in charge of the annual 
financial statements of the 
government or Minister responsible 
for a department or office of 
Parliament may make multiple 5 
minute speeches but not normally 
more than two consecutive speeches. 
Not more than 
two speeches of 
5 minutes each 
for each review. 
Debate on financial 
reviews of Crown 
entities, SOEs and 
public organisations 
3 Responsible Minister for the Crown 
entity, public organisation or SOE 
may make multiple 5 minute 
speeches but not normally more than 
two consecutive speeches. 
Not more than 
two speeches of 
5 minutes each 
for each review. 
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Controller and Auditor-General  
The Auditor-General has a central role in the parliamentary control and scrutiny of 
government expenditure. As watchdog the Auditor-General ‘acts as a check and balance on 
how public money is being collected and spent’ providing Parliament with independent 
assurance that ‘public sector organisations are operating and accounting for their performance 
in the way Parliament intended’.551 The Auditor-General performs the audit and controller 
functions.552 The controller function involves checking that public money is spent only as 
approved by Parliament.553 The audit function involves auditing all public entities, 
undertaking performance audits and inquiries, and providing additional auditing or assurance 
services.554 The Auditor-General is an officer of Parliament appointed by the Governor-
General on the recommendation of the House.555 The Officers of Parliament Committee 
recommends a person to serve as the Auditor-General.556 The Auditor-General is appointed 
for a single term of up to seven years.557 The Governor-General may suspend or remove the 
Auditor-General from office.558 The deputy Auditor-General is appointed the same way 
serving for up to five years and may be reappointed.559 The deputy with restrictions may 
carry out all the functions, duties and utilise all the powers of the Auditor-General.560 The 
Auditor-General is divided into two separate units the Office of the Auditor-General and 
Audit New Zealand. The Office is responsible for planning, reporting to the House, 
undertaking performance audits and inquiries, appointing and monitoring auditors, setting 
auditing standards and reviewing work undertaken on the Auditor-General’s behalf. Audit 
New Zealand undertakes auditing work on the Auditor-General’s behalf along with private 
sector auditors.561 Together they are known as ‘appointed auditors’.562  
The Auditor-General is independent and has extensive powers. The Auditor-General 
and those working on the Auditor-General’s behalf must act independently.563 The Auditor-
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General does not question government policy.564 The Auditor-General cannot be an MP or 
local representative and cannot hold other employment without approval from the Speaker.565 
The House appoints an independent auditor to audit the Auditor-General.566 The Auditor-
General has extensive powers that enable it to effectively carry out its functions. The office of 
the Auditor-General has the power to obtain information from any public entity or person 
necessary to exercise or perform the functions, duties, or powers of the office.567 Public 
entities must ensure that the Auditor-General has access to any required information.568 The 
Auditor-General can require a person to give evidence under oath and inspect bank 
accounts.569 The Auditor-General may report to any Minister, House committee, public entity 
or person.570 Finally, the Auditor-General has the power to disclose information.571  
 
Audit Function  
The Auditor-General performs the audit function by undertaking annual audits, performance 
audits and inquiries. The Auditor-General is the auditor for all public entities and must audit 
the financial statements, accounts and other information that public entities are required to 
have audited.572 Through the audit function the Auditor-General provides assurance to 
Parliament that public entities are accurately reporting their activities.573 The Auditor-General 
observes issues relating to performance, waste, probity and financial prudence, authority and 
accountability. The audit function centres on the undertaking of annual audits that ‘involves 
gathering all the information and explanations needed to obtain reasonable assurance that 
financial statements and other information do not have material misstatements caused by 
fraud or error’.574 Audit reports evaluate the presentation and comment on the financial 
control systems and the ‘financial culture’ within the entity.575 The subsequent audit report, 
including the audit opinion, forms a part of the entity’s annual report. The audit report 
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contains information to make it easier to read.576 A further report is provided to the entity and 
covers issues that were found.577  
Performance audits and inquiries are undertaken as a part of the audit function. The 
Auditor-General carries out performance audits into public entities to examine effectiveness 
and efficiency, compliance with statutory obligations, use of public resources, probity and 
financial prudence.578 The Auditor-General may carry out an inquiry on its own initiate or at 
the request of others into any matter relating to a public entity’s use of public resources.579 
Performance audits examining effectiveness and efficiency and all inquiries cannot question 
government policy.580 The Auditor-General may provide other auditing services to public 
entities.581 Auditors follow the Auditor-General’s auditing standards that incorporate the New 
Zealand Institute of Chartered Accounts’ auditing standards.582 The Auditor-General must 
regularly publish the auditing standards it uses through a report to the House with any 
significant changes included in its annual report.583 
 
Controller Function 
The Auditor-General as controller ensures that public money is spent only as Parliament has 
approved. All public money must be in a Crown Bank account or a departmental bank 
account.584 Public money may be transferred between Crown Bank Accounts and 
departmental bank accounts without an appropriation.585 However, public money can only be 
withdrawn from a Crown or a departmental bank account if there is an appropriation or other 
statutory authority providing for the withdrawal.586 The Auditor-General in carrying out the 
controller function provides Parliament with assurance that expenses and capital expenditure 
incurred by a department or office of Parliament were for lawful purposes and were within an 
appropriation or other authority.587 The controller function is carried out by checking monthly 
Treasury reports and through the audit of appropriations. The Treasury is required to provide 
monthly reports that enable the Auditor-General to determine that expenses and capital 
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expenditure were incurred within an appropriation or other authority from Parliament.588 The 
Auditor-General may use its powers to verify the report.589 The Treasury reports are generally 
limited by only providing information on breaches of appropriation by amount.590 The 
primary way that the controller function is performed is through the audit of appropriations or 
other authorities.591 Appropriations are audited as a part of annual audits and it is where most 
issues are identified.592 The controller function is supported by the Auditor-General’s ability 
to direct a Minister to report to the House and stop payments from a Crown or a departmental 
bank account.593  
 
Relationship with the House 
The Auditor-General reports to and has a close relationship with the House especially its 
select committees. The Auditor-General presents a draft annual plan to the House through the 
Speaker that describes its proposed work program for the coming year. Both the Speaker and 
the FEC consider and respond to the draft.594 The Auditor-General alters the plan considering 
the comments made and indicates any requested changes that were not included. The final 
annual plan is submitted to the House before the start of the financial year.595 The Auditor-
General produces an annual report for the House like that required of departments, including 
discussion on the implementation of the annual plan.596 The Auditor-General reports to the 
House at least once a year on matters arising out of its performance and exercise of its 
functions, duties and powers.597 All reports from the Auditor-General are referred to the FEC 
which may consider the report itself, or where appropriate refer it to another committee.598 A 
code of practice serves as a guide to the nature and extent of assistance provided by the 
Auditor-General to the House, select committees and individual MPs.599 The Auditor-General 
may assist select committees with their examination of the Estimates and financial reviews, 
consideration of bills, inquiries, and consideration of reports from the Auditor-General, as 
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well as address requests or inquiries made straight to the Auditor-General by individual 
MPs.600 The Auditor-General and the FEC consult each year on the nature and extent of the 
assistance that will be provided.601  
 
Finance and Expenditure Committee 
The FEC plays an important role in controlling and scrutinising government expenditure. 
There are 12 subject select committees created by the House. All select committees must 
consider bills, petitions, treaties and other matters referred to it. Select committees may also 
undertake, on their own initiative, inquiries into matters relating to their subject area and they 
can receive briefings on proposed inquiries.602 The FEC is specifically tasked with auditing 
the financial statements of the government and government departments, and for the subject 
areas of government finance, revenue and taxation.603 The government is not required to 
respond to the House on recommendations made in a report on the Estimates, Supplementary 
Estimates and financial reviews but is required to do so for inquiries.604 Select committees are 
able to create subcommittees to help undertake their work.605 The Business Committee 
determines the size of each committee with overall membership closely proportional to 
parties’ membership in the House. The FEC like all select committees does not have a set 
size, although it is one of Parliament’s largest.606 The FEC currently has 11 members 
representing four parties, but has had 12 members representing six parties in the recent 
past.607 The committee’s large size allows for all parties to have a member on the committee 
if they wish while maintaining proportionality. The FEC has a government chairperson and 
majority, as has been historical practice, although neither is required. Not all select 
committees have government chairpersons and majorities.  
The FEC holds a premier or king status among Parliament’s select committees due to 
its co-ordinating role and the body of work it undertakes. The FEC’s high status does not 
come solely from its subject area. Although the committee is ‘pre-eminent’ in undertaking 
financial work, all select committees play an important part in examining government 
expenditure.608 The importance of the FEC comes from its leadership position. The FEC is 
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the ‘linchpin’ for the select committee examinations of the Estimates, Supplementary 
Estimates, reports on non-departmental appropriations and the undertaking of financial 
reviews through its allocation duty.609 The FEC performs a leadership role in how select 
committees perform those examinations. The leadership role is reflected in the issuing of the 
standard estimates questionnaire and its consideration of proposed changes to how both 
financial and non-financial information is presented.610 The FEC examines financial 
management legislation, such as amendments to the PFA, and has the ‘heavy burden’ of 
considering most tax legislation.611 The FEC is tasked with considering and reporting on the 
aforementioned fiscal responsibility documents.612 Furthermore, the FEC examines monetary 
policy by holding public hearings for the quarterly monetary policy statements and the six 
monthly financial stability reports from the Reserve Bank with the bank’s Governor.613 
 
Conclusion 
Parliament theoretically has extensive practice and procedures for controlling and scrutinising 
government expenditure. Parliament is able to perform the function because the government 
needs parliamentary consent to spend public money. At the centre of Parliament’s procedure 
and practice is the supply process, where Parliament is able to provide its consent, and the 
financial review process, where government expenditure is checked after it has occurred. The 
two processes revolve around the FEC-led select committee examinations and the House’s 
various debates. The Auditor-General has a key role with its audit and control functions that 
provide Parliament with assurance that the government has been honest with its expenditure 
of public money. The appropriations and accounting systems provide for parliamentary 
control and facilitate scrutiny of government expenditure. The practice and procedures enable 
Parliament to perform the function. The next chapter evaluates Parliament’s control and 
scrutiny of government expenditure to determine whether the practice and procedures are 
effective.  
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Chapter Four: Evaluation 
 
Introduction  
The following chapter examines Parliament’s effectiveness at controlling and scrutinising 
government expenditure. It critiques the procedure and practice described in the previous 
chapter to determine its appropriateness for aiding Parliament in the undertaking of the 
function. MPs, naturally, are at the centre of Parliament’s undertaking of the function. As 
stated by Pallot ‘ultimately, the effectiveness of parliamentary control depends on the vigour 
of Parliament’s scrutiny and debate’.614 Therefore, emphasis is placed throughout the chapter 
on examining the behaviour of MPs and how the various elements are, or can be, utilised to 
assist them in performing the role. Crucially the core evidence comes from MPs themselves, 
who are in an ideal position to pass judgement. This chapter broadly follows the same 
structure as the previous one. The first section has current MPs describe what they believe is 
Parliament’s role and their overall opinion of its performance. The central provisions and the 
impact of MMP are also considered in that section. The appropriations system, Budget 
documentation, and the financial statements and accounting system that facilitate 
Parliament’s performing of the function are then critiqued. The parliamentary process section 
discusses the debates and select committee examinations where MPs exert Parliament’s right 
to scrutinise government expenditure. The Auditor-General, a key agent in assisting 
Parliament to perform the function, is subsequently considered with the focus on the audit 
and control functions as well as the relationship with the House. Finally, the Finance and 
Expenditure Committee (FEC) is examined in depth using specified success factors.  
 
General Themes and Central Provisions  
 
Role of Parliament 
MPs were asked to describe the appropriate role for Parliament in relation to government 
expenditure. It was unanimously recognised that controlling and scrutinising government 
expenditure is an important role for Parliament. The history of the role was recognised with 
one member stating that:  
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The fundamental principle goes back to the English revolution that governments should not be 
able to spend money without the authority of Parliament and that is a very sound principle that 
continues to be implemented in New Zealand.615 
Members stated that Parliament’s role is to approve, oversee and review government 
expenditure. One member summarised that Parliament’s role is:  
To scrutinise, to keep check on, and to challenge the validity and the value of the spending and to 
make sure that spending is transparent. Spending not only from an auditing perspective but also in 
terms of the efficacy and the extent to which it advances the government’s policy aims.616   
Interviewees stressed that the role is performed on behalf of taxpayers with one member 
stating that: 
The taxation of citizens is effectively a long term social as well as legal contract. Government 
cannot spend money and tax people forcibly without the authority of Parliament. Parliament 
provides checks and balances upon that process on behalf of the people.617 
Parliament’s role of controlling and scrutinising government expenditure was connected to 
that of informing the public of the government’s actions. Scrutiny of government expenditure 
is not limited to the executive. It extends to the whole public sector with Parliament aiming to 
impose incentives and create a culture whereby public money is spent as though it were their 
own. Regular scrutiny was seen as an important discipline that ensures the government is 
operating effectively and efficiently.  
There were two key limitations identified on Parliament’s role of controlling and 
scrutinising government expenditure. The first limitation is that the function is only one of 
Parliament’s roles. Parliament has other roles (including law making, representation and 
providing for a government) that are of equal or greater importance. The second limitation is 
that Parliament’s role is only to control and scrutinise government expenditure. MPs outside 
of the executive have little or no role in determining government expenditure. The executive 
is responsible for instigating government expenditure through the supply process with 
backbench government MPs having a limited influence through Caucus and Caucus 
committees. The Treasury was identified as undertaking important control and scrutiny work. 
The first level of scrutiny by elected representatives and the most significant initial scrutiny 
of government expenditure is performed by Cabinet. Parliament was identified as having an 
important role in forming the legal framework in which government expenditure occurs, 
principally the Public Finance Act 1989 (PFA).  
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The effectiveness of Parliament  
Opinion was divided amongst MPs as to how effectively Parliament performs the function. 
The majority argued that Parliament is fairly good at controlling and scrutinising government 
expenditure. Parliament was given a B+ grade with its processes and systems frequently 
described as ‘robust’.618 Parliament’s effectiveness was linked by several interviewees to the 
Auditor-General and the select committee process. Parliament’s control of government 
expenditure was seen as exceptional by one MP with good practices and procedures for 
tracking public money and ensuring it was not spent inappropriately. The problem is with the 
quality of the scrutiny with concerns raised about how effective Parliament is at questioning:  
Whether we are getting the best bang for the buck, not just whether it was being used 
appropriately, but if it was being used as well as it could be, and whether it was really delivering 
on our public policy outcomes.619   
Scrutiny instead is ‘superficial’ and at a ‘fairly high level’ with the focus inevitably on 
current political issues rather than government expenditure.620 There is significant control and 
scrutiny at the governmental or ministerial level but not at the lower operational or 
departmental level. There was a firm impression that a great deal of public money goes into 
departments ‘that are still quite opaque’ to Ministers and MPs.621 Interviewees were reluctant 
to say that the public sector has a culture of wastefulness.  
Parliament’s undertaking of the function was criticised with the recurring theme being 
the ability and willingness of MPs to perform the role. There was widespread criticism of 
Parliament’s performance. The argument was made that government expenditure is simply 
‘rubber stamped’.622 Parliament was viewed as having a ‘big machine’ to examine 
government expenditure that does not achieve what it aims to do.623 However, the member 
believes that the mechanisms available can and do work, but that requires MPs to have ‘their 
heads around the issues and understanding what is going on… making sure that the collective 
does not make a mistake’.624 That argument is supported by a further member who stated that 
‘you can set up the structure as neat and tidy as you wish but you can’t control the calibre of 
questions that members will ask during the Estimates and financial review processes’.625 
Furthermore, MPs were seen to rarely examine government expenditure in detail. Rather than 
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asking the hard questions they attempt to score political points. A major source of the 
problem is the large amount of reading required to prepare for debates and select committee 
meetings on top of the other work MPs are expected to perform. Several interviewees 
stressed that MPs must balance their commitments to Parliament as well as their 
constituency, party and family. The level of talent possessed by MPs was not often perceived 
as sufficient for effective scrutiny particularly with the lack of necessary training. With MPs 
coming from diverse backgrounds it is case of how to effectively utilise their expertise.    
Reforms to legislation and parliamentary procedure in the past 25 years were seen to 
have improved Parliament’s ability to control and scrutinise government expenditure. The 
PFA received high praise as it laid the solid ground rules and basis for the operation of the 
current system. The usage of accrual accounting and appropriations based on inputs, outputs 
and outcomes was commended. The majority of interviewees praised the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act 1994 (FRA) believing that it has improved their ability to hold the 
government to account. The principles of responsible fiscal management and the related 
documents were perceived as critical to Parliament’s performing of the function. Members 
recognised that prior to the FRA it was difficult for the opposition to know the true state of 
the government’s finances. The impact of both the PFA and FRA was summarised by one 
member that stated the government must now: 
Lift its skirt… The government can’t fudge it, it’s open for all to see and everyone can make their 
own assessment, the information is there. I think they’ve been critical to making government know 
that they will be absolutely accountable for the state of the books at all times…and be required to 
explain why they are where they are.626   
The change to separate supply and financial review processes was acknowledged as a 
significant improvement. Members like the separate processes because it ensures that past 
and future government expenditure are examined separately.  
 
Confidence and Supply 
The question of what should happen if the government were to fail to obtain supply from 
Parliament received a consistent response. It was stressed that the government must maintain 
the confidence of the House including supply. As set out by one member ‘it’s a big leaver, it 
acts as a very strong discipline’.627 However, a government failing to retain supply is unlikely 
even under MMP because it would reflect badly on those who withdrew support. The 
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consensus was that if supply was not provided an attempt should be made to form a new 
government from the existing Parliament. If that were to fail a new election must be held. The 
majority of MPs believe that a fresh election would be the likely outcome if Parliament 
refused to grant supply. There was contention about providing imprest supply or other 
contingency provision to fund government in the interim. Most members believed that should 
occur if required. MPs would not want to be associated with a government shutdown, they 
would not play games. The grant of imprest supply must be well crafted to ensure the 
principle that the government cannot continue in office without confidence and supply is not 
diluted. It was acknowledged that the power lies with the Governor-General. As such there is 
historical precedent that the Governor-General can check with the Prime Minister that the 
government has sufficient supply to function before dissolving Parliament.628  
 
MMP 
The shift to the MMP electoral system has not transformed Parliament’s performing of the 
function. When asked about the effect of MMP members’ responses varied from it having a 
negligible positive to a slightly negative impact. The main improvement is related to having a 
more representative Parliament with debate that better reflects public opinion. MMP has also 
improved select committee examinations. They are now ‘more vibrant and 
meaningful…there is more real engagement, interest and transparency’.629 MMP has removed 
the government’s complete dominance of the select committee system because they do not 
necessarily hold all the chairpersonships and majorities.630 However, MPs carry out their 
roles the same way as under FPP. Their attitude towards examining government expenditure 
has not shifted. Although the number of questions asked by members through written 
questions and the Official Information Act requests has surged as a result of the introduction 
of minor parties.631 The conclusion of Boston and Church that ‘the role and influence of 
Parliament during the legislative phase has altered little under MMP’ still stands.632 They 
argue that the House has not become a place for negotiating the details of government 
expenditure, there is little risk of the government failing to obtain supply, Budgets have not 
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received any significant amendment following its presentation, and governments have rarely 
had to resort to the financial veto.633  
 
Financial Veto 
The financial veto ensures that the executive is definitely responsible for government 
expenditure and does not compromise parliamentary control and scrutiny. There was near 
complete support for MPs to have the ability to propose amendments and new government 
expenditure balanced by the executive having access to the financial veto. The ability to 
propose and amend government expenditure is a valued way to scrutinise the government. 
The veto was viewed favourably compared to the previous rules. The veto was recognised as 
a necessary mechanism to ensure that the system works whereby the executive is responsible 
for government expenditure and Parliament for critiquing it. The argument was that the 
executive must be able to govern and should only be held accountable for government 
expenditure that it is willing to take responsibility for. However, the veto must be treated as a 
‘reserve power, its use needs to be rare and sparing’.634 Members believe that generally the 
veto is only used for expenditure proposals which would have had more than minor impact. 
The argument that the veto is undemocratic was dismissed because governments risk political 
punishment if they abuse it. Any abuse will result in ridicule from the media and the 
opposition. They must still maintain the confidence of the House and face the next general 
election. As argued by McGee the ability to amend expenditure is not ‘fundamental’ but the 
ability to scrutinise the executive’s proposals is.635   
 
Appropriations  
There were few concerns about the appropriations systems with the various type and forms 
seen as necessary. Pallot provides that a fundamental issue with appropriations is the:  
trade-off between flexibility and parliamentary control…Narrower, more specific appropriations 
permit a more stringent level of parliamentary control and may be sought in areas of high political 
(not just financial) risk, but too many appropriations become unmanageable.636  
A senior member believes that the appropriations system is suitably balanced at present. 
Newberry and Pallot argue that MPs do not fully understand appropriations. Part of the 
problem is that the PFA does not contain a definition for ‘appropriation’ despite the immense 
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importance of the term. MPs were seen to have difficulty recognising that appropriations are 
accrual-based. Particularly that they do not necessarily provide the amount stated in cash for 
the activity being financed.637 Occasionally there are issues with appropriations according to 
the senior member but the system ensured that any abuse was stamped out. The challenge for 
Parliament is to expose any abuse. There must be ‘compelling justification’ for permanent 
appropriations according to McGee.638 There is little to suggest that permanent appropriations 
are abused. The importance of closely watching permanent legislative authorities was 
stressed due to past abuse. Historically the problem was not incompetence but deliberate 
efforts to hide information and prevent the exposure of nasty surprises.  
The various appropriation types do not have an adverse impact on parliamentary 
control. Permanent legislative authorities, emergency expenditure provisions and multi-year 
appropriations were of little concern to interviewees. Multi-year appropriations were 
described as a necessary flexibility for governments with the Budget process getting better at 
handling them. It was pointed out that all multi-year appropriations must go through the 
supply process each year because, although they provide an expectation of future funding, 
Parliament will not necessarily continue to approve it. The emergency expenditure provisions 
were perceived as appropriate because the government must have the ability to react 
following a disaster or emergency. The freedom to spend funds is balanced out by the 
requirement that they later go through the House as appropriations. Imprest supply is 
typically used following a disaster although the emergency expenditure provisions were used 
following the 2011 Canterbury earthquake.639 There was concern from Newberry and Pallot 
that the introduction of multi-class appropriations would reduce parliamentary control. The 
trade off with managerial flexibility was not seen as a fair balance. They were also concerned 
that having multiple Ministers responsible for a Vote would reduce responsibility and 
accountability.640 Multi-class appropriations and in some cases having more than one 
responsible Minister are both deviations from the appropriations concept although neither is 
detrimental to parliamentary control.  
 
Budget and Estimates Documentation  
The Estimates documentation provided to Parliament was a major area of contention. Most 
members had issues with the Estimates relating to their form and content and the ability or 
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desire of MPs to comprehend the information they contain. Opinion was split on how 
comprehensible the Estimates are. The Estimates were generally seen to contain an 
abundance of information but were difficult to understand. Drilling down into a Vote can be a 
complex and time consuming task. Opposition members in particular believed that real effort 
is required to dissect the Estimates in the limited time available, although it is easier with 
experience. One opposition MP surmised that: 
Those kinds of things which are hidden in there, the inconsistencies in the budget, what mistakes 
have been made and the way in which cuts are intended to be made are not always transparent in 
the initial document. Even where they are, trying to compare them in an incredibly short time 
frame is not possible.641  
Accountability is not lacking because information is hidden according to one member. 
Budget documentation is full of information, transparent and easy to access. The member 
argued that MPs who are trying to work through it know where to look and what to find. The 
documentation may not be that effective for the public at large but he was unsure how many 
actually read the documents. Several members expressed that the open availability of Budget 
documentation is important because it allows the public to bring forward issues and the media 
if they get a ‘whiff’ of a potential story.642 
There were issues with the information contained in the Estimates documentation. A 
major issue with the Estimates is striking the right balance between the level of detail and the 
ability of the reader to comprehend their contents. As stated by one member: 
I don’t think there’s any such thing as perfection in this regard. The less detail you have, and the 
more general it is, the harder it is to hold people to account for meaningful amounts of money 
rather than the overall amount. On the other hand, the more details you get into the harder they are 
to follow and therefore it’s hard for people to use them except if they are really expert in these 
matters.643 
The current balance was seen as appropriate. Interviewees had two main issues with 
Estimates documentation. First, requiring MPs to plug together the various documents and 
those from previous years was seen as unreasonable. Secondly, there is an overemphasis on 
accountancy in the Estimates documentation, although it was acknowledged as necessary. 
Members want more information on what government expenditure is expected to deliver. As 
stipulated by one MP ‘the focus is too much on black letter accounting; how big the numbers 
are, rather than what outcome the money is achieving’.644 Expenditure is not adequately tied 
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to ‘measurable’ outcomes according to another member, that ‘help to very quickly identify 
where money is being squandered’.645 Norman identifies that governments are reluctant to 
specify their desired outcomes too explicitly.646 Outcome descriptions are frequently ‘vague’ 
with a lack of information on how progress will be measured.647 Progress has been made with 
stating and reporting against outcomes according to one interviewee. However, resistance to 
stating outcomes will continue due to the number of factors, many uncontrollable, which 
influence them.  
MP’s dedication to reading the documentation was the issue, not the content or format 
of the Estimates according to several interviewees. One member stressed that the real issue is 
the commitment of MPs to reading the documentation. The member believes that much of the 
detail in the Estimates and other documents ‘never sees the light of day and there is a wealth 
of material in terms of government programs, intentions and what changes are being 
made’.648 Frustration was expressed at how the extensive documentation was ‘pushed aside’ 
by MPs surmising that ‘the form and content is fine, just the use to which they are put is 
questionable’.649 Another MP was of a similar opinion stating that the ‘Estimates certainly 
assist Parliament in that they provide a bunch of information, but it all just gets rubber 
stamped’.650 It is important that there is expertise available to ‘unscramble’ the information 
contained across the various documents.651 Content and format changes frustrate MPs. 
Several interviewees stated the work of the Auditor-General in interpreting and briefing 
select committees on the Estimates helps immensely.  
 
Standard Estimates Questionnaire 
The standard estimates questionnaire was controversial. Opposition MPs view the 
questionnaire as a valuable tool for getting detailed information on the public record that 
would otherwise not be available. The questionnaire was seen by them as well-crafted and 
serving as a solid starting point for the select committee examinations. Opposition members 
were frustrated with departments providing ‘pro-forma’ answers.652 Departments were seen 
to go to great effort to avoid answering questions and hide information. The questionnaire 
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was only seen to work if the opposition could get the answers they need, while recognising 
they may not get the answers they want. Inadequate responses were put down to insufficient 
resources in departments and pressure from Ministers to restrict the flow of information. 
Government MPs restrict the questionnaires because of the cost to departments and the 
ammunition answers could provide to the opposition. It was acknowledged that providing 
answers was a ‘nuisance’ for departments.653 Schick comments that the substantial 
information requests made in the questionnaire is due to the Estimates lacking data valued by 
MPs.654 However, it was acknowledged by an opposition member that the questionnaires 
rarely produce useful information and they do not make much use of the material.    
There was considerable criticism of the standard estimates questionnaire from 
government MPs. They were seen to waste departments’ time and as a result public money. 
They questionnaire is overly long considering it asks predominately about trivial matters and 
for overly complex data. There was the impression that the information obtained was never 
actually used and the member could not trace an opposition attack back to a questionnaire. 
The member did concede that specific questions could provide useful information. The 
opposition has the absolute right to ask questions through the questionnaire with the member 
stating that ‘a part of the price we pay for our free democracy is that there can be a lot of 
fishing exercises’.655 A further government member described the questionnaire as flagging 
and repetitive.  
 
Fiscal Responsibility Documents  
The fiscal responsibility documents were praised. Economic and fiscal updates are 
particularly important for transparency. The pre-election update was highly valued by MPs 
being described as ‘exceedingly useful and important’.656 The update enables politicians to 
hold each other to account for the policy promises they make during the campaign. There was 
criticism of the pre-election update with one member arguing that the document is weakened 
by the government not being required to provide new information that arises between the 
documents’ presentation and Election Day. The budget policy statement was described as too 
‘pre-functionary’ with the document and the FEC hearing having devolved into the reiteration 
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of wish lists.657 There was strong pessimism from one member about the fiscal responsibility 
documents. The member asserted that they are only as effective as the interest and 
understanding that MPs and the wider public had in their contents, which was minimal. 
McGee claims that pre-Budget hearings like those for the budget policy statement should 
serve as an opportunity to ‘channel legislative and public opinion on the Budget into the 
government’s consideration of Budget preparation’.658 Currently that is not the case with few 
submissions made on the budget policy statement.659   
 
Financial Statements and Accounting 
The accounting system was applauded by most members. The majority of interviewees 
expressed great confidence in the government’s accounting system. The legislative 
framework, principally the Financial Reporting Act 1993, was viewed as a vital piece of 
legislation that ensures the government’s accounts are prepared in accordance with proper 
accounting standards and ensure transparency. There was confidence that the government’s 
accounting system is of a high standard when compared internationally. The usage of 
generally accepted accounting practice (GAAP) and accrual accounting were acknowledged 
as important and was broadly accepted by most interviewees. GAAP was described as a ‘very 
important discipline’ that ‘puts a proper constraint on politicians’.660 The move from cash to 
accrual accounting was appreciated as a significant improvement. Norman claims that accrual 
accounting has made it much easier for MPs to understand the financial statements because it 
is the ‘same accounting language’ as that used by the private sector.661 Accrual accounting 
was recognised as providing Parliament with an accurate picture and information on the 
financial position of departments and the government as a whole. Pallot asserts that accrual 
accounting ensures ‘it is no longer possible to hide the cost of decisions’.662 There was some 
disagreement from members on the extent that governments are able to hide financial 
information. There were concerns from members that the accounting system is becoming too 
complex and expensive without actually adding much extra value for society.  
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There was significant criticism of financial statements and the accounting system. The 
argument was made that there is a lot of subjectivity and variance with how figures and 
information are presented in the financial statements. The member believes that the 
presentation of financial information should be ‘black and white’ but feared that was a ‘pipe 
dream’.663 There should be better standardisation of the categories used by departments with 
the accounting of consultancy spending and policy advice from the department provided as 
an example. Furthermore, the member was irritated by changes that made comparing 
financial statements over time difficult. The argument was made that one should take a step 
back and determine what an accounting system should actually deliver. The member set out 
that with an accounting system and financial statements:  
You want to show with integrity: that’s what you collected, that’s what you spent and those are the 
outcomes you’ve secured, and that’s the money that got pocketed, and that money got wasted.664  
It was stipulated that using those criteria the system and statements are too complicated and 
fail to deliver the valuable or transparent information required. The financial statements have 
become too complex for most MPs and the public to comprehend. The member alleged that 
even highly competent MPs, including qualified accountants, can struggle to understand the 
financial statements. Newberry and Pallot are scathing of financial statements, especially the 
annual financial statements of the government, arguing that they are not prepared for the 
people of New Zealand who should be the intended users.665  
 
Parliamentary Process 
 
Annual Process 
There was strong support for the continued use of an annual cycle by Parliament to control 
and scrutinise government expenditure. As stipulated by McGee an annual process has 
‘natural appropriateness’.666 Although the government was identified as operating on a three 
year rolling cycle but it is important that scrutiny is performed annually according to the 
member. There was concern from interviewees that having an annual process results in an 
overly short term focus on government expenditure. It was observed that Parliament has 
improved its critiquing of the long-term impact of government expenditure.  
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Debate in the House 
Parliament’s debate on the Budget, Estimates and financial reviews was heavily criticised. 
The various debates are of poor quality and resemble general debates even though they are 
meant to focus on government finance and expenditure. The Budget debate was described as 
lengthy and formulaic with the initial contributions long set pieces. It was further dismissed 
as being ‘as good a quality as any other debate’ with other members rhetorically asking if any 
quality debate occurs in the House.667 The Estimates debate was panned because it is ‘very 
rarely a good detailed exchange of ideas on the way money could be spent’.668 The Estimates 
debate was labelled as ‘formulaic’ and ‘high level’ with Votes rarely scrutinised in detail.669 
At best there are ‘patches of illumination’.670 Debate was characterised as ‘theatre’ that just 
‘scratched the sore’ with each side doing their utmost to irritate the other.671 The debates were 
defended by a few members with who described them as long and thorough.  
Various reasons were provided for the poor quality of debate. The primary reason 
provided was the adversarial nature of Parliament which results in parties simply reiterating 
their ideological positions. The debate is subsequently about current political issues rather 
than government expenditure. MPs’ speeches were criticised for their level of repetition. 
Repetition was blamed on MPs’ over reliance on speech notes prepared by research units and 
that the art of debate has been lost. Simplicity and repetition were recognised as important for 
politicians when conveying their message to the media and wider public. Making the debates 
informative and engaging was a challenge according to one member. The public has the 
tendency to glaze over when government expenditure is discussed in the billions. As a result 
politicians draw down their debate to make it more tangible to the public. The Budget debate 
an opposition member claimed was limited by the short time available to examine the large 
amount of information presented to the House prior to the debate. Time pressure on 
Parliament and MPs was recognised as a major constraint on their undertaking of the 
function. 
The system used to allocate speaking times and determine what will be debated for the 
Estimates and financial reviews debate was viewed as appropriate. There was broad 
satisfaction with the method used to allocate speaking times with proportionality identified as 
the appropriate guiding principle. There was some divergence in opinion. Opposition 
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members stipulated that they would like greater control. A government member was critical 
of the opposition’s power over what was debated. The opposition was seen to pick Estimates 
and financial reviews based on how politically contentious they were rather then on 
expenditure or financial performance grounds. The member stipulated that it was fair to an 
extent as that held Ministers to account in a political scene. However, it resulted in scrutiny 
equating to ‘once over lightly’ in true financial accountability terms.672 
There was consensus that Parliament provides itself with sufficient time to debate 
government expenditure and to perform the function overall. Newberry and Pallot have slated 
the decrease in debate time for the Estimates and financial reviews.673 The majority of 
members though, including those in the opposition, argued that the House commits sufficient 
time to critiquing government expenditure. As put by one member:  
In practice a lot of it is taken up with politicking, which is fair enough, but if anybody was of the 
mind to there are more than enough opportunities to bring things to light and debate them.674  
A more critical argument was made by another member that since the debates rarely produce 
anything meaningful there is more than enough time available. While debate time has 
declined it is not worthwhile extending the current length of the debates as the extra time 
would not be used effectively. Debates were still considered to have great potential for 
scrutinising government expenditure but they are currently an ineffective use of the House’s 
time. The length of the debates was viewed as appropriate when balanced against other 
parliamentary business and the amount of time spent examining government expenditure in 
select committees provided the process was robust.  
Several members stressed that scrutiny of government expenditure was not just through 
the Estimates and financial review processes. It was argued that the hard hitting financial 
accountability questions are not asked in select committees but in written questions. The 
ability of parliamentary questions and Official Information Act requests to assist Parliament 
in carrying out the function was perceived as dependent on the government’s willingness to 
answer requests and provide information.  
 
Imprest Supply  
The granting of imprest supply by Parliament was not of concern. Parliament’s consideration 
of Imprest Supply Bills was described as a non-event. The question of how seriously the 
granting of imprest supply was taken by Parliament was raised by one member. MPs were 
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identified as not fretting over the granting of imprest supply, viewing it as a necessary 
formality to ‘keep the shop running in the meantime’.675 The whole process was labelled as 
very quick with one member stating: 
Imprest supply tends to also be a political debate…a chance to debate issues of the day rather than 
the particular content of the Imprest Supply Bill and maybe that’s the way it will always be. It 
would be naïve to think that you could change that.676   
Pallot regards imprest supply as not being a strict following of the principles of parliamentary 
control as the Act only limits the total amount that can be spent against appropriations with 
little further detail.677 Imprest supply was identified as causing problems for the Auditor-
General’s performing of the controller function. Specifically the Treasury reports as 
expenditure what would have been incurred against imprest supply.678 However, the audit of 
appropriations ensures that all expenses and capital expenditure incurred were against an 
appropriation or other authority.  
 
Supplementary Estimates  
The Supplementary Estimates process was likewise described as a formality and non-event. 
The process was identified as necessary because government expenditure will require 
adjustments as circumstances become clearer and to enforce parliamentary accountability 
over the changes. The process for scrutinising Supplementary Estimates was well regarded 
and described as ‘smooth’ and ‘reasonably crisp’.679 The smoothness was linked to far less 
expenditure being pushed through the process than in the past. Supplementary Estimates are 
now seen as tidying up. Scrutiny was identified as adequate provided there is nothing 
‘particularly odious’ in the Supplementary Estimates.680 There are rarely problems and as 
such they are given little attention. It was claimed that Supplementary Estimates do not 
receive sufficient attention. The problem according to a further member is that ‘it is all a bit 
after the event’ with the focus on ‘what’s around the corner, not what’s behind the 
shoulder’.681 The FEC does not examine the Supplementary Estimates to the same extent as 
the Estimates due to the limited time available to consider them. They are examined ‘well 
enough’ with sufficient opportunity to raise issues.682  
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Financial Reviews 
Financial reviews are a vital feature for parliamentary accountability of government 
expenditure. Financial reviews were identified as the strongest aspect of parliamentary 
control and scrutiny by some interviewees, especially when compared to the Estimates 
examination. Unappropriated Expenditure in Appropriation (Financial Review) Bills was 
acknowledged with one member expressing surprise at how consistently departments operate 
within appropriations stating that ‘there is certainly not a tradition or track record these days 
of massive unbudgeted expenditure’.683 There was consensus that financial reviews are 
important for holding departments to account. According to one member the select committee 
examination provides ‘the opportunity to give officials a bloody good knocking around and 
sometimes rightly so’.684 They provide the opportunity to ‘expose incompetence, negligence 
and stupidity’.685 A further member elaborated that select committees are able to extract from 
officials where money has been spent, what errors were made and where they failed to obtain 
good value for money. Financial review reports vary greatly. McGee explains that some 
reports are ‘pro forma’ where the select committee informs the House that a review has been 
undertake and has nothing to report, and commonly there was no oral examination.686 Such a 
financial review was still seen as beneficial because it ensures that select committees are 
watching departments and other entities.687  
Despite the generally high regard of the financial review process certain aspects were 
criticised. The select committee examination was viewed as having limited value by one 
member because the Minister is not required to appear. The member acknowledged that 
financial reviews relate more to operational matters, but since the Minister is ultimately 
responsible to Parliament for the department they should be required to appear before the 
committee. Financial reviews were understood to hold limited value to a further member 
because the expenditure and activity have already occurred. Members stressed that the 
financial review process is not an in-depth analysis of expenditure but more of a political 
event. However, in contrast to the Estimates examination government members are more 
willing to criticise the government because it is departments rather than the Minister under 
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examination. As pointed out by a government member they do not necessarily agree with all 
the decisions and actions of departments and as a result are more open to criticising them.  
 
Select Committees 
The select committee examinations were identified as where Parliament most effectively 
controls and scrutinises government expenditure. Select committees were held in high regard 
for their scrutiny of Estimates and financial reviews. It was even argued that it was only in 
select committees that any effective scrutiny occurred. The effectiveness of the select 
committee examinations was put down to their ability to examine government expenditure 
more closely than the House can through debate. It was recognised that despite select 
committees having greater ability than the House to examine government expenditure in 
detail ‘there is just no way that any committee is going to be able to absorb every dollar this 
is being spent in every Vote that they’re examining’.688 Select committees were described as 
an important information source for MPs with what is obtained in examination being used in 
the debates.  
Select committee hearings with Ministers and official were seen as very important to 
interviewees. The hearings on the budget policy statement, the Estimates and financial 
reviews were identified as major events in the FEC’s and other select committee’s calendars. 
The comment was made by one member that the most effective work undertaken by select 
committees was the hearings. Hearings provide committees with an excellent opportunity to 
hold both the Minister and the department to account. The Estimates hearings in particular 
were highly valued because the Minister must appear before the committee. A senior member 
stated that requiring Ministers to appear had significantly improved accountability. Ministers 
are ‘on the spot’ with one member stating that ‘there is nothing more frightening than going 
before a select committee with your feet to the fire’.689 The presence of the media does create 
a spectacle. Departments were claimed to ‘work themselves into a tizz’ to ensure that they are 
ready for hearings because ‘they live in fear of being found wanting in front of a select 
committee’.690 The hearings ‘lift the bar’ in terms of expectations of departments with 
opposition MPs in particular criticising answers that are not up to the expected standard.691 
Attempts to hide information typically get officials in more trouble than the actual issue 
according to one member.  
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The quality of examination was linked to the composition and dedication of the 
committee’s members. Strong committees, it was argued, have a mixture of MPs with 
commercial knowledge, particularly accountants, and others with expertise in the 
committee’s subject area. One member expressed the thought that select committees ‘do not 
have the expertise, interest or skill’ to provide the same level of scrutiny as the FEC.692 A 
further member argued that if the FEC were to carry out the examinations on its own there 
would be an overemphasis on reporting and accounting with less overall scrutiny. MPs, 
especially those in the opposition, must take full advantage of the select committee process. 
The effectiveness of the select committee process is linked to the determination of MPs 
particularly those of the opposition.  
There was criticism of the select committee examinations. Hearings concentrate on 
aspects of Estimates and financial reviews that are politically contentious and not necessarily 
what should receive the most attention. The effectiveness of the hearings depends on the 
ability and desire of MPs to ask good questions. MPs focus on the trivial rather than the 
substantive according to one member. They concentrate on input controls or local issues with 
little attention given to the big picture or the long term impact of expenditure.693 Questions 
asked were viewed as having an excessive focus on new expenditure at the expense of 
requesting information on existing commitments. Questions in the Estimates hearing are 
frequently not relevant and would be more appropriate for the later financial review or a 
parliamentary question. Conversely one member argued that MPs got better answers by 
asking simple or naïve questions rather than more finite questions. The quality of the 
Estimates hearing is dependent on the competence of the Minister appearing before the 
committee. Ministers were criticised for reducing the time available for MPs to ask questions 
by making overly elaborate opening statements. Chairpersons must rein in a Minister that is 
wasting the committee’s time.  
Both government and opposition MPs were ridiculed for how they treated committee 
hearings. MPs in hearings either focus on making political attacks or defending the 
government rather than critiquing or seeking to improve government expenditure. Opposition 
MPs were seen to grab the opportunity to embarrass a Minister rather than ask about 
proposed expenditure. It was asserted that a crude but not inaccurate view of the select 
committee process was that opposition MPs’ hunt for financial scandal. They ask questions 
with the goal of embarrassing the Minister. However, that was identified as a ‘perfectly 
                                                          
692 Anonymous MP, 31 November 2012.    
693 Norman, Obedient Servants, p. 160.  
 94 
 
proper role’ for opposition MPs.694 A government member described the hearings as ‘a big 
chance for the opposition to try and score points. But that’s fine, that’s part of the game’.695 
Government MPs protect their Minister and avoid asking difficult questions instead putting 
forward ‘patsies’.696 Select committees are rendered less effective by the strict controls that 
the government imposes on its caucus. Government MPs were described as hobbled because 
they were not meant to or even allowed to criticise the government. It was stipulated that 
government MPs just ‘get told they don’t stand up for themselves’.697 The media was 
indicated to have an important role here because they can publicise when government MPs 
are defending the un-defendable. 
Effective select committee examination of the Estimates and financial reviews is 
dependent on a competent chairperson. Members identified that a competent chairperson acts 
independently and fairly allocates the overall time for committee business. They must 
balance the right of the opposition to hold the government to account and that of the 
government to have its business done. Chairpersons must appropriately allocate time or 
questions during the committee hearings. They must recognise that the hearings particularly 
on the Estimates are the ‘opposition’s day’.698 Former chairpersons believe that the 
opposition should have the majority of the time available with two thirds to three quarters 
identified as appropriate. Parties should be allocated their share of the time available prior to 
the hearing enabling MPs to ‘run free’.699 However, the common approach from chairpersons 
is to take questions from each party, seemingly at random, which constrains the ability of 
MPs to build momentum and ask an effective line of questioning. Opposition members 
criticised the government for using the chairpersonship or its majority to block or restrict the 
ability of the opposition to ask questions both during hearings and in the standard estimates 
questionnaires. They added that blocking the flow of information is inappropriate and a good 
chairperson must recognise that a competent Minister should not require protection. 
Opposition MPs can make the select committee ‘awkward and unpleasant’ if they believe 
they were hard done by.700  
The FEC and the other select committees are under intense time pressure that constrains 
their ability to contribute to the control and scrutiny of government expenditure. McGee 
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identifies a lack of time as a ‘great enemy of effective scrutiny’.701 The FEC’s single three 
hour meeting on a Wednesday was described as ‘tough’.702 It was emphasised by one 
member that a great deal more of MPs’ time is consumed preparing for the meeting. 
Committees have quite limited time to examine the Estimates and financial reviews. The lack 
of time available is a further explanation for the many pro-forma financial review reports 
because committees must prioritise what they will examine in detail. They have tight 
reporting back dates and other business to perform particularly considering bills. Committees 
were noted for having vigorous debates on how they will allocate their time. Select 
committees were identified as effective at prioritising their work. The FEC was seen to do a 
thorough job given the time available. The time available for the hearings is acceptable 
provided the occasions are recognised as the opposition’s day. The opposition has 
complained occasionally when they felt insufficient time was allocated to a committee 
hearing on the Estimates.703 However, the frequency of hearings was questioned with one 
member arguing that these should occur more often.  
 
Controller and Auditor-General 
The Auditor-General was held in high regard by members. The Auditor-General was set out 
by one interviewee as ‘an important safeguard, almost a quasi-constitutional role in some 
sense’.704 The Auditor-General’s independence and its status as an officer of Parliament was 
valued and perceived as critical by interviewees. The effectiveness of the Auditor-General 
was attributed to the capability and judgement of the office holder. The Auditor-General is 
highly influential and has a significant impact on the public sector particularly in relation to 
how an organisation is set up and its culture. The power of the Auditor-General comes from 
access to information and its reporting powers, especially due to the publicity its reports can 
receive.705 Power and influence is generated through the audit and control functions. 
Members had no major qualms with the Auditor-General’s performance but did identify 
issues that constrain, or do not effectively assist, Parliament in controlling and scrutinising 
government expenditure.  
The Auditor-General’s roles and powers are sufficient but the office is under-resourced. 
The Auditor-General has ‘a very wide and solid mandate’ through the Public Audit Act 2001 
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and the PFA to undertake its work.706 Roles and powers are not the issue according to several 
members. The real issue is the level of resources available and how they are used. The 
Auditor-General and appointed auditors were described as ‘stretched’.707 There was a 
strongly held view that the Auditor-General could do more but will require extra funding to 
undertake further work. With Parliament and the government determining through the 
Officers of Parliament Committee the level of resources for the Auditor-General MPs must 
decide what they are prepared to fund.  
 
Audit Function 
The Auditor-General was understood to do an excellent job of undertaking the audit function 
but there are issues. The high standard of auditing was linked to the usage of Audit New 
Zealand as well as private sector auditors. It was stressed by one interviewee that New 
Zealand has a ‘clean, effective public sector’.708 There will always be issues found but they 
are around the edges. However, there were some members that believe the Auditor-General 
misses problems. Although satisfied with the Auditor-General’s performance one member 
felt there was room for improvement arguing that the office ‘lost their way’.709 The focus of 
auditing was overly concentrated on higher level scrutiny rather than at the lower ‘grass 
roots’ level that ensures a culture in the public sector of avoiding poor quality expenditure.710 
The notion was supported by several other members that want more emphasis placed on 
identifying waste and failures to get value for money. The aforementioned member put 
forward the case that ideally the public should be able to inform the Auditor-General of 
potential waste and have confidence that their concern will be investigated. The member was 
adamant that an enhanced ability for the public to raise issues would make the public sector 
spend money more wisely. There were concerns from members that the Auditor-General is 
commenting on issues beyond its area of expertise.  
Further issues with auditing relate to cost and the documents that are produced. There 
were concerns from many interviewees that the cost of auditing is too high especially for 
small entities. One interviewee questioned whether it was necessary to audit small public 
entities every year such as schools. Auditing should fit the size and risk of organisations. It 
was recognised that a major challenge for the Auditor-General is balancing accountability 
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and transparency with the costs placed on departments and entities to meet reporting 
requirements. The Auditor-General was perceived as overzealous with compliance 
documents. The documents that departments must produce were too difficult to comprehend 
because they are overly long, formulaic and bureaucratic. One member questioned whether 
growing documentation requirements actually improved accountability. The onus is on 
Parliament to determine the level of information and assurance it wants from the Auditor-
General. If Parliament believes that auditing is excessive it should move resources to other 
parts of the system.  
Performance audits and inquiries were highly respected parts of the Auditor-General’s 
work. They were described as valuable tools that enable the Auditor-General to investigate a 
broad range of issues including those requested by MPs and the public. Inquiries and 
performance audits were identified as being thorough and performed to a high standard. 
Opposition members in particular appreciated the subsequent reports, believing they are 
important to holding the government and departments to account. The opposition were 
identified as using reports from Auditor-General inquiries to hold the government to account. 
The Auditor-General must balance its resources, priorities and overall work program to 
determine what inquiries it will undertake. The Auditor-General is unable to investigate every 
issues referred to it due to the limited resources available.  
 
Controller Function 
There was satisfaction with the Auditor-General’s performing of the controller function. The 
controller function was of little concern to MPs but they did recognise its immense 
importance. The Auditor-General on the whole carries out the control function adequately 
according to a senior member, although there may be times when a member or Minister may 
think that a decision is adverse to their interests. A further member commented more broadly 
arguing that expenditure is well controlled with the public sector very capable at budgeting, 
accounting and reporting. There should be ‘reasonable satisfaction’ that public money is 
properly appropriated and spent in accordance with what Parliament has authorised.711 The 
powers available to perform the controller function are adequate. The culture of government 
is very important to control. It was stressed that it is not just about formal rules but strong 
traditions and conventions. Conventions according to one member are undervalued 
particularly those that ensure freedom from corruption. Newberry and Pallot insist that the 
                                                          
711 Interview with anonymous MP, 15 November 2012. 
 98 
 
controller function has been eroded.712 They argue against the change to the Treasury 
reporting system. They identify the reporting system as overly reliant on the assurances of 
Treasury labelling it as poor governance and constitutionally unsound.713 However, the 
Auditor-General has powers that enable it to check the reports’ accuracy and they neglect the 
audit of appropriations that reinforces the reporting requirements.714 The Auditor-General has 
expressed confidence in how the function is now performed and stated that the old method 
was made ineffective by accrual appropriations.715 Although it is no longer performed the 
traditional way, the controller function is performed effectively.  
 
Relationship and Reporting to Parliament  
The Auditor-General’s relationship with Parliament is important and was generally 
recognised as being in good health. The relationship between the Auditor-General and 
Parliament was highly commended and respected with members describing it as 
‘constructive’, ‘independent but collegial’ and ‘close and effective’.716 It is widely recognised 
that the Auditor-General should have an effective relationship with the PAC, in New 
Zealand’s case the FEC.717 The Auditor-General in line with New Zealand practice has a 
close relationship with all select committees ensuring better engagement with Parliament as a 
whole.  The connection between the Auditor-General and select committees, especially the 
FEC, was identified as being particularly good. The Auditor-General received special praise 
for its relations with select committee chairpersons. A senior member claims that select 
committees are building on a historically good relationship by making greater use of the 
Auditor-General as an advisor.  
The assistance provided by the Auditor-General as an advisor to select committees was 
commended. The Auditor-General was recognised as a valuable and useful resource for 
members providing assistance of a high standard. Oral briefings were viewed as immensely 
important and help to build ‘understanding’ and ‘maturity’ in the relationship.718 They 
provided ‘colour and richness’ that are difficult to convey in written reports.719 The oral and 
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written briefings on the Estimates and financial review documentation are appreciated by 
members. It was acknowledged that MPs are unable to read and process all of the information 
in time while additionally providing a valuable second opinion. The briefings were 
recognised for suggesting areas that the committee may like to explore and for providing 
potential lines of questions. However, Norman notes that usually the Auditor-General’s 
briefings are put to one side with questions instead focusing on embarrassing the Minister.720 
The briefings for the financial reviews were criticised for having too great an emphasis on 
issues relating to the controller function. Members would like more information on waste, 
value for money and outcomes. Members appreciate that the Auditor-General avoids 
overstepping its authority in the briefings. The advice provided was viewed as limited by one 
member because it does not comment on government policy. However, other interviewees 
firmly believe that it is inappropriate for the Auditor-General to comment on government 
policy.  
Select committees were criticised for not being sufficiently receptive of the Auditor-
General’s reports. Select committees ideally consider the Auditor-General’s reports. They 
receive an oral briefing from the Auditor-General’s staff and proceed to investigate the issues 
raised in the report. The select committee subsequently produces a report for the House 
describing their examination and how the issues will be addressed. The process was 
demonstrated to show a clear process of parliamentary accountability. However, select 
committees frequently decline briefings. The FEC in particular has a reputation for rarely 
examining reports from the Auditor-General.721  For the four years through to June 2005 the 
FEC did not review, or undertake a follow-up inquiry, on any report from the Auditor-
General.722 The issues identified by the Auditor-General are often left without scrutiny from 
Parliament which was labelled as frustrating by one interviewee. It was acknowledged by one 
member that the Auditor-General finds it frustrating that the office’s reports receive little 
attention from select committees. Time restrictions and wanting to focus on other areas are 
the common reasons for reports not receiving greater attention.  
 
Finance and Expenditure Committee  
 
Role and Status  
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The FECs significant and broad role was identified by interviewees. The committee was 
recognised as New Zealand’s equivalent to a Public Accounts Committee (PAC) but with a 
significantly wider role. The FEC was described as a ‘unique hybrid’ with a number of 
‘multi-layered’ roles.723 It was put by interviewees that the FEC is responsible for the 
parliamentary oversight of government expenditure and revenue, monetary policy and 
economic policy. It examines and reports on the ‘macro, large view picture’.724 The FEC not 
only co-ordinates the Estimates and financial review examinations but is crucial to setting the 
tone for the other select committees. The committee is expected to have a broader focus than 
just its primary business. The committee must hold a more strategic view in relation to the 
financial management model. The FEC’s roles as a subject committee were also 
acknowledged including consideration of tax and government finance legislation and 
undertaking inquiries.   
The FEC was recognised as holding a pre-eminent position amongst Parliament’s select 
committees with capable members. The committee was labelled as the ‘premier’ select 
committee.725 It was even claimed that the FEC is ‘the most powerful committee in 
Parliament’.726 The FEC’s power was linked to its high profile including the media coverage 
it receives for its various hearings. The committee’s supremacy also comes from its position 
as the point where all financial and expenditure matters must pass. Its power and influence is 
reflected by most, if not all, parties wanting representation on the committee. The FEC was 
distinguished for bringing together capable and aspirational government backbenches and 
hard hitting experienced opposition MPs. Many members have ministerial experience and the 
chairperson is identified as a ‘stepping stone’ to becoming a Minister.727 The committee was 
understood to have more financially literate members than other select committees. It was 
stressed by the interviewee that that was not criticism of the membership of the other select 
committees but a reflection that MPs have different strengths.  
The FECs performance was highly rated. While members stressed the importance of the 
FEC they were quick to acknowledge that for the Estimates and financial reviews it is the 
other select committees that do most of the grunt work. The committee received high praise 
with one member asserting that there is ‘a reasonably high standard of people on the 
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committee and they’re all quite diligent and do a good job’.728 There was some modesty from 
a further member who described the FEC as adequate and competent. Members saw the FEC 
as effective at scrutinising the fiscal responsibility documents. The committee was believed 
to carry out its work such that the opposition got a fair opportunity to question and acquire 
the information it requires while allowing the government to have its business completed.   
 
Success Factors  
The FEC is at the centre of Parliament’s control and scrutiny of government expenditure. 
With the FEC having a pivotal role it must be fully capable of undertaking its work. Pelizzo, 
Staphenhurst, Sahgal and Woodley are recognised for identifying a wide range of factors that 
influence how successful a PAC is at performing its duties.729 They argue that in regard to 
formal powers PACs should have a broad mandate and freedom to choose what they 
investigate, be able to examine both past and present expenditure, should check the 
government’s implementation of its recommendations, and have a good working relationship 
with the Auditor-General.730 There are also key behavioural factors of members and the 
functioning of the committee that influence PACs effectiveness: the extent that members read 
the documentation and prepare for meetings, whether transcripts are produced, if conclusions 
and recommendations are published, and if the media and the public are involved.731 They 
identify that PACs must have ‘adequate staff and independent sources of information’ and 
function in a non-partisan fashion.732 Pelizzo and Stapenhurst further identify that PACs may 
be restricted by the government lacking interest in or having an aversion to legislative 
oversight.733 The FEC’s leadership position results in the analyses having value for accessing 
the capability of all select committees. Several of these factors have been examined earlier. 
The following section considers the other factors.   
 
Inquiries 
The FEC and the other select committees were identified by interviewees as not undertaking 
an adequate number of inquiries. The FEC is not renowned for undertaking inquiries as made 
evident by it not conducting a single inquiry either on its own initiative or on referral from 
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the House from July 2001 to June 2005.734 The FEC’s workload instead is concentrated on 
Estimates and financial review examinations, and considering bills, petitions and other 
matters.735 Several interviewees were of that mind-set, believing the FEC undertakes fewer 
inquiries than it did previously. The launching of inquiries is dependent upon the government 
who can use its majority to block them. Successive governments have strangled select 
committees by blocking inquiries requested by the opposition using their majority. Inquiries 
are blocked to prevent political embarrassment and to ensure that committee time is not 
diverted from government business. The ability of select committees to undertake inquiries 
reflects their independence from the executive and Caucus.736 The FEC’s inability to 
undertake inquiries suggests that the government has too much influence on the select 
committee system. Several members expressed that the FEC’s time would be better spent 
undertaking inquiries. Committees need the ability to investigate poor governance but 
inquiries were identified as more useful if they were into non-partisan issues.  
 
Government and Reports  
The extent that the FEC’s reports are taken seriously by the executive and departments was 
disputed. It was argued by the KPMG report that PACs are only seen as effective if their 
recommendations are implemented.737 Departments were thought to take reports from the 
FEC very seriously. Several members were of the opinion that the Cabinet and departments 
follow the FEC closely with reports receiving thorough consideration. Highly critical 
recommendations from the FEC would be concerning. Members noted that the government 
must respond to various reports produced by select committees but not those on the Estimates 
and financial reviews. Several members commented that the FEC to an extent follows up on 
its reports. Reports presented to the FEC were identified as following up on previous reports 
and it was clear if an issue had been adequately addressed. It was stated that control issues are 
followed up in subsequent audit reports. There were more critical observations of the 
government’s consideration of FEC reports. It was argued that FEC reports ‘tend to get 
wrapped into a general melee, it is a bit unreasonable to expect otherwise’.738 A more critical 
opinion was that the government does not need to worry about FEC reports because they can 
steer findings through their majority.  
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Reports 
There were stark contrasts in opinion on the reports of the FEC and the other select 
committees. Reports from the FEC were described as holding greater significance than those 
from the other select committees because of its status. The FEC was viewed as having a 
reputation for producing high quality reports with some being ‘quite profound in terms of 
their influence on subsequent policy’.739 Other members were more critical describing them 
as low quality due to a poor process. There was cynicism from a further member who 
doubted that the FEC’s reports have much influence. The FEC was seen as pedantic about the 
wording of its reports given their small audience. The FEC does include transcripts of its 
hearings in many of its reports. The argument is made in the KPMG report that PACs reports 
are stronger when they have unanimous support from committee members.740 Unanimity 
provides certainty to Parliament about the committee’s conclusions and bolsters the 
recommendations. The KPMG report surmises that ‘it is better to negotiate and compromise 
in the drafting of committee recommendations than to issue a report with dissenting 
views’.741 Although the ability to submit a minority view is important the privilege is 
currently abused. It was recognised that a report’s impact is diminished when a number of 
minority reports are attached to it. They should only be used where there is a profound 
disagreement with the majority position.   
 
Public Access  
The current level of access for the media and the public to select committee proceedings is 
appropriate. Pelizzo, Staphenhurst, Sahgal and Woodley argue that ‘media coverage can 
provide committee members an incentive to perform their oversight function effectively’.742 
Their argument is too simplistic and does not fit with the evidence presented by the FEC. 
Interviewees were satisfied with, and saw value in, the current level of public and media 
access that generally has select committees open for the hearings and closed for the 
deliberations amongst MPs. The media were described as having the role of ‘policemen’.743 
A public hearing provides the opposition with the opportunity to embarrass the government 
and gives the public and the media the opportunity to critique the information obtained 
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through questioning. Members were adamant that it helps not having the public and the 
media in attendance. There is a significant increase in politicking due to the opportunity to 
score points and officials are not as frank with the committee. Select committees meeting in 
private enable MPs to work together and find compromises. Interviewees did not believe that 
more open select committees would improve the quality of democracy or the accountability 
of government expenditure. There was little support for televising select committees as that 
would further increase partisanship and point scoring. Any televising should be limited to 
meetings that are already open to the public.  
 
Committee Staff and Resources 
There was broad satisfaction with the level of staff and resources provided to the FEC and the 
other select committees. Staff support provided to select committees has been criticised by 
Pallot and Newberry.744 Interviewees expressed confidence in the level of assistance provided 
to MPs but generally would like more. Staffs from the Office of the Clerk were for the most 
part identified as very capable by members. They are strictly secretaries that provide 
administrative assistance and ensure that committees are aware of their roles and proper 
procedure. It was reiterated by a number of members that the FEC and the other select 
committees receive excellent independent advice from the Auditor-General. Party research 
units and the Parliamentary Library also serve as important information sources. Members 
specified that when they require further advice specialists can be brought in for one off 
assistance. Contracting in extra specialists is more efficient than hiring further permanent 
staff. Specialist advisers are utilised effectively for briefings on the monetary policy 
statement and for tax legislation. Several members were of the opinion that the FEC should 
have extra support staff. It was argued by one member that the main limit on Parliament’s 
ability to control and scrutinise government expenditure was the lack of resources available 
to MPs. 
 
Partisanship 
The FEC typically operates in a partisan fashion although it is capable of being non-partisan. 
There was near unanimity that the FEC is a partisan committee. It was even argued that the 
FEC is the single most partisan select committee. However, there was a more positive view 
that the FEC tends to work fairly collaboratively but given the nature of some of the issues it 
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considers there will occasionally be partisan splits. The hearings are dominated by party 
politics. It was explained that the FEC will inevitability feature a high level of partisanship 
because of the adversarial nature of Parliament. It is unavoidable that the contentious issues 
addressed by the FEC will result in partisanship. In many cases partisanship was even seen as 
desirable. It was identified that the level of partisanship in select committees is determined by 
its membership, the nature of the business in front of it, and if the proceedings are open to the 
public. There was recognition that select committees are where the ‘real work’ of Parliament 
occurs and that should result in efforts to balance out the level of partisanship.745 Aspects of 
the FEC acting in a non-partisan way were acknowledged such as entities failing to meet 
accounting standards.  
 
Formation 
The FEC and the select committee system as a whole have an effective structure. The current 
select committee structure that has the FEC performing a leadership role was broadly 
approved of by interviewees. The lack of a specialist PAC in the opinion of one member 
prevents the thorough examination of Auditor-General reports and in-depth inquiries. 
However, members that have attended international PAC conferences were comfortable with 
the FEC model. It was seen to ensure a more specialised and knowledgeable committee that 
was more appropriate given the size of Parliament. A separate PAC would split up the small 
group of MPs that have a comprehensive understanding of finance and economics. Referring 
the Estimates and financial reviews across the select committees is appropriate because of the 
importance of the function to Parliament. It ensures that more MPs are used to examine 
expenditure with their specialist subject area knowledge compensating for not having the 
same level of financial expertise. Such knowledge is important for evaluating the delivery of 
outcomes. Having a separate PAC to undertake financial reviews was rejected. Estimates and 
financial reviews are intertwined with knowledge carried between examinations. They should 
be undertaken by the same committee. Splitting off financial reviews to a special committee 
would reduce knowledge accumulation.  
The FEC should continue to have a government MP as its chairperson. Chairpersons 
are ultimately responsible for the effectiveness of a PAC.746 Most members were adamant 
that the FEC must have a government chairperson. The structure of the select committee 
system, the FECs broad role and its premier status makes a government chairperson desirable 
                                                          
745 Anonymous MP, 23 October 2012.  
746 KPMG, The Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee, p. 6.  
 106 
 
if not a necessity. An opposition chairperson was identified as appropriate if New Zealand 
had a more standard PAC. It was stressed by several members that governments must be able 
to govern. Opposition members in particular acknowledged that a government chairperson is 
appropriate to ensure that its business flows through the committee. An opposition 
chairperson was perceived as risky because potential abuse of the position could create 
paralysis, particularly due to the FEC’s mechanical and deliberative role. It was noted that 
opposition MPs do serve as chairperson of other select committees. One member interviewed 
argued that it is character rather than party allegiance that is important. It is a matter of 
perspective according to one member. The opposition would prefer one of their MPs as chair, 
while the government would want one of their backbenchers to hold the post. Government 
chairpersons are generally highly capable MPs on track to becoming a Minister and they want 
to prove themselves.    
There were some interviewees who were not adverse to the FEC having an opposition 
chairperson. A government chairperson can be perceived as compromising a committee’s 
independence, including limiting its inquiries. There is the counter-argument that a 
government chairperson has greater access to the executive and is able to add extra weight to 
the committee recommendations.747 It was claimed by a member that given the few checks 
and balances on the government an opposition chairperson of the FEC could be appropriate. 
Several members stressed that a chairperson’s ability to perform their duties is dependent on 
the MPs integrity and not whether they were from the government or the opposition. They 
recognised that an obstructive chairperson would be a major problem. An opposition 
chairperson must still have the fundamental objective of assuring that the government’s 
business is done. It was contended that most MPs, whether government or opposition, take 
the responsibility of holding a chairpersonship seriously and this ensures that they perform 
the job adequately. There was apprehension from one member who argued that an opposition 
chairperson would have little impact without an opposition majority.  
There was strong support for the FEC continuing to have a majority of government 
MPs due to the committees’ immense importance. For practical purposes members argued 
that the FEC must have a government majority. Possessing a government majority on the 
FEC is crucial to ensuring that the government’s business progresses in a timely manner. It 
was recognised by several members that a great strength of the New Zealand parliamentary 
system is that governments are able to govern. It was argued that an opposition majority on 
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the FEC could effectively handicap the ability of the executive to perform the business of 
government. Opposition members stressed that they would certainly want a government 
majority if they were in office. However, one member was adamant that the FEC is 
ineffective because of the government majority which was identified as turning the 
committee into a rubber stamp. There must be a balance between checks and balances and 
ensuring the government’s capacity to govern; an opposition majority risks swinging the 
balance too far toward the former.  
The current size of the FEC with 12 members was identified as appropriate with no 
desire for change. A larger FEC would be inefficient, unwieldy and unworkable. There was 
no wish to reduce the size of the FEC. It was recognised that given the importance and stature 
of the FEC all parties should be represented, or that they at least have the option. The 
argument was made that it is not about the number of MPs but their quality, their approach to 
undertaking the paperwork and their understanding of what the committee’s work means. It 
was contended by a further member that a far larger Parliament can have MPs who dedicate 
their careers to committee work and are more thorough as a result. A small Parliament 
prevents such specialisation with a small pool of MPs focusing on getting into the Cabinet. It 
has become apparent that select committees, particularly the FEC, have frequent membership 
changes. McGee reasons that committees should have a stable membership with MPs 
expected to remain on the committee for the full length of the parliamentary term.748 Constant 
membership changes can result in the loss of knowledge.749 
The FEC does not use subcommittees to help undertake its work and certainly not to the 
same extent as the Public Expenditure Committee. McGee argues that PACs can use 
subcommittees to perform particular tasks to counter their time constraint.750 Having all 
select committees able to initiate their own inquiries has resulted in less pressure on the FEC 
when compared to its predecessor to form subcommittees to carry the load. The FEC did have 
a subcommittee from 2000 to 2002 to examine reports from the Auditor-General.751 It was 
seen as a ‘useful development’ and part of an ideal process by the Auditor-General for 
consideration of its reports.752 Subcommittees are used to address a large number of public 
submissions on bills. However, it was argued that it is better to meet as a whole committee 
because of the friction created by MPs arguing over what submissions they did or did not 
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hear. According to one member, establishing subcommittees is rare and difficult due to the 
introduction of MMP and minor parties. Minor parties want equal representation to ensure 
that they do not miss out. The ‘game’ of equal representation has resulted in subcommittees 
inevitability being used less.753 Generally there was no demand for making greater use of 
subcommittees. However, several members saw subcommittees as an effective way to 
undertake more inquiries. Such inquiries could involve general housekeeping such as tidying 
up glitches, inefficiencies or policy mistakes according to one member. The major issue was 
government resistance if they saw too much political risk.  
 
Conclusion  
Parliament performs the role of controlling and scrutinising government expenditure less than 
optimally. Parliament has adequate control of government expenditure but effective control is 
primarily due to the Auditor-General’s proficient performing of the audit and control 
functions. The appropriations system, Budget documentation and the financial statements and 
accounting system also facilitate Parliament’s solid performing of the control aspect. 
Parliament as such has quality machinery in place to ensure that the government only spends 
public money as it has approved. Parliament is however somewhat deficient at scrutinising 
government expenditure. Government expenditure is primarily scrutinised through the 
various parliamentary debates and select committee examinations. The opportunities to 
debate government expenditure in the House are often wasted by MPs. Select committee 
examinations do feature some quality scrutiny, particularly for the financial reviews, but they 
are often not properly used either. Therefore, MPs themselves are primarily responsible for 
the imperfect scrutiny of government expenditure. Reform is desirable to improve 
Parliament’s control and scrutiny of government expenditure. The next chapter will provide 
recommendations that have the potential to improve Parliament’s performance.  
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Chapter Five: Recommendations and Conclusion 
 
Introduction  
With Parliament being somewhat deficient at controlling and scrutinising expenditure it is 
necessary that reforms be introduced to improve its performance. The function has been 
recognised as important through its history, in academic debate and by current MPs. The 
previous chapter established that Parliament is quite effective at controlling government 
expenditure but was found wanting when it came to scrutiny. With the function’s recognised 
importance it is appropriate that Parliament reviews and reforms how it performs the role. 
The following chapter provides a number of reform options, envisaged from the previous 
chapters as well as suggestions and requests from interviewees that have the potential to 
improve Parliament’s performance. Potential reforms discussed range from being quite 
specific, to the identification of more general issues that do not have more finite solutions. 
But first opportunities for further research are discussed.  
 
Opportunities for Further Research  
There are further areas that could be researched relating to this thesis. A complementary 
avenue for research is to examine the procedure and practice used by foreign Parliaments to 
examine government expenditure and determine what lessons can be learnt for the New 
Zealand Parliament. Particular emphasis should be placed on other countries of the 
Westminster tradition such as the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. However, 
examining the work of other foreign legislatures will most likely also be beneficial. Research 
could also be taken into broader areas relating to Parliament and government finance. It may 
perhaps be of interest to analyse Parliament’s control and scrutiny of government revenue, 
lending and borrowing. In addition, consideration may feasibly be given for research into the 
accountability of local government expenditure.  
 
Support for and Limitations on Reform  
There was support for making some changes to Parliament’s procedure and practice but there 
are limitations on suggested reforms. One member stated that is ‘absolutely relevant and 
worthwhile’ reviewing the current systems that are in place.754 Even those who believed that 
Parliament is effective at performing the function saw room for improvement. The argument 
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was quite correctly made that there are no quick fixes. Instead the contention was made by 
several interviewees that a path of steady, incremental improvement is more appropriate. It 
was suggested that New Zealand already has a strong and mature platform, it is now about 
how that can be improved. The potential cost of reform was questioned particularly if only 
marginal improvements would be achieved. A further limit on reform is the significant time 
pressure already on Parliament and MPs which limits the amount of further work that can be 
undertaken. There were expressed doubts from members that there is very much scope for 
increasing the amount of time Parliament allocates to the function. MPs already have an 
exhausting workload, with commitments to Parliament, their party and their constituency as 
well as their family. It was stressed that without that time beyond the House MPs would 
become a subset of society and not a representative group of politicians. There must be 
caution to ensure that attempts to improve either control or scrutiny do not overly jeopardise 
the ability of Parliament to perform its other roles. 
 
Members of Parliament 
 
Transform ability and willingness of MPs to perform the function  
Improving Parliament’s ability to control and scrutinise government expenditure must 
concentrate on improving MPs’ ability and willingness to perform the role. One senior MP 
commented that:  
The next area of change is focusing better the minds of parliamentarians on their role as 
controllers…I don’t think that’s sufficiently widely understood or appreciated at the moment and 
consequently lots of opportunities for really asking hard questions about expenditure or proposed 
expenditure go missing.755 
The member added that the necessary machinery to enable MPs to perform the role is in 
place. How that machinery is used is the problem. The issue was expanded upon by a further 
member. It was argued that for Parliament’s performance to improve, MPs must exercise 
integrity, and they must not just play political games. Instead their focus must be on the 
substantive, what is in the country’s best interest, rather than the trivial. It was surmised that 
that is a case of MPs better determining when they should be serving as parliamentarians or 
as instruments of their parties. The member did however acknowledge that it is good and 
healthy for MPs to have differing points of view. The fundamental problem is the nature of 
our parliamentary democracy that results in Parliament having a confrontational and 
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adversarial culture. It has too much anarchy. For scrutiny to improve the adversarial nature of 
Parliament must be toned down. The select committee process in particular could benefit 
from a reduced level of partisanship. Changing the political culture is an insurmountable task, 
but two reforms could have some impact.  
 
Reduce the Government’s ability to control their Backbenchers  
The executive’s dominance over government backbench MPs should be reduced to allow 
them to contribute to effective scrutiny. It is an irony that for parliamentary control and 
scrutiny of government expenditure to improve the government must be more open to 
criticism. The select committee process, in particular, would be more effective if government 
MPs were given the ability to operate as parliamentarians with the freedom to criticise the 
government. The extent to which the government is able to dominate select committee 
proceedings through pressure exerted on chairpersons and their majorities should be reduced. 
Governments must be able to have their business proceed through select committees but that 
should not constrain the ability of opposition MPs to ask questions. There was a request from 
one member that a new Standing Order be introduced to reduce the ability of government 
chairpersons and majorities to refuse to put forward questions. Opposition MPs must be able 
to delve into areas of the Estimates and financial reviews that they believe are of interest. 
However, such a proposed rule change is unlikely to work in practice. The emphasis instead 
should be put on changing attitudes towards performing the function.    
 
Increase the size of Parliament and Extend the Length of the Parliamentary term 
Increasing the size of Parliament and the length of the parliamentary term could theoretically 
help address the aforementioned problems. Parliament’s performance could improve with 
additional MPs who are of sufficient calibre and are committed to performing the function. A 
larger Parliament of 140 or 150 MPs is associated with a more independent government 
caucus that is less subject to pressure from Cabinet.756 More MPs would allow for a greater 
number of select committees opening up the possibility for alternative structures.757 
Furthermore, there is the increased likelihood that backbenchers would be more likely to 
identify a parliamentary career as a quality committee member as a valuable alternative to 
serving as a Minister. Increasing the length of the parliamentary term from three to four years 
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has distinct potential benefits too. A longer term would provide MPs with a more appropriate 
timeframe from which to judge the government’s policies, particularly as stated in their 
desired outcomes.758 The shift could also result in MPs focusing more on serving as 
parliamentarians because with elections further away there is the reduced incentive to focus 
on point scoring.759  
 
Estimates Documentation 
 
Review Estimates Documentation 
The Estimates documentation requires review to ensure that it fully enables MPs to scrutinise 
the government’s expenditure proposals. Several interviewees requested that efforts be made 
to improve the Estimates documentation. The various documents must meet the needs of 
Parliament. Their content must be made as easy to understand as possible and be presented in 
a straightforward format. The availability of the Budget and Estimates documentations in 
electronic form has improved access and digestibility. It would be appropriate to take 
advantage of having documentation in electronic format. The various documents, including 
those from previous years, could be linked together to reduce the extent that MPs and the 
public need to sift between sources and to ensure that both receive the full picture from the 
information available. Improving accessibility is necessary to better engage the public and 
subsequently improve the quality of debate on government spending. Several members, those 
from the opposition in particular, would appreciate more time to examine the Estimates and 
the other Budget documents. The problem with increasing the time to examine 
documentation is the impact that would have on the supply process, and the subsequent 
impact on Parliament’s, and particularly the Auditor-General’s contribution to, the control of 
government expenditure. The content of the standard estimates questionnaire should 
continually be examined for any new trends in information that MPs wish to have in the 
Estimates.  
There must be caution when making changes to Estimates documentation. Modifying 
Estimates documentation to improve the scrutiny of government expenditure has the potential 
risk of over simplification. Estimates information that is too simple could jeopardise 
Parliament’s ability to exert adequate control, because appropriations are not specified in 
enough detail. There has been criticism of attempts to move away from the current set of 
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documents. Newberry and Pallot argue for the continued usage of the current Estimates and 
Supplementary Estimates documentation. They say that they are a ‘flexible, adaptable means 
of presenting information to Parliament and the public in a useful and meaningful form’.760 
The evidence from interviewees suggests that that is not entirely the case. They are rightly 
nervous about changes, but that does not mean Parliament should be held back by existing 
practice. They do acknowledge that innovation in how information is presented is desirable, 
but that does not mean that the existing requirements need be compromised. Therefore, the 
key is innovation in presentation to improve comprehensibility and speed of consumption, 
rather than decreasing the level of detail.   
 
Improve Outcome Specification and Measurement  
Improving the specification of outcomes in Estimates documentation and reporting on their 
delivery in annual reports should advance the ability of MPs to scrutinise government 
expenditure. Several members argued that outcomes must be more clearly stated. It was 
argued that MPs are more effective at critiquing proposed expenditure outcomes, and the 
government’s subsequent ability to deliver them, rather than examining output and control 
issues. Focusing on outcomes would be a more effective use of Parliament’s time and would 
make better use of MPs subject area expertise. There was a request for documentation that 
better allows for the ‘consideration of opportunity cost of spending and bang for the buck as 
opposed to just volumes of black letter accounting’.761 A further member stipulated that a 
greater emphasis on outcomes would improve Parliament’s ability to assess the impact of 
government expenditure on society. Information on, and measurements of sustainability, 
happiness and wellbeing should be included with the financial data. Achieving effective 
linkages between government expenditure represented in outputs with the outcomes it aims to 
achieve has been an on-going challenge.762 Despite the apparent difficulty, further work 
should be put into improving outcome specification. It was argued by one interviewee that 
‘the next challenge on the horizon is how we can use financial and non-financial information 
to better inform strategic decision making’.763 If Parliament is to participate in that evolution 
it will need better outcome information.  
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Financial Statements and Accounting   
 
Review presentation of Financial Statements and Accounting Standards  
The presentation of financial statements and accounting standards should be reviewed to 
ensure that they meet the needs of their users. MPs currently struggle to understand the 
financial statements presented to Parliament. As stated by one member the government’s 
accounts must be accessible and avoid unnecessary complexity. There is considerable risk in 
changing the financial statements. A balance must be achieved that allows for MPs and the 
wider public to scrutinise government expenditure while also providing sufficient detail for 
control. There may actually be little room for modifying the financial statements. The 
solution then is to improve MPs’ ability to comprehend their contents. As put by Newberry 
and Pallot ‘they need to be educated in accounting matters and their significance for the 
democratic process’.764 There was a strong call from members for the government’s 
accounting standards to be reviewed. They want a review to examine how appropriate the 
current standards are for the government and the public sector, predominantly for smaller 
entities. There was also strong support for better reconciliation of international financial 
reporting standards (IFRS) with the needs of the government and the public sector. The 
government’s accounting system should be analysed to determine what it must aim to attain 
from first principles and how that can be done.  
 
Parliamentary Process 
 
Improve the Quality of Debate 
Debates in the House are where there is the most potential to improve Parliament’s 
performance. Unfortunately that is the case because it is where Parliament’s efforts are most 
inadequate. Unlocking that potential is problematic. It has been suggested that an increase in 
the size of Parliament would reduce speaking demands on MPs and allow them ‘to be better 
informed and prepared when they speak’.765 Several members were firmly of the opinion that 
there is little that can be done to improve the quality of debate on the Budget, the Estimates 
and financial reviews. It will require a change in political culture. The contention was made 
that the Estimates debate would be useful if it more thoroughly examined what would be the 
most effective way to use government expenditure to achieve the government’s desired 
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policy outcomes. However, debate should also examine the appropriateness of the outcomes 
that the government is seeking. The likelihood of such a debate was described as ‘pie in the 
sky’.766 Having such a debate is unlikely due to the adversarial and confrontational nature of 
Parliament. As provided by the member it would require MPs to put aside party politics and 
operate on their conscience. The speaking time and debate lengths should remain as is. The 
focus should be on improving the quality of the debate.   
 
Controller and Auditor-General 
 
Relationship with Parliament  
The Auditor-General does not require major reform but there should be tweaks made to 
ensure that it is fully utilised to Parliament’s benefit. As stated by one interviewee there are 
no reforms required to the Auditor-General’s current platform for performing its work. 
Parliament must be cautious to tinker with the Auditor-General because of the risk of turning 
it into a ‘whipping boy on everything or a political activist’.767 However, Parliament, and the 
Auditor-General must clarify and develop greater understanding of each other’s work and 
their expectations of what their relationship should entail. Clarification is needed of what the 
Auditor-General should be delivering for Parliament, and how the work of the Office may 
best be utilised by the House and select committees. There are a number of areas where both 
aspects can be improved. The reports and briefings produced by the Auditor-General must 
better fit the needs of MPs. The House and select committees should be more receptive of, 
and give greater attention to, reports from the Auditor-General. If necessary the Finance and 
Expenditure Committee (FEC) subcommittee to consider and process the Auditor-General’s 
reports should be re-established. A further step would be to introduce an annual debate on 
reports from the Auditor-General following the presentation to the House of its annual report. 
An annual debate on the Auditor-General’s report could follow the practice for that on the 
budget policy statement, and replace the next General Debate following its presentation. The 
Auditor-General should improve the public’s ability to report instances of apparent waste in 
the public sector. However, such an expansion will required additional funding from 
Parliament. In general the Auditor-General should receive additional funding to expand and 
further develop its work.   
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Finance and Expenditure Committee 
 
Inquiries  
The FEC should be undertaking more inquiries. There were consistent requests from 
opposition members for the FEC to have the ability to launch inquiries more frequently. The 
government must provide the FEC and the other select committees with some freedom to 
launch inquiries into matters that they believe are of concern. Members were quite broad in 
the areas that they believed inquiries should concentrate on. There was the preference that 
inquiries, rather than concentrating on accounting and auditing, focus on issues relating to the 
delivery of outcomes and the efficiency and effectiveness of government expenditure. 
Inquiries were perceived as appropriate by one member if they are only used in specific 
instances, including examining alternatives to new and existing expenditure. A further 
member would like the FEC to examine macroeconomic issues and the government’s broader 
fiscal strategy. There was significant resistance to the FEC undertaking more inquiries only 
due to the committee’s and MP’s lack of time to undertake further work themselves. One 
member was concerned about the vast amount of work the FEC must already tackle. Instead 
the member argued that the FEC should spend more time considering in greater depth its 
current workload. A further member was blunt, stating that inquiries may make MPs appear 
more effective from a Wellington point of view, but the time that they consume is at the 
expense of maintaining the important connection with those that they represent.  
There are options available to Parliament that could allow the FEC to carry out further 
inquiries. Utilising non-sitting or recess weeks, following the practice of the Public 
Expenditure Committee (PEC), was for the most part rejected. Most members argued that 
meetings during non-sitting weeks are only appropriate for providing existing matters 
additional time or when there is a lot of critical business to undertake. Further work, 
including inquiries in non-sitting weeks, was seen as an ineffective use of MPs’ time 
considering their other obligations. However, there was strong support from some members 
who saw merit in further utilising non-sitting weeks. The general consensus was that the 
focus must be on using sitting weeks effectively with the suggestion made that select 
committees should have greater ability to meet while the House is sitting. The problem with 
any additional meetings is the extra preparation required of MPs, and the resources required 
to facilitate them. Thought should be given to using subcommittees, as was the practice of the 
PEC, despite the issues identified with their usage in the previous chapter. A further option is 
to introduce a separate Public Accounts Committee (or similar) tasked with undertaking 
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inquiries. Members were opposed to changing the select committee structure for the reasons 
stated previously. The primary concern was that Parliament does not have a sufficient pool of 
expertise for an alternative structure or to split current responsibilities. A larger Parliament 
could provide for the extra MPs required to make a separate Public Accounts Committee 
more feasible. 
 
Annual Report and Debate  
The FEC should produce a report on its performance and that of the other select committees 
on matters relating to the control and scrutiny of government expenditure. The FEC does not 
report on its own performance or that of the other select committees that undertake work 
referred to them.768 An annual report from the FEC could state what Estimates and financial 
review examinations were undertaken, what inquiries it undertook, and how many Auditor-
General reports were referred to the FEC and received select committee examination. 
Performance information could also be presented, such as the timeliness of committee 
reports, the level of public participation in the committee’s processes, including submissions 
received, and the percentage adoption rate of its recommendations by the government.769 
McGee has argued that legislatures should hold a debate on the work of their PAC.770 The 
majority of the FEC’s work is available to debate in the House but it would be beneficial to 
have a dedicated debate each year on the committee’s work. A debate on the FEC’s annual 
report could be arranged, using the same practice as that recommended for the Auditor-
General’s annual report.  
 
Assistance  
Research, advisory and support services to Parliament should receive additional funding. 
There was a strong demand for MPs and select committees to receive greater assistance in 
order to improve their ability to perform the role. It was requested that the FEC and 
parliamentarians should have better access to economic advice and background research and 
briefings for the business before them. The argument was made that the Speaker should take 
greater responsibility for ensuring that Parliament, and especially select committees, are 
properly resourced. It was acknowledged that a lot is spent on Parliament already with most 
bases covered, but it is foolish to ‘skimp’ on the little bit extra to ensure that Parliament is 
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well run.771 Although MPs are well served by the Auditor-General the greater availability of 
officials from departments and the Treasury was identified as a way to improve scrutiny of 
the Estimate documentation. It was argued that the opposition must be armed with their own 
independent analysis to challenge that provided to the government by departments. One 
member was not in favour of further staff and resources for select committees because any 
extra resources would be wasted on select committees that are not prepared to do their job. 
However, given the extensive workload placed on MPs it seems appropriate that further 
targeted assistance be provided.  
 
Parliamentary Budget Office and Independent Fiscal Council  
Providing further assistance through a Parliamentary Budget Office was not supported by the 
majority of members. A Parliamentary Budget Office is a ‘nonpartisan, independent, 
objective analytic unit’ that supports legislatures ‘in both enacting and overseeing 
implementation of the Budget’.772 Members would appreciate greater resources but such an 
office was not perceived as necessary, and there were further significant reservations. 
Confidence was expressed in the current form of assistance provided to MPs by the Auditor-
General, the Treasury, MPs own offices, party research units, the Parliamentary Library, and 
the specialist advisors that committees can request. There were concerns about a role conflict 
between the Auditor-General and a Parliamentary Budget Office. It was felt that the Auditor-
General’s undertaking of performance audits and inquiries, the type of work that could be 
expected of a Parliamentary Budget Office, made the latter unnecessary. There were claims 
that conflict is unlikely because the Budget Office would examine macro-economic or overall 
fiscal strategy while the Auditor-General would have a narrower audit or micro-economic 
role. It was argued that the office would likely develop into another captured quango and 
additional bureaucracy. There was further resistance on cost grounds with Parliament not 
having the size or funding available to justify every form of financial advice.  
There was some backing for the creation of a Parliamentary Budget Office or a similar 
entity. A minority of members saw a Parliamentary Budget Office as potentially offering 
significant benefit to Parliament’s ability to scrutinise government expenditure. A member, 
who was strongly in favour, believes such an office should provide MPs with the ability to 
submit issues for consideration while also having its own work programme. A further 
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member supported the creation of such an entity because it would help MPs to have 
independent economic and fiscal advice at all times, and not just when certain items of 
business were before select committees. The contention was made because the level of 
analysis required was beyond what party research units and other current forms of assistance 
can offer. A further member believed that a full Parliamentary Budget Office was excessive, 
but that a special unit within an existing entity could provide the economic and financial 
advice desired. The Treasury has considered creating an Independent Fiscal Council to try to 
increase the public debate on fiscal policy by ‘providing ex-post commentary on fiscal 
strategy and the macroeconomic stability dimension’.773 Parliament should consider the 
creation of such an Independent Fiscal Council to address the apparent shortfall in economic 
and fiscal advice.   
 
Spending Cap 
A legislative spending cap has been proposed to limit the growth of government 
expenditure.774 The proposed reform, contained in the confidence and supply agreement 
between the National and ACT parties, would have a major impact on Parliament’s control 
and scrutiny of government expenditure.775 The proposed cap would limit government 
expenditure increases, with exceptions, to ‘the annual increase in the rate of population 
growth multiplied by the rate of inflation’.776 All members who were interviewed were 
opposed to the introduction of a spending cap with extensive reasoning provided for their 
dismissal of the idea. They were labelled as ‘blunt’ and ‘crude’ tools that are both 
unconstitutional and impractical.777 Spending caps were identified as having a ‘disastrous’ 
impact internationally on infrastructure and investment in a jurisdiction’s future.778 
Constitutionally they are inappropriate because they attempt to bind future Parliaments. 
Elections are the appropriate means to check and change government expenditure patterns. 
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Wilkinson, ‘Restraining Leviathan’, pp. 49-65; The Treasury, ‘Regulatory Impact Statement for Spending Cap 
(People’s Veto) Bill’, April 2011,  http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/informationreleases/ris/pdfs/ris-tsy-
scpvb-aug11.pdf (24 October 2012). 
775 ‘Confidence and Supply Agreement with ACT New Zealand’, in Jon Johansson and Stephen Levine (eds.), 
Kicking the Tyres: The New Zealand General Election and Electoral Referendum of 2011 (Wellington: Victoria 
University of Wellington Press, 2012), p. 391. 
776 ibid. 
777 Interview with anonymous MP, 30 January 2013; Anonymous MP, 23 January 2013; Anonymous MP, 28 
November 2012; Interview with anonymous MP, 6 November 2012. 
778 Anonymous MP, 2 November 2012. 
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Spending caps were also seen to constrain the ability of governments to govern and manage 
circumstances that are often beyond their control. It was firmly put by one member that 
artificial constraints should not be implemented to meet the ideology of one part of the 
political spectrum that could limit Parliament’s sovereignty in the future.  
Although a spending cap was thoroughly refuted, alternatives were proposed. Several 
members acknowledged and supported the rhetoric and principle behind such a measure but 
were strongly opposed to introducing a spending cap on constitutional grounds. They believe 
that governments must be transparent about their future expenditure intentions. There was 
consensus that any limits placed on expenditure must be set by governments themselves and 
not foist upon them by Parliament. Guidelines or principles were seen as more appropriate 
whereby the government would be required to explain significant increases of decreases in 
expenditure or be required to set out its future expenditure intentions. A further alternative 
provided was a system whereby public opinion is more directly engaged on significant 
increases in expenditure. Such a measure appears cumbersome with New Zealand’s 
representative democracy. Members were adamant that any spending cap or alternative 
measure must have contingencies for emergencies and disasters because governments require 
flexibility in how they respond to the circumstances before them.  
 
Public Finance Amendment Act 2013 and Public Finance (Fiscal Responsibility) 
Amendment Act 2013 
Parliament has recently examined and passed the Public Finance Amendment Act 2013 and 
the Public Finance (Fiscal Responsibility) Amendment Act 2013. The Public Finance (Fiscal 
Responsibility) Amendment Act 2013 introduces four new fiscal responsibility principles, 
including ‘when formulating fiscal strategy, having regard to its likely impact on present and 
future generations’.779 Such a principle could improve Parliament’s ability to scrutinise the 
long term impact of government expenditure. Members stipulated that they were comfortable 
with the existing principles and did not believe that changes were necessary. There was 
reluctance to change the principles due to the risk of lurching between sets by different 
governments. Changes are made to the fiscal strategy report and the budget policy statement 
and a new investment statement is being introduced.780 The Public Finance Amendment Act 
                                                          
779 New Zealand Parliament, ‘Public Finance (Fiscal Responsibility) Act 2013’, 3 September 2013, 
http://legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2013/0067/17.0/DLM4681505.html (10 October 2013). s.4.  
780 ibid, s.5-s.10. 
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2013 makes significant and widespread changes to the Public Finance Act 1989.781 It is not 
feasible to fully describe the modifications, but there are significant changes as to how 
appropriations must be specified, the contents of the Estimates and the supporting 
information, and the reporting requirements of departments and offices of Parliament. All 
changes will have been implemented by the middle of 2014. The alternations have great 
theoretical potential to improve Parliament’s control and scrutiny of government expenditure, 
but it is far too early to pass judgment on what impact they will have in practice.  
 
Summary of Recommendations  
It is recommended that Parliament consider the following reforms to improve its ability to 
control and scrutinise government expenditure 
 Expand to 150 MPs. 
 Extend the parliamentary term to four years. 
 Review Estimates documentation. 
 Require better outcome specification and measurements of delivery.  
 Review the financial statements and accounting standards.  
 Improve MPs’ access to training on accounting matters.  
 Change the nature of debates on the Budget, Estimates and financial reviews.  
 Review the relationship between Parliament and the Auditor-General. 
 Require the Auditor-General to produce briefings better suited to the needs of 
select committees.  
 Introduce an annual debate on the Auditor-General’s annual report. 
 Increase the funding to the Auditor-General and other assistance services 
provided to MPs.  
 Additional funding to the Auditor-General should also be provided to improve 
the public’s ability to report on apparent waste in the public sector.  
 Further inquiries should be carried out by the FEC. Subcommittees or a separate 
Public Accounts Committee may be necessary to facilitate that.  
 Have the FEC present an annual report.  
 Consider creating a Parliamentary Budget Office or an Independent Fiscal 
Council.   
                                                          
781 New Zealand Parliament, ‘Public Finance Amendment Act 2013’, 17 July 2013, 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2013/0050/latest/DLM5326005.html (10 October 2013).  
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 Do not enact a spending cap but consider alternative options.  
 The FEC should review the changes made by the Public Finance Amendment 
Act 2013 and the Public Finance (Fiscal Responsibility) Act 2013. Such a 
review should occur after the changes have been applied to a full financial year. 
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